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1、Afghanistan: Backqround and U.S. Policy: In BriefContentsIntroduction 1Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement1U.S. Military Drawdown 2Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown: Afghan Forces and Security Dynamics3Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown: Democracy and Human Rights in Afghanistan6Intra-Afghan Talks and E
2、fforts to Achieve a Settlement 8Accelerated U.S. Diplomatic Efforts9Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors10Economy and U.S. Aid 11Outlook and Issues for Congress 12FiguresFigure 1. Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts in Afghanistan4ContactsAuthor Information13Congressional Research
3、ServiceAccelerated U.S. Diplomatic E仔ortsIn spring 2021, with talks in Doha having made no evident progress, the Biden Administration launched an intensified U.S. diplomatic push to broker an intra-Afghan agreement. On March 7, 2021, the Afghan media outlet TOLOnews published an undated letter repor
4、tedly from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to President Ghani. When asked about the accuracy of reports about the letter and draft peace proposal on March 8, 2021, State Department Spokesman Ned Price said, Tm not going to be able to comment on any reported private correspondence.” U.S. Depar
5、tment of State, Department Press Briefing, March 8, 2021. In the letter, Secretary Blinken reportedly asked President Ghani to exercise urgent leadership in forming a united fronf, with other Afghan political leaders.5)Thomas Gibbons-Neff, David Zucchino, and Lara Jakes, U.S. Pushes U.N.-led Confere
6、nce in Letter to Afghan Leader/ New York Times, March 7, 2021. Text of the letter available at s:/tolonews /pdf702.pdf. Exclusive: Details of Proposed Draft for Afghan Peace, TOLOnews, March 7, 2021. Muhammad Naeem (IeaOffice), Twitter, April 13, 2021,3:59PM.The United States also reportedly prepare
7、d a draft peace proposal for consideration by Afghan negotiators (the text of which was also published by TOLOnews), The document, which is described as intended to jumpstarf, talks by providing concrete power-sharing alternatives, proposes the formation of a transitional peace government,including
8、the selection of a new president acceptable to both sides.,，6 The document also proposes possible changes to the Afghan parliament and provincial councils (in both cases by either adding Taliban members to the current bodies or suspending them during the transitional government); the creation of a n
9、ew High Council for Islamic Jurisprudence to treview legislation “to ensure compliance with Islam; and the writing of a new Constitution by a 21 -member commission.The culmination of these U.S. efforts was to be a senior-level meeting in Istanbul, Turkey in late April to finalize an agreement,per Se
10、cretary Blinkens letter. On April 13, shortly after the publication of reports about President Bidens decision to maintain U.S. troops in Afghanistan beyond May 1, a Taliban spokesman wrote on Twitter that ujntil all foreign forces completely withdraw from our homeland.the Taliban will not participa
11、te in any conference that shall make decisions about Afghanistan.,，61 Turkey has postponed the meeting indefinitely, and the Taliban reportedly have refused to attend unless the meeting is short and comprised of low-level delegations who will not make decisions on critical issues. Tahir Khan, “VOA E
12、xclusive: Taliban Attach Conditions to Istanbul Conference Participation,VOA, May 25, 2021. Hamid Shalizi, Exclusive: Afghan president, rejecting US peace plan, to offer election in six months, officials say J Reuters, March 23, 2021; Taliban slam Afghan presidents proposal for new election,France24
13、, March 24, 2021; “Ghani will not run in any eventual election,Afghanistan Times, April 3, 2021.For his part, President Ghani has proposed a presidential election within six months in which he would not run, per a top advisor; in response to those reports, the Taliban rejected such a plan, arguing t
14、hat previous elections had “pushed the country to the verge of crisis.代 President Ghani is widely viewed as severely weakened and isolated, and U.S. officials have reportedly “lost patience with him and his refusal to consider stepping down. Adam Nossiter, Afghan President in Desperate Situation9 as
15、 His Power Is Undermined,v New York Times, April 10,2021.Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other NeighborsRegional dynamics, and the involvement of outside powers, directly affect the conflict in Afghanistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, which has
16、played an active, and by many accounts negative, role in Afghan affairs for decades. Pakistans security services maintain ties to Afghan insurgent groups, most notably the Haqqani Network.6、For more, see CRS In Focus IF 10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.R
17、egional dynamics, and the involvement of outside powers, directly affect the conflict in Afghanistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, which has played an active, and by many accounts negative, role in Afghan affairs for decades. Pakistans security s
18、ervices maintain ties to Afghan insurgent groups, most notably the Haqqani Network.6、For more, see CRS In Focus IF 10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas. Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, have attributed much of the insurgency9s power and l
19、ongevity either directly or indirectly to Pakistani support. White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. Some Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Talibans increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself. Author in
20、terviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018. Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad/ The Hindu, February 9, 2019. Baradar had been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010. Baqi
21、r Sajjad Syed, Pentagon chief praises Pakistans role in Afghan peace process,“ Dawn, March 23, 2021. The Trump Administration sought Islamabads assistance in U.S. talks with the Taliban after 2018, and U.S. assessments of Talibans role have generally been more positive since. For example, Khalilzad
22、thanked Pakistan for releasing Baradar from custody in October 2018 and for facilitating the travel of Taliban figures to talks in Doha, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin expressed gratitude to his Pakistani counterpart in March 2021 for Pakistans continued support for the Afghan peace process.,
23、，67 Pakistani leaders assert, however, that their country will not host U.S. bases after the military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan refused to give military bases to US: FM, Pakistan Today, June 8, 2021.Despite official Pakistani leaderships statements to the contrary, Islamabad may view a w
24、eak and destabilized Afghanistan as preferable to a strong, unified Afghan state (particularly one led by an ethnic Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul; Pakistan has a large and restive Pashtun minority). Pashtuns are an ethnic group that makes up about 40% of Afghanistans 35 million people and 15
25、% of Pakistans 215 million; they thus represent a plurality in Afghanistan but are a relatively small minority in Pakistan, though Pakistans Pashtun population is considerably larger than Afghanistan. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of over one million Afghan r
26、efugees in Pakistan, as well as a long-running and ethnically tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile border. Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but Afghanistan does not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plagui
27、ng Afghan-Pakistani Relations, Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017. Pakistans security establishment, fearful of strategic encirclement by India, apparently continues to view the Afghan Taliban as a relatively friendly and reliably anti-India element in Afghanistan. Indias diplomatic and commercial
28、 presence in Afghanistanand U.S. rhetorical support for itexacerbates Pakistani fears of encirclement. India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction, but New Delhi has not shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defense relationship with Kabul and, according to one June 20
29、21 media report, has “opened channels of communication with Taliban leaders. Rezaul Laskar, 4tIn a huge shift, India opens channels with Afghan Taliban factions and leaders,Hindustan Times, June 9, 2021.Afghanistan maintains mostly cordial ties with its other neighbors, notably the post-Soviet state
30、s of Central Asia, whose role in Afghanistan has been relatively limited but could increase. Humayun Hamidzada and Richard Ponzio, Central Asias Growing Role in Building Peace and Regional Connectivity with Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace, August 2019. In the past two years, multiple U
31、.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of support for theTaliban from Russia and Iran, both of which have cited the Islamic State affiliate presence in Afghanistan to justify their activities. Both were reported in 2020 to have been more directly involved, including possibly supporting Talib
32、an attacks against U.S. forces. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S. Troops, Intelligence Says,“ New York Times. June 26, 2020. Additionally, in October 2018, the Trump Administration sanctioned several Iranian military off
33、icials for providing support to the Taliban. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Sanction Taliban Facilitators and their Iranian Supporters, October 23, 2018.Taliban from Russia and Iran, both of which have cited the Islamic State affiliate
34、 presence in Afghanistan to justify their activities. Both were reported in 2020 to have been more directly involved, including possibly supporting Taliban attacks against U.S. forces. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S. T
35、roops, Intelligence Says,“ New York Times. June 26, 2020. Additionally, in October 2018, the Trump Administration sanctioned several Iranian military officials for providing support to the Taliban. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Sancti
36、on Taliban Facilitators and their Iranian Supporters, October 23, 2018. Both nations were opposed to the Taliban government of the late 1990s, but reportedly see the Taliban as a useful point of leverage vis-a-vis the United States. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority for China in the
37、context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally. See, for example, Barbara Kelemen, “Chinas Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the Table? Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020.Economy and U.S. AidIn addition to its long-standing military presence, the United
38、States has provided considerable development assistance to Afghanistan. Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated approximately $144 billion in overall aid for Afghanistan, with about 61% for security and 25% for governance and development (with the remaining 14% for civilian operations and humanitari
39、an aid). SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020.In addition to its long-standing military presence, the United States has provided considerable development assistance to Afghanistan. Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated approximately $144 billion in overall aid for
40、Afghanistan, with about 61% for security and 25% for governance and development (with the remaining 14% for civilian operations and humanitarian aid). SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020. DODs quarterly Cost of War report estimated the cost of U.S. combat operations
41、 (including related regional support activities and support for Afghan forces) as of December 2020 at $824.9 billion since FY2002.The U.S. military withdrawal could affect the level and types of assistance the United States may provide to Afghanistan. Some Members have raised concerns that a withdra
42、wal might impair the United States ability to monitor the distribution and effectiveness of U.S. aid, a long-standing U.S. concern. See Senator Reeds remarks at Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on U.S. Central Command, February 5, 2019. Additionally, the number of personnel present in Afghanis
43、tan under Chief of Mission authority (mostly State Department or USAID personnel) declined steadily during the Trump Administration and significantly after the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic began.Furthermore, U.S. assistance may affect, and in turn be affected by, intra-Afghan talks a
44、nd a potential settlement. Special Representative Khalilzad said in September 2020 congressional testimony that we are committed for the long term in terms of providing assistance to Afghanistan,“ but that U.S. decisions would depend on the outcome of Afghan negotiations, as other U.S. officials hav
45、e emphasized. House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Afghanistan Strategy, September 22, 2020. For example, Secretary Pompeo told intra-Afghan negotiators in Doha that their choices and conduct will affect both the size and scope of United States future assista
46、nce.” The appropriation of assistance funding remains a congressional prerogative. It is unclear to what extent (if at all) the prospect of changes to U.S. and international financial assistance might put pressure on or create U.S. leverage over the behavior and policies of the Taliban or the Afghan
47、 government. For more, see Live Event: What Does the Taliban Want?, Wilson Center, October 6, 2020.U.S. and international development assistance could become more critical if a U.S. and allied military withdrawal further weakens Afghanistans economy, already among the worlds smallest.Afghanistans gr
48、oss domestic product (GDP) has grown an average of 7% per year since 2003, but growth rates averaged between 2% and 3% in recent years and decades of war have stunted the development of most domestic industries. President Ghani said in July 2020 that 90% of Afghans live below the government-determin
49、ed poverty level of two dollars a day. Anisa Shaheed, “Ghanis Afghan Poverty Estimate Catastrophic: Analysts,TOLOnews, July 20, 2020. 8 “The Economic Disaster Behind Afghanistans Mounting Human Crisis,International Crisis Group, October 3, 2016. The withdrawal of a U.S. force much smaller than that of a decade ago would seem to have less dramatic second-order economic effects for Afghanistan than d