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1、财务风险外文翻译 公司财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献 中英文资料外文翻译外文资料Financial rm bankruptcy and systemic riskIn Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG), themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remaine
2、d with the insurer. Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIGs credit default swaps (CDSs). The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIGs assets, with no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue t
3、o function as before. Thus, the governments effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that rms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result. The concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-vis CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008.In
4、 contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related rms. This decision is consistent with the view in macroeconomicresearch that financialrmbankr
5、uptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies. For example, Bordo and Haubrich (2009) conclude that “.more severe nancial events are associated withmore severe recessions.” Likewise, Bernanke (1983) argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in th
6、e banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious balance sheets and tighter credit conditions. This in turn leads to a drop in inve
7、stment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn. Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at nonnancial rms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not be so severe.We argue instead that the contagious impact of a nonfinancial firms bankrup
8、tcy is expected to be far larger than that of a financial rm like AIG, although neither would be catastrophic to the U.S. economy through counterparty risk channels. This is not to say that an episode ofwidespread financial distress among our largest banks would not be followed by an especially seve
9、re recession, only that such failures would not cause a recession or affect the depth of a recession. Rather such bankruptcies are symptomatic of common factors in portfolios that lead to wealth losses regardless of whether any firm les for bankruptcy.Pervasive nancial fragility may occur because th
10、e failure of one rm leads to the failure of other rms which cascades through the system (e.g., Davis and Lo, 1999; Jarrow and Yu, 2001). Or systemic risk may wreak havoc when a number of nancial rms fail simultaneously, as in the Great Depression when more than 9000 banks failed (Benston, 1986). In
11、the former case, the failure of one rm, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, could lead to widespread failure through nancial contracts such as CDSs. In the latter case, the fact that so many nancial institutions have failed means that both the money supply and the amount of credit in the e
12、conomy could fall so far as to cause a large drop in economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1971).While a weak nancial systemcould cause a recession, the recession would not arise because one rm was allowed to le bankruptcy. Further, should one or the other rmgo bankrupt, the nonnancial rmwould h
13、ave the greater impact on the economy.Such extreme real effects that appear to be the result of nancial rm fragility have led to a large emphasis on the prevention of systemic risk problems by regulators. Foremost among these policies is “too big to fail” (TBTF), the logic of which is that the failu
14、re of a large nancial institution will have ramifications for other nancial institutions and therefore the risk to the economywould be enormous. TBTF was behind the Feds decisions to orchestrate the merger of Bear Stearns and J.P.Morgan Chase in 2008, its leadership in the restructuring of bank loan
15、s owed by Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), and its decision to prop up AIG. TBTF may be justied if the outcome is prevention of a major downswing in the economy. However, if the systemic risks in these episodes have been exaggerated or the salutary effects of these actions overestimated, then th
16、e cost to the efciency of the capital allocation system may far outweigh any potential benets from attempting to avoid another Great Depression.No doubt, no regulator wants to take the chance of standing down while watching over another systemic risk crisis, sowe do not have the ability to examine e
17、mpiricallywhat happens to the economy when regulators back off. There are very fewinstances in themodern history of the U.S.where regulators allowed the bankruptcy of amajor nancial rm.Most recently,we can point to the bankruptcy of Lehman,which the Fed pointedly allowed to fail.However,with only on
18、e obvious casewhere TBTFwas abandoned, we have only an inkling of how TBTF policy affects systemic risk. Moreover, at the same time that Lehman failed, the Fed was intervening in the commercial paper market and aiding money marketmutual fundswhile AIGwas downgraded and subsequently bailed out. In ad
19、dition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were scaremongering about the prospects of a second Great Depression to make the passage of TARPmore likely. Thuswewill never knowifthemarket downturn that followed the Lehman bankruptcy reected fear of contagion from Lehman to the real economy or fear of
20、 the depths of existing problems in the real economy that were highlighted so dramatically by regulators.In this paper we analyze the mechanisms by which such risk could cause an economy-wide col-lapse.We focus on two types of contagion that might lead to systemic risk problems: (1) information cont
21、agion,where the information that one nancial rmis troubled is associatedwith negative shocksat other nancial institutions largely because the rms share common risk factors; or (2) counterparty contagion,where one important nancial institutions collapse leads directly to troubles at other cred-itor r
22、ms whose troubles snowball and drive other rms into distress. The efcacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms dominates.Counterparty contagion may warrant intervention in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does not.If regulators d
23、o not step in to bail out an individual rm, the alternative is to let it fail. In the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the rmare very quickly repaid. In contrast, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay
24、closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 ling of a nonnancial rm. However, if the nonbank nancial rm inquestion has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation (SIPC), the rmis required by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act (SIPA) to liquidate under
25、Chapter 7 (Don and Wang, 1990). This explains in large partwhy only the holding company of Lehman led for bankruptcy in 2008 and its brokerdealer subsidiaries were not part of the Chapter 11 ling.A major fear of a nancial rm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that
26、re sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed nancial rm and that these re saleswill have ramications for other rms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the failed rm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This fear was behind the Feds decision to exten
27、d liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on nancial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illiquid markets. Thismight have resulted in.a re sale scenario., inwhich a cascade of f
28、ailures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse nancial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia)The fear of potential re sales is expressed in further detail in the same speech as a reason for the m
29、erger of Bear Stearns and JP Morgan:“Bear.would be forced to le for bankruptcy.which wouldhave forced Bears secured creditors and counterparties to liquidate the underlying collateral and, given the illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counter parties might well have sustained losses. If they
30、 responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of their holdings by pulling back from providing secured nancing to other rms, a much broader liquidity crisis would have ensued.”The idea that creditors of a failed rm are forced to liquidate assets, and to do so with haste, is counter to the basic
31、 tenets of U.S. bankruptcy laws, which are set up to allow creditors the ability to maximize the value of the assets now under their control. If that value is greatest when continuing to operate, the laws allow such a reorganization of the rm. If the value in liquidation is higher, the laws are in n
32、o way prejudiced against selling assets in an orderly procedure. Bankruptcy actually reduces the likelihood of re sales because assets are not sold quickly once a bankruptcy ling occurs. Cash does not leave the bankrupt firm without the approval of a judge.Without pressure to pay debts, the rm can r
33、emain in bankruptcy for months as it tries to decide on the best course of action. Indeed, a major complaint about the U.S. code is that debtors can easily delay reorganizing and slow down the process.If, however, creditors and management believe that speedy assets sales are in their best interest,
34、then they can press the bankruptcy judge to approve quick action. This occurred in the case of Lehmans asset sale to Barclays,which involved hiring workers whomight have split up were their divisions not sold quickly.金融公司破产及系统性的风险2008年秋，当美公司财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献联邦储备委员会和财政部拒绝85亿美金巨资保险投入到美国国际集团时，这边借给美国国际集团的
35、货款就直接落到了竞争对手手里，而投保人只得到极少的一部分资金。在那些大的受益人当中，高盛用12亿美金来撤销美国国际集团的信用违约互换。这一应急方案通过逐步售出美国国际集团的资产来偿还贷款，而不是保住岗位或者是确保短期贷款市场像之前那样持续运转发挥市场效能。因此，政府避免美国国际集团的系统性风险的目的，是为了确保美国国际集团的商业伙伴不至于破产。从这一出发点，很明显是信用违约互换当中最好的一个。也是因为这一点，相比2008年美国国际集团多赢得4000亿的合同。 在条款当中，美国政府在援助通用汽车时表现的并没那么积极，可能是因为政府确信，通用的破产把损失强加到相关的合作企业，这样不会对宏观经济产生
36、太大的坏影响。这一决定和宏观经济调查的结果是一致的，即金融公司的破产比非金融公司的破产产生的系统性风险大很多。例如Bordo和 Haubrich提到“越是严重的金融事件越是和严重的经济衰退联系在一起。”同样的，Bernanke反驳道，大萧条如此的让经济衰退是因为银行业的缺陷影响到投资的信用度。Bernanke 假设一种金融加速器机制，在这样的机制中，经济的一个领域破产导致更多的不稳固的资产负债表和紧张的信贷状况。这反过来就导致投资的减少，随之而来的是变少的贷款和普遍的经济衰退。如果对非金融企业的经济冲击都是以破产的形式呈现，这些作者们在辩论经济低迷好似不会很严重的。我们反而认为非金融企业破产的
37、连锁影响远比金融企业的大，就像美国国际集团。虽然通过竞争对手风险渠道，不会对美国经济产生毁灭性的打击。但并不是说一段时期在大银行间的经济低迷不会伴随冲击很大的经济衰退。只是因为这样是经济失利不会引起经济衰退，也不会影响经济衰退的深度。不管是哪一种类型的企业破产，这样的破产在企业股份中不是常见的导致经济损失的症状。因为一个公司的倒闭导致其他公司的倒闭形成系统内的一种联级，这样就会产生普遍的经济脆弱的现象。当许多金融公司同时倒闭，系统风险会减弱经济的破坏力度，就像在大萧条时期，9000多家银行倒闭。在前一种案例中，一家公司的倒闭，譬如像美国国际集团，雷曼兄弟，或者贝尔斯登这样的公司倒闭，会导致倒闭
38、现象在金融界蔓延，例如信用违约互换。在后一种案例中，事实是许多金融机构的倒闭意味着不仅仅是货币的供应，而且只要经济活动中的破败，就会降低信用额度。当脆弱的金融系统引起经济的萧条时，经济萧条就不会产生，因为公司可以申请破产。而且如果只是一两个公司的破产，非金融企业会对经济产生更大的影响。这样极端且真实的影响是金融企业的脆弱性导致调控者特别强调对系统性风险的预防。这些政策当中，最突出的是“太大以至于破产”(TBTF的逻辑)，这一观点的思维方式是，一个大型的金融机构的倒闭将会影响到其分支的金融机构，因此，对经济的风险是很大的。太大而倒闭是2008年随着美国联邦储备委员会决定合并贝尔斯登公司和摩根大通
39、银行之后产生的，在重建银行货代时期的领导是长期资金管理，这一政策的决定是支援美国国际集团。如果结果是阻止了经济的衰退，太大而倒闭的政策将会被证实。然而，如果在这一段时期系统性风险被夸大，或者所采取的措施的益处被高估，资金分配以避免另外一场大萧条的效率代价体系将远远超出任何潜在的利益。毫无疑问，在观察另外一个系统性风险的时候，没有管理者想乘机撤退。因此当管理者推到一边的时候，我们不能凭经验来考核决定经济状况。当今的美国，很少有管理者同意一家大的金融公司破产的。最近，我们可以看到雷曼兄弟的破产，这是美国联邦储备委员会，逼不得已同意破产的企业。然而，雷曼兄弟的破产是唯一一个显而易见的例子表明太大而倒
40、闭的政策是名不副实的，我们只看到中意政策对系统性风险的微不足道的影响。此外，与此同时因雷曼兄弟的倒闭，此外,与此同时,雷曼兄弟的失败的情况下,美联储正在干预商业市场、促进货币资金,而美国国际集团是跳伞了。而且，美联邦储备局和财政局即将散布第二次大萧条的谣言，以彰显其采取的措施的有效性。因此，我们将永远不知道雷曼兄弟的破产是否会导致市场低迷，以及从雷曼兄弟破产致使人们对破产的恐惧反映到现实的经济上来或者管理者对人们的现实经济体中存在的问题的恐惧进行无限的夸大。在本论文中，我们分析会引起经济崩溃风险的经济体制。我们关注两种可能引起系统性风险问题的蔓延：（1）信息蔓延，一个金融机构的困境会对其他金融
41、企业产生一系列的消极影响，主要是因为这些企业有许多共同的风险因素。（2）对手蔓延，一个重要的金融机构倒闭直接导致其他信贷机构的危机，这些危机会产生滚雪球效应，引起其他金融企业倒闭。太大而倒闭主义政策的有效性主要依据于这两种系统性风险的控制。对手蔓延会授权干预每一个倒闭的银行，不过信息蔓延就不会。如果管理者不介入救助某一企业，要不就是任其倒闭。例如一家银行，处理的过程包括以美国联邦储蓄保险公司作为其产业管理人，使其担保的债务在很短的时间里还清。相反，如果破产的是一个投资银行或者是对冲基金没有参与美国联邦储蓄保险公司，这可能是很像百度搜索“就爱阅读”,专业资料,生活学习,尽在就爱阅读网,您的在线图书馆 14