《中国碳市场在电力行业低碳转型中的作用.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《中国碳市场在电力行业低碳转型中的作用.docx（94页珍藏版）》请在taowenge.com淘文阁网|工程机械CAD图纸|机械工程制图|CAD装配图下载|SolidWorks_CaTia_CAD_UG_PROE_设计图分享下载上搜索。
1、AbstractThe Peoples Republic of China (China)officially launched its national emissions trading system (ETS) in 2017, and it will come into operation in 2021. Initially covering the power sector, which accounts for over 40% of Chinas energy-related CO2 emissions, the ETS is set to subsequently be ex
2、panded to other energy- intensive sectors. Chinas national ETS could be an important market-based instrument to help the country meet its recently enhanced climate goals to have CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.This report explores how Chinas ETS can spur emis
3、sions reductions from electricity generation and support power sector transformation. It builds on understanding of power sector development and policy trends and relies on indepth national and provincial scenario modelling of Chinas power system from 2020 to 2035. This study also analyses how the E
4、TSs output- and rate-based design affects overall power sector emissions, technologies and costs, and regional distribution. Finally, it recommends ways Chinas ETS can play a stronger role in incentivising cost-effective and structural power sector decarbonisation to support the countrys long-term c
5、limate ambitions.一= 山一Carbon-Pricing Scenario (a drop of around 570 Mt CO2, equivalent to Canadas total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in 2018).The ETS would drive emissions reductions mainly by improving the efficiency of coal-fired power generation, particularly between 2020 and 2030, and by e
6、nlarging the deployment of carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) in the power sector from 2030. With technology-specific benchmarks and free allocation, the impact of the ETS on fuel-switching away from coal is nevertheless limited.Figure 2 Factors yielding additional emissions reductions i
7、n the ETS Scenariocompared with the No-Carbon-Pricing Scenario, 2025-2035203020350000 000 12 3 - - -do in Switch from fossil to nonfossil technologies Coal-to-gas switchis Switch from unabated coal to coal+CCS-400 Switch from less- to more-efficient coal technologies-500 Technology efficiency improv
8、ements-600IEA. All rights reserved.In combination with the power sector reform, an ETS with free allowance allocation could achieve these emissions reductions by 2035 while the average electricity cost remains at the 2020 level.5 In addition, the ETS would be more cost-effective than using mandatory
9、 energy consumption standards for coal-fired power plants, delivering the same emissions reductions at lower additional system costs.ETS allocation design encourages efficiency in coal-fired power generation and in the capacity mixWith its installed capacity having increased fourfold since 2000 to r
10、each 1 007 GW in 2018, Chinas coal-fired power fleet is today the world5s largest, as well as one of the youngest and most efficient (IEA, 2020a). Nevertheless, less-efficient units such as subcritical units still represent almost half of China5s operational coal-fired5 The electricity cost reflects
11、 the average system cost per unit of electricity generated. Under free allocation, entities receive allowances for free, and total allowance surpluses and deficits among entities balance out at the system level, limiting the increase in system costs.EG A p2 T- E G Apower capacity. Managing its coal-
12、fired fleet will be essential for China to achieve its emissions reduction objectives and clean energy transition.With its output-based allowance allocation design, the ETS will prompt more efficient unabated coal-fired power generation, Unabated coal power generation refers to coal-fired power gene
13、ration lacking any technology to substantially reduce its CO2 emissions, such as CCUS. as units achieving emissions intensities below the applicable benchmark could sell surplus allowances while those exceeding the benchmark would need to purchase them. The benchmarking approach and the shift to eco
14、nomic dispatch would encourage high-efficiency units to run significantly more than they currently do. In the ETS Scenario, generation from ultra-supercritical units accounts for 66% of the coal-fired power mix in 2025 and 94% of unabated coal-based generation by 2035. Meanwhile, less-efficient and
15、(usually) older units would either serve as back-up capacity with low annual running hours or be retired.In addition to changing operating patterns, the ETS can accelerate the replacement of less-efficient units by the most high-performing ones. In the ETS Scenario, nearly 150 GW of subcritical, hig
16、h-pressure and circulating fluidised bed (CFB) units would retire between 2020 and 2030, 43% more than in the NoCarbon-Pricing Scenario. The drive for efficiency under the ETS would increase the capacity factor of more-efficient coal-fired units, but it could also incentivise more construction of ne
17、w efficient coal-fired power capacity than the No-Carbon- Pricing Scenario by 2030.The average energy consumption of unabated coal-fired units could fall to 275 grammes of standard coal equivalent per kWh (gce/kWh) by 2035 in the ETS Scenario, which would be an 11% reduction from the 13th FYP target
18、 of 310 gce/kWh for coal-fired units in operation in 2020. As a result, the emissions intensity of unabated coal-fired power generation could decrease to 764 g CO2/kWh, 5% below the projected level without ETS implementation.Current ETS design has the potential to support CCUS technology uptake in t
19、he power sector by 2030The current ETS allowance allocation design has the potential to promote CCUS technology deployment in the power sector from 2030 onwards by allowing units equipped with carbon capture technology to gain revenues by selling surplus allowances. If applying the benchmark for lar
20、ge coal-fired power units to CCUS-equipped units, the ETS could provide a substantial financial incentive for coal+CCUS technology and make it cost-competitive in certain regions by 2030.In the ETS Scenario, generation from CCUS-equipped coal-fired units would account for 3% of total coal-fired powe
21、r generation by 2030 and 8% by 2035. By displacing more than 470 TWh of unabated coal-fired power generation, the deployment of this technology could avoid nearly 300 Mt CO2 of electricity generation emissions in 2035 and reduce the average emissions intensity of coal- fired generation to around 710
22、 g COz/kWh.Technical specificities of the ETS, such as allocation design and exemption rules, could drive the introduction of less-carbon-intensive technologies in co-ordination with other support policies.Multiple benchmarks and free allocation limit incentives to switch to gas and non-fossil sourc
23、esWhile the ETS could provide an incentive for Chinas coal-fired power fleet to become more efficient and potentially use CCLIS technology, its promotion of gas- fired power and non-fossil alternatives would be limited under the current outputbased design with multiple benchmarks and free allocation
24、.The output-based design grants units allowances in proportion to their production activities, encouraging plants in each technology category to reduce their emissions intensity to below the applicable benchmark so that they gain an allowance surplus rather than a deficit. Under a certain allowance
25、price, the effective carbon cost (e.g. in CNY per kWh of generation produced) applying to a power unit would also depend on its performance relative to the benchmark. While having multiple benchmarks could help address distributional effects among technologies, they actually differentiate the effect
26、s of emissions trading for the various technologies even more than using a single benchmark would (Goulder et al., 2020).As the benchmarks for coal- and gas-fired units are separate and Chinas ETS currently does not include non-fossil sources directly, entities covered by the ETS could receive surpl
27、us allowances for coal-fired units with relatively low emissions intensities but would not necessarily gain any revenue by switching from coal to gas or nuclear or renewables. Meanwhile, under an output-based design with free allocation, units need to pay for allowances only if they perform below th
28、e applicable benchmark and have an allowance deficit, which also limits the effective carbon cost imposed on emitting units and thus reduces the incentive for fuel switching.Page|13,g) UJIn the ETS Scenario with free output-based allocation and technology-specific benchmarks, generation from gas and
29、 non-fossil sources would be only marginally higher than in the No-Carbon-Pricing Scenario by 2035. As wind- and solar-based generation would not be specifically encouraged, they would remain at roughly the same level in 2035 in both scenarios. Capitalising on the ETSs untapped potential to encourag
30、e fuel switching could further enhance its ability to drive emissions reductions and power sector transformation.Introducing auctioning in an output-based ETS could lead to even greater power sector decarbonisationUnder an output-based ETS, total emissions are not limited by a fixed cap but depend o
31、n production activities and benchmarks applied. With free allowance allocation, the carbon cost imposed by the ETS remains limited, as only entities facing allowance deficits need to purchase allowances for compliance. Conversely, introducing auctions would require most entities to purchase a certai
32、n amount of allowances, raising the effective carbon cost faced by emitters and making it less attractive to raise the allowance volume through production choices. Auctioning could thus reduce emissions even further.In the ETS Auctioning Scenario, with the share of auctioning increasing after 2025 a
33、nd gradually reaching 50% in 2035, carbon emissions from electricity generation could peak at a lower level than under free allowance allocation, reducing annual electricity generation emissions by an additional 10% (nearly 500 Mt CO2) in 2035. Auctioning could therefore cut electricity system CO2 e
34、missions to below the 2020 level by 2035.Implementing allowance auctions would strengthen the competitiveness of renewables-, nuclear- and gas-based technologies vis-a-vis coal-fired plants, leading to faster decommissioning of existing coal-fired units and fewer installations of new ones. Moderate
35、auctioning could reduce the share of unabated coal-fired power generation in the mix to below 40% by 2035, compared with nearly 50% in the ETS Scenario. Compared with free allowance allocation, auctioning would double gas-fired generation in 2035 and increase generation from wind (by 10%) and solar
36、(by over 40%). The higher the share of allowance auctioning, the deeper and quicker power sector decarbonisation is likely to be.Page|14Moderately raising the share of allowances auctioned over time would keep total system cost increases in check while creating revenues that could be used towards th
37、e clean energy transition and technology development as well as to address electricity affordability and equity. In the ETS Auctioning Scenario, annual revenues generated by allowance auctioning could reach CNY 685 billion (USD 99 billion) in 2035, counterbalancing a substantial portion of the incre
38、ase in total system costs.Regional distributional effects could arise under the ETSEquity concerns at the regional level could emerge if allowance surpluses and deficits are distributed unevenly, depending on a regions generation mix.In the ETS Scenario, regions with a higher share of ultra-supercri
39、tical units could benefit from the ETS in 2020, while those with more subcritical and high-pressure units were likely to face additional costs. With the tightening of benchmarks and greater CCUS deployment, regional distributional effects could change significantly and widen over time. Regions with
40、CCUS-equipped coal-fired units have the potential to gain high allowance surpluses while all unabated coal-fired power technologies would accrue deficits by 2035. Combined with a higher allowance price, the monetised impact could further widen regional disparities. Addressing potential equity issues
41、 could be important to strengthen fairness and political acceptance of the ETS.5 1- E G ApaAJes。sr2= u-Policy recommendationsThe national ETS becoming operational is an important step in Chinas climate policy development and expanded market mechanism use. To help the ETS incentivise more cost-effect
42、ive and structural power sector decarbonisation, and to further align its short- and medium-term effects with Chinas ambitions of reaching peak emissions before 2030 and attaining carbon neutrality before 2060, China could:1. Tighten its ETS benchmarks and gradually merge them to enhance the effecti
43、veness of the output-based design.2. Accelerate power market reform to amplify the effects of the ETS.3. Introduce allowance auctioning to provide stronger signals for fuel switching and to generate revenues.4. Transition to a mass-based design with a fixed cap to guarantee emissions trajectory cert
44、ainty and support its emissions-peaking and carbon-neutrality goals.5. Strengthen policy co-ordination for ETS implementation in the power sector and its expansion to other industrial sectors, e.g. co-ordinate it with renewables deployment, energy efficiency and CCUS support policies.Tighten and gra
45、dually merge benchmarks to enhance the effectiveness of the output-based ETSStringent benchmarks will be essential for an output-based ETS to drive power sector decarbonisation, as benchmarks guide the emissions intensity trajectory and determine the total number of allowances for given output level
46、s.Gradually lowering the benchmark values will be crucial for the ETS to be consistently effective and to support China in meeting its climate goals. As average fleet efficiency improves as older units are retired and a greater share of generation comes from more efficient technologies, the average
47、emissions intensity of thermal power generation will decrease over time. The benchmark trajectory should integrate such improvements and reduce the risk of overallocation while continuing to provide further incentives to achieve the intended transition objectives. Depending on the stringency of the
48、initial benchmarks and the evolution of the power fleet, the rate of benchmark tightening could be gradually adjusted for a smooth transition, before being accelerated to meet higher policy ambitions.In parallel, merging benchmarks will reduce the differentiation of carbon price signals for different technologies and guide more cost-effective emissions reductions. Gradually transforming the multi-benchmark design into a singlePage|16benchmark will optimise emissions abatement options across a larger group of technologies and assets, increasing the economic efficiency of the ETS and its en