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1、ContentsIntroduction3Background4The effects of COVID-19 shock on the Turkish economy6Risks Associated with Non-performing Loans8Financial Risks Associated with the Exchange Rate10Effects of Credit Growth on the Economy10Change in the Composition of Short-Term Funding13Decline in Long-Term Funding15B
2、usiness Conditions16Labour Force and Productivity17Trade Conditions18Tourism21An evaluation of counter-cyclical policies developed to offset the pandemic.Were they successful? What will be the long-run impact?24Conclusion26Abbreviations29List of Figures and Tables30and low interest rate policies. Ra
3、pid credit growth can be a sign of stress and could be a potential trigger for financial crisis. Jorda, O., Schularick, M., and Taylor, A., 2013, When Credit Bites Back, Journal of Money, Cred-it and Banking 45, 3-28.Unlike advanced economies where bank deposits increased during the pandemic (as a r
4、esult of increased demand for safe haven assets), in Turkey the increase in TL loans was not matched by a proportional increase in TL deposits. Instead, the low interest rate environment triggered dollarisation and increased FX deposits and demand for gold instead. s:/uk.reuters.eom/article/uk-turke
5、y-currency-gold/gold-rush-at-turkish-bazaar-a-test-of-tTust:-for-l owlv-lira-idUKKCN25A0H8?il=0 Consequently, loan-to-deposit ratios on TL-denominated assets and liabilities exceeded 140 percent. There has also been a net outflow from the banking system such that the decrease in TL deposits was not
6、exactly matched by an increase in FX deposits, increasing the net borrowing needs of the banking system. While banks could swap these FX deposits for TL at the CBRT, micro-prudential measures such as the active ratio made it more expensive to accept FX deposits and put additional strains on bank bal
7、ance sheets. The active ratio also penalized banks if they did not lend. Figure 7 shows that the net FX position of the banking sector followed a V-shaped pattern and is at pre-COVID levels, eliminating concerns on that front.Figure 7: Banking Sector Net FX PositionQsn) uowsod XLONQsn) uowsod XLON60
8、00400020000-2000-4000-6000-8000-100009TeTzoa Bovzoe gecoosoe ococoomocm golnozsCM wzocooe CO99095CXJ 8040190。 eL&oooe 8&LDOCM电CM?。/ 8 LOT6O。 &896OCM &906L。 CO9360Q LT86OCM 9T二OOOCM Rsooooe 308 Loe 51900003 90-3-oooe 60&ooooeSource: Turkey Data MonitorIn the aftermath of the pandemic, the 13-week mov
9、ing average credit growth reached a peak of 100 percent for commercial loans by mid-May, and 120 percent in mid-August for consumer loans (see Figure 8). Excessive credit growth increases the funding needs of the banking sector and puts pressure on the TL, particularly given the fact that the averag
10、e loan- to-deposit ratio is around 140 percent. Figure 9 shows that the composition of the banking sectors FX debt moved towards short-term loans during the pandemic season where banks were net payers of long-term Ioans, but were able to roll over short-term loans.Figure 8: Credit Growth Rates for C
11、ommercial and Consumer LoansLoan Growth (FX adjusted, 13-week moving average, annualised, %)Total Loans (Non-financial sector)Consumer LoansCommercial Loans。工。6eoe 801000。、 90soeoe COOIOOCMOCM o二LSEe 6eco96Ee 8Q9965CXJ 9H Loe(e&ooEe 47808 Loe 寸LoocoEe coL4ooooe 69eoooEe 89m 990工oe 寸。8。Loe eoooEe Lco
12、ooEe &o:5e gwJLoe 以609 Loe oelnooEe 8vco998e gToCDEe COT二Inoe LLggEe 。工。-gEe 80Ln0LnEe goggoCM eololnEe140120100806040200-20-40Source: Turkey Data MonitorFigure 9: Banking Sector Rollover Ratios of Cross-Border LoansExternal Debt Rollover Ratio, Banking Sector20001000o-1000-2000HO68。 wmoCM-900053 寸
13、ooooe寸。167。、 Looeoe eooeoe 一二65C 806 Loe-3000-4000 -5000 Short-term Long-termSource: CBRTCredit growth has slowed since August 2020, as shown in Figure 10, which displays the change in credit in real terms (orange bars) and the credit impulse (grey bars), With tightening measures in place, loan grow
14、th declined to 40 percent for consumer loans and 10 percent for commercial loans. This is also reflected in credit impulse, which shows the change in credit growth. While the slowdown in credit growth is bad news for the growth rate, it is good news for the exchange rate and macroeconomic balances.
15、The slowdown in credit growth reduces the probability of hard landing moving forward and makes it possible to ease exchange rate pressures as well as the inflation rate. Looking forward however, the rollover needs of the corporate sector might limit the decline in credit growth.Figure 10: Credit Con
16、ditionsSource: CBRTChange in the Composition of Short-Term FundingNet FX reserves of the CBRT declined significantly in 2020. Gross reserves amounted to 42.3 billion USD as of the end of October. Just to provide perspective, gross reserves were as high as 89 billion USD on average over the years bet
17、ween 2008 and 2018. While gross and net reserves declined at a fast pace, part of the decline in FX stock was offset by the increase in short-term debt by the CBRT and the public sector.Looking at the short-term funding of the private sector, we observe a decline in the shortterm external debt of th
18、e private sector which offsets the increase in the short-term external funding of the public sector and the CBRT. Figure 11 displays the evolution of the short-term debt structure for these three sectors in the last two years. Turkey has been experiencing a decline in capital inflows for a while. Th
19、e volatility in the exchange rate and the consequent restrictive measures that were adopted during the pandemic accelerated outflows of shortterm funding. As shown in Figure 12, portfolio flows declined by 15 billion USD over the course of last year while short-term loans (excluding commercial loans
20、) declined by 2 billion USD. While the decline in short-term funding puts pressure on the exchange rate, low levels of funding reduce the scope for further volatility in financial markets and the exchange rate. PublicCBRTa- Private (Right axis)Total (Right axis)200180160140120100806040200906707 cooo
21、CMoe eT6oe36oe 901607 009603eLoooe 60000。900007 80000。Figure 11: Short-Term Debt Structure (Debt with 1 year or shorter maturity, billion $)45 -140 -35 -30 25 -20 15 -10 -5 -0 -Source: TurkStatFinancial Borrowing: Short-term loans, portfolio investment, currency and deposit liabilitiesComponents of
22、Financial Account, Monthly Aggregates(asn UO_=E)(asn UO_=E)6000050000400003000020000100000-10000-20000-30000slnLoe ELnLoe 6048CM gcrnoe 848N 6985Q 3cooe 60CM5CM go&Ee -o&Ee 6。Loe 99二。e 5二。 69ie goooe iooLoeIlli z z z a ooooooooooo (NCMCMCMCMOUOUCMCMCMOdShort-term loans (excluding commercial loans) P
23、ortfolio investmentDeposit liabilitiesSource: Turkey Data MonitorDecline in Long-Term FundingLong-term funding of the non-financial corporate sector has been declining in the last 12 months (see Figure 13), Combined with the weaker TL, some Turkish firms are struggling to repay foreign currency debt
24、, resulting in loan restructurings. On the bright side, depreciation in the TL makes Turkish assets more attractive, which may explain the stable pattern of foreign direct investment. Since the exchange rate crisis in August 2018, the focus for Turkish companies has been on deleveraging, which is th
25、e process whereby businesses pay their debt by accumulating cash, often by selling their assets. Deleveraging is an advantage for the heavily indebted private sector to strengthen its balance sheets. Furthermore, Figure 14 suggests a similar picture as firms in the non-financial sector have been del
26、everaging in recent years. This can be indeed explained by the fact that firms cash holdings display a significant time variation.Figure 13: Corporate Borrowing and FDI(dsn uo=ErE_ol llwolu&L)20000150001000050000-5000-10000-15000寸。oeoe 80啕 寸96S7 oSLOa OLcoLod 807 寸 OOOOCM OCOOCM oTzoe szoe 寸。、OCM L0
27、40OU OT9OQ 69 Loe 寸。，9SCM 8CO0CJ oTgoe 69 Loe 寸。，gse o1nse 0L,bLoe ZOSOCM 寸。L6OCU sgse bqcoLoe OCOOCM OL&oe zo&se 寸。&OCM 8&OZ 。二8d Z9LOZ 悟一二oe OLOL ZOOOCM 3.0 8W aoseLong-Term Non-Financial Private Sector BorrowingDirect InvestmentsSource: Turkey Data MonitorFigure 14: Leverage in Non-financial Corp
28、orate SectorAl5b 山/s1 SS445,0%40,0%35,0%30,0%25,0%20,0%15,0%10,0%5,0%0,0%2009 2010 20112012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019Source: CBRTBusiness ConditionsTurkey has been introducing business-friendly regulations to create an environment fostering business startups and growth. Based on the World B
29、anks ease of doing business index, Turkey moved up from a rank of 43 in 2019 to a rank of 33 in 2020 (Figure 15).Figure 15: Ease of Doing BusinessSource: World Bank, Doing Business DatabaseNevertheless, the quick /patches that were adopted to fight the August 2018 crisis limited foreseeability of th
30、e business environment and received protests from the business community. The Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), one of the largest NGOs representing the Turkish business community, expressed in February 2020 that we must be aware of the negative effects on the investment environmen
31、t caused by changes in legislation concerning the real sector and money markets, unanticipated laws that impact the business world, tax policies that undermine the confidence of economic actors and measures that generate concerns over property rights,. s: tusiad.org/en/press-releases/item/10531-gene
32、ral-assembly-meeting-of-tusiadWhile this warning came prior to the onset of the pandemic, further restrictions were imposed in due course. In April 2020, banks were required to inform the Ministry of Treasury and Finance before making any money transfers from Turkey of 100,000 TL (close to 12,750 US
33、D as of 1 December 2020) or more (or the equivalent in any other currency). In the same month, the rasset ratio, was introduced by the BRSA, which designed a mechanism to punish banks that do not lend or buy government bonds or engage in swaps with the central bank. Another regulation was issued in
34、May 2020 regarding manipulation and misleading transactions in financial markets. A nice summary of these restrictions can be found here: Hakan Yazici, “Will Turkey Attract Foreign Investments after Covid-19?”, Yetkin Report, 14 May 2020, s:yetkinreport /en/2020/05/14/will-turkey- attract?foreign-in
35、vestments-aft:er-covid-19/While this warning came prior to the onset of the pandemic, further restrictions were imposed in due course. In April 2020, banks were required to inform the Ministry of Treasury and Finance before making any money transfers from Turkey of 100,000 TL (close to 12,750 USD as
36、 of 1 December 2020) or more (or the equivalent in any other currency). In the same month, the rasset ratio, was introduced by the BRSA, which designed a mechanism to punish banks that do not lend or buy government bonds or engage in swaps with the central bank. Another regulation was issued in May
37、2020 regarding manipulation and misleading transactions in financial markets. A nice summary of these restrictions can be found here: Hakan Yazici, “Will Turkey Attract Foreign Investments after Covid-19?”, Yetkin Report, 14 May 2020, s:yetkinreport /en/2020/05/14/will-turkey- attract?foreign-invest
38、ments-aft:er-covid-19/Gradual removal of the above-mentioned restrictions or regulations in the second half of 2020 signals a more market-friendly approach and allows greater access to international debt markets. For example, the Treasury sold $2.5 billion Eurobonds in October 2020, following the ra
39、te hike by the CBRT that signalled a return to more orthodox policies.Labour Force and ProductivityEconomic growth can be decomposed into capital accumulation, labour and Total Factor Productivity TFP. In terms of labour, Turkey has a dynamic and flexible population. A young, qualified labour force
40、supported by a strong infrastructure has always been one of the strengths of the Turkish economy. On the other hand, the unemployment rate had been on the rise for some time even before the pandemic started. The duration of the pandemic will be critical because long spells of unemployment may cause
41、permanent damage to the labour force by increasing discouraged workers who drop out of the labour force. The labour force participation rate has been declining since the onset of the August 2018 crisis.Nevertheless, the recent increase in labour force participation likely reflects the stimulus measu
42、res that were put into effect during the pandemic (Figure 16).Figure 16: Labour Force Participation and Employment Rate53549474543439( -pssmpB A-BUOSB s)ooeoCXJ 6968CM S968CXJ L96OCM 6988OU gooooCM ocooe 69ZO。 gzoe O,ZOCM 699OZ 398Q oooe 6o，goe gqgoCM o1nOCM 6。，寸OCM go4oe oGoe 60CO0CM gocoLOCXJ scoo
43、e 60&8CXJ g9eoCM OCMOCM 69LOZ g9Loe o二oe 6OOOCXJ go,ooe OOOCXJ 696。、 996。、 o，6oocm 60CO。、 goooooe o，8ooe 69Z00CM 9。|昌 olooe 699。、 goCDooCM 09007 6990。、 999。、 o，gooeEmployment RateLabour Force Participation rateSource: Turkey Data MonitorOf course, a dynamic labour force does not translate into per c
44、apita income growth. For Turkey to enrich its population, it needs to increase its TFP. Yet, Turkey experienced a significant decline in TFP in the period after 2010. The contribution of TFP to total growth was nil after 2014 where growth was driven by capital accumulation. Baki, 0. and Acar, 2020,
45、Evolution of Total Factor Productivity in Turkish Economy: A Sec-toral Outlook, 1980-2018 (Tiirkiye Ekonomisinde Toplam Faktor Verimliliginin Seyri: Sektorel Baki, 1980-2018), BETAM Working Paper Series No: 19. While the decline in the contribution of TFP is clearly negative for growth prospects, po
46、st-COVID transformation and support for new technologies by the Turkish government, such as solar and wind energy, electric vehicles and unmanned air vehicles, provides an opportunity for Turkey.Due to the redistribution of global supply chains after the pandemic and thanks to its geographical advan
47、tages, Turkey might attract more foreign direct investment, which might result in technology transfer that could in turn translate into higher TFP levels.Trade Conditionsakmakh et al. Cakmakh, C., Demiralp, S., Kalemli, Ozcan, S., Yesiltas, S., and Yildirim, M., 2020, COVID-19 and Emerging Markets:
48、An Epidemiological Model with International Production Networks and Capital Flows, NBER Working Paper No. 27191, akmakh et al. Cakmakh, C., Demiralp, S., Kalemli, Ozcan, S., Yesiltas, S., and Yildirim, M., 2020, COVID-19 and Emerging Markets: An Epidemiological Model with International Production Networks and Capital Flows, NBER Working Paper No. 27191, note that those sectors that are more clo