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1、附录 1：英文原文The Renminbis Dollar Peg at The CrossroadsIn the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationarypressures，China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balanceunder its dollar currencybasket peg.Over the longer term，Chinas large,modernizing，and dive
2、rse economy will need exchange rate flexibility and，eventually，convertibility with open capital markets.A feasible and attractive exitstrategy from the essentially fixed RMB exchange rate would be a two-stageapproach，consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005，but going beyondthem.First，
3、establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket ofmajor trading partner currencies.Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluationof the RMB against the dollar，manage the basket rate within the band if necessary，and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange mark
4、ets develop。Second，put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization。They willbe less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB basket rate isallowed to move flexibly within a band，and they are best postponed until domesticforeign exchange markets develop further，the e
5、xchange rate is fully flexible,and thedomestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-orientedbasis。From 1997 until July 21，2005，the Chinese authorities pegged the renminbi（RMB）price of the United States dollar within a narrow range。On July 21,2005,Chinas authorities moved to
6、an adjustable basket peg against the dollar,with arevaluation of the central RMB/rate of 2.1 percent relative to the prior central rateof RMB 8。28 per dollar。Very notably in view of the claims that Chinas exchange rate policy is dict ated bythe imperative of maintaining an undervalued currency，the a
7、uthorities resistedsubstantial devaluation pressures，at the cost of some deflation，during the Asiancrisis period starting in 1997。For some time now the situation has been reversed，with strong revaluation pressures,speculative capital inflows,and gatheringinflationary momentum in the economy。The abil
8、ity to resist speculative pressurescomes from the maintenance of restrictions on private capital flows,especiallyinflows,as well as from administrative controls useful in restraining inflation。Nonetheless，“hot money”inflows have helped swell Chinas foreign reservesimmensely in recent years.Prior to
9、July 21，2005，most observers，and indeed theChinese government itself,acknowledged that Chinas exchange-rate arrangementswere unsustainable and undesirable as a long-term foundation for responding，without disruptive episodes of inflation or deflation，to inevitable real-side shocks,aswell as to secular
10、 changes in the economy such as real appreciation due toBalassa-Samuelson effects.At the time of unification，the parallel rate already stoodat a depreciated level relative to the official rate.Revaluation-cum-“flexation”is aresponse to the situation，including the external trade pressures it had gene
11、rated，butleaves questions about how flexibility will be exploited in the future。So far,even the 0.3 percent margins of RMB/flexibility that exist have notbeen utilized fully.Furthermore,capital markets that are open to the world seem aprerequisite for a modern high income economy such as China seeks
12、 eventually tobecome.The issues concern the transition.how might China best move toward agenuinely more flexible exchange rate regime。And how might it best dismantlecapital controls。And how might it optimally sequence these two conceptuallydistinct liberalization initiatives.In the following pages I
13、 have four goals。First,to provide a brief overview ofdevelopments in Chinas real exchange rate,external accounts，and inflation，thereby filling in some concomitants of the nominal exchange rate trajectory inFigure。Second，to draw parallels with the experience of Germany（still theworlds premier exporte
14、r）during the Bretton Woods era。Third，to discuss the rathersuccessful experiences of Chile andIsrael in transiting from pegged exchange rateswith capital controls to floating rates with financial opening.Fourth and finally，tosketch a blueprint for gradually flexing the RMBs exchange rate in advance o
15、fcapital-account liberalization。A feature of the basket system is that intervention insupport of the basket rate could still be carried out entirely in the RMB/$market.Thereason is that the basket can be implemented entirely through a variableRMB/$exchange rate target.As a technical matter,the band
16、could be redefined eachmorning using the exchange dollar rates prevailing earlier that day in the Tokyomarkets。Or it could be updated more frequently。The decision to peg to a basket isalso separable in principle from the decision on the denomination of foreign-currencyreserves。Diversification of off
17、icial reserves in line with the basket weights wouldserve to stabilize the value of reserves in terms of RMB，but is not otherwise anecessary adjunct of a basket peg system.Once market forces are given greater play in determining the daytoday valueof the RMB/rate,the RMB might well move initially to
18、the strong edge of anyband that was established.For that reason,it is important that the existing capital flowcontrols not be dismantled until the exchange rate bands have been widened to thepoint where a managed float has been achieved.The move toa currency band，aband that could be widened over tim
19、e，would render superfluous some of the ad hocliberalization measures that have been deployed to ease exchangerate pressures。Manydiscussionsmakeinsufficientdistinctionbetweenenhancedexchangeflexibility,which can be achieved(with less currency volatility）under restrictedinternational financial flows，a
20、nd openness of the financial account。The two arecompletely different，and a less risky sequencing would tackle the full gradualrelaxation of financialaccount controls only after the achievement of a good degreeof exchange-rate flexibility。Eichengreen（2005)and Prasad,Rumbaugh，andWang（2005)lay out the
21、case for this sequencing in greater detail。The manifesthazards of opening to inflows in the current setting of domestic banking-systemweakness furnishes one of the most compelling arguments for placing furtherdecontrol of the financial account on the back burner.In the face of huge balance ofpayment
22、s surpluses and internal inflationary pressures,China has been in a classicconflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency peg.Over the longer term,Chinas large，modernizing,and diverse economy will needexchange rate flexibility,and eventually，currency convertibility with ope
23、n capitalmarkets.A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed RMBexchange rate would be the following two stage approach,consistent with the stepsalready taken since July 2005，but going beyond them：Establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major tradi
24、ngpartner currencies.Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMBagainst the dollar。Manage the basket rate within the band if necessary，and widenthe band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop。Possibly allow atrend crawl in the band to accommodate long run real
25、exchange rate changes due tostructural changes along BalassaSamuelson lines。Put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization.They will be lesshelpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB/basket rate is allowed tomove flexibly within a band，and they are best postponed unt
26、il domestic foreignexchange markets develop further，the exchange rate is fully flexible,and thedomestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-orientedbasis。Only a resilient financial sector will be able to withstand the occasional sharpinterest-rate changes that the monetary
27、authorities may find necessary whether theyare responding to incipient unwanted exchange-rate movements or to domesticinflationary pressures.附录 2：中文译文人民币汇率在十字路口面对巨大的收支盈余和内部通货膨胀的压力，中国一直处在一个经典的其货币盯住一篮子货币的汇率机制下的内部和外部平衡之间的冲突。长远看来，中国的大型现代化和多元化的经济将需要汇率灵活性，并最终开放资本市场的可兑换。一个可行的和有吸引力的出口战略，从本质上固定人民币汇率将会是一个两阶段的
28、方法，一致与 2005 年 7 月以来已经采取步骤，但超越他们.首先，为与人民币有关的一篮子主要贸易伙伴的货币建立一个有限的交易带。建立传送带,以便允许一些人民币对美元原始的估价,如果有必要,可以再这个地带管理一篮子货币汇率，随着国内外汇市场的发展，还可以拓宽这个地带。第二,暂缓特设金融市场自由化措施。他们将很难帮助缓解人民币汇率升值压力,一旦人民币汇对一篮子汇率可以允许在一个地带灵活移动，最好推迟直到国内外汇市场进一步发展,汇率完全灵活，国内的金融体制加强，并放在一个以市场为导向的基础之上。从 1997 年到 2005 年 7 月 21 日，中国当局把用美元表示的人民币的价值限制在一个较窄的
29、范围内.2005 年 7 月 21 日,中国当局开始实行兑美元的可调节的一篮子货币的汇率，相对于之前的中间价 8.28 元/美元，人民币对美元汇率升值2。1%。在从 1997 年开始的亚洲金融危机期间，他们很明显针对宣称中国汇率政策被称作是维持一个被低估的货币,当局抵抗实质性的贬值压力，以通货紧缩为代价。一段时间以来,形势已经逆转，人民币具有较强的升值压力,投机资本流入,并在经济中聚集了通货膨胀的势头.能够抵御来自维护限制私人资本流动的投机压力,以及从行政管制有效地抑制通货膨胀，尤其是资本的流入。尽管如此,在最近的几年里,“热钱”的流入加剧了中国外汇储备的极大的膨胀。在 2005 年 7 月
30、21 日之前，大多数观察家，事实上，中国政府本身,承认中国的汇率安排作为长期的基础是不能成立的，不和需要的，没有破坏性的发作的通货膨胀或通货紧缩,必然是真正几个方面的冲击,以及对经济的长期变化，比如说由于巴拉萨萨缪尔森效应引起的长期的增值。在联合的时候,平行汇率已达到一个相对于贬值官方利率水平。附带增长的货币增长是一种情境化的反应，包括对外贸易已经产生的压力，但是遗留下来关于如何开发未来的灵活性的问题.到目前为止，甚至人民币对美元的汇率弹性0.3%的利润还没有被充分利用。此外，资本市场对世界开放似乎是一种现代高收入经济的前提,比如中国寻求最终的实现。这个问题涉及到中国如何更好地向真正的更好的更
31、灵活的汇率机制转变，它将如何最好的废除资本控制，它将如何最佳优化那两个概念性的明显的自由化的主动权序列。在接下来的文章中我有四个目标。首先，提供一个简要概述，关于中国实际汇率的发展、外部账户和通货膨胀,从而填充一些与名义汇率共存的轨迹图。第二，画出德国的经验（仍然是世界首要的出口商)在布雷顿森林体系时代的经验。第三，讨论了智利和以色列人从固定汇率和资本管制到浮动利率金融开放成功的经验.第四，最后勾画出逐渐弯曲的人民币汇率转移到了资本帐户自由化之前的蓝图.一篮子货币汇率制度的一个特征是介入以支一篮子货币汇率能够继续执行人民币/美元完全市场。究其原因是，一篮子货币能够完全地实现，通过一个可变的人民
32、币/美元汇率目标。作为一个技术问题,这个地带能被重定义每天早上使用的在东京市场上的前一天的兑换美元的汇率。或者，这也可能被更频繁地更新.紧盯住一篮子货币的决定也是可以分离的原则上也可从外汇储备的等级决定。官方储备的多样化与一篮子货币的重要性相一致能够服务于人民币储备价值的稳定，而不是盯住一篮子货币体系的必要的辅助。一旦市场力量决定了参加日常的更大价值人民币/美元汇率，人民币或许能够首先更好地移动到任何确定的边缘地带。因此，重要的是要从现有资本流量控制被取消，直到达到有管理的浮动被拓宽了汇率边缘的地步。向货币边缘的移动，一个随着时间的推移能够被拓宽的边缘，也许会导致一些多余的特设的部署缓解汇率的
33、压力的自由化措施。许多讨论使区分外汇灵活性增强不足，就可以实现(用较少的汇率波动）在限制国际金融流动和开放性金融帐户。这两者是完全不同的,一个风险较小的次序将解决逐渐放松金融账户充分的控制只能在实现一个较高的汇率的灵活性的很高的自由度之后.格林(2005 年)和普拉萨德,鲁姆博夫，王建民（2005)展示出更详细的细节的问题。在现在的环境下，明显的障碍开放流动表现在危害流入国内当前设置国立银行弱点提供的一个最令人信服的论据下单进一步的取消金融账户暂时搁置.面对巨大的收支盈余和内部通胀压力,中国一直在一个经典的内部和外部平衡之间的冲突在它的美元货币盯住美元的汇率机制。长远看来，中国的大型现代化和多
34、元的经济需要汇率灵活性，最终,货币兑换开放资本市场.一个可行的和有吸引力的退出策略从本质上是固定的人民币汇率将下列两阶段方法，符合 2005 年 7 月以来的步骤已经采取,但可能超越他们。建立一个与人民币相关的一篮子货币相关的主要交易合作伙伴的货币的有限交易带。设置一个边缘带以便它允许人民币对美元汇率的货币升值.在可能的情况下于边缘地带管理一篮子货币汇率，如果有必要，可以随时间流逝拓宽边缘带,依照国内外汇市场发展。可能使得趋势中变动,由于调整长期的实际的汇率变动所致沿着萨谬尔森线结构变化。搁置的临时措施金融账户自由化.他们将会减少帮助缓解压力一旦人民币对一篮子货币汇率是允许在一个边缘带灵活移动，他们最好推迟到国内外外汇市场进一步发展，汇率是完全灵活，国内金融系统已经增强，放置在一个以市场为导向依据。只有有弹性的金融部门能够承受偶尔锋利利率调整，货币当局是否会发现有必要的-他们因应汇率变化或不必要的初期国内通货膨胀的压力。