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1、标题：Chain-Store Competition: Customized vs. Uniform Pricing原文：1. IntroductionDifferent retail locations have different costs and, what is our concern here, different degrees of competition. For example, wage levels may vary by location and a particular market player may face fewer competitors in some
2、 locations than others. Hence, we might expect prices to be customized across locations. As an illustration, take the milestone antitrust investigation by the US Federal Trade Commission of the proposed Staples/Office Depot merger. Here, a key element the FTC uncovered was the adoption of markedly d
3、iffering pricing practices across locations of differing competitive intensity, with a clear link between the number of competing stores of similar type and the level of price. This is third degree price discrimination, but in an oligopoly context 。A commonly held view is that firms are better off p
4、racticing this form of price discrimination between locations of differing competitive intensity. Against this view, Cortes (1998) and other subsequent authors have shown that in situations of “best response asymmetry”, where one players strong market is the others weak market, firms can be worse of
5、f practicing price discrimination. As Cortes puts it, “ if firms differ in which markets they target for this aggressive pricing and competitivereactions are strong, prices in all markets may fall.”。 But in most retailing situations, such as office equipment supplies, rival firms will hold the same
6、opinion about which market is strong and which is weak as a result of differing degrees of competition a situation of best response symmetry rather than asymmetry. Under these circumstances, a clear puzzle is why in some prominent cases of best response symmetry, in distinction to Staples/Office Dep
7、ot, firms practice uniform pricing rather than varying price by location. It is this puzzle that is the focus of our paper. As we document in detail below, the key players in the United Kingdom (“UK”) supermarket industry, which has a turnover over five times as large as the US office equipment mark
8、et, have maintained or enhanced their policies on uniformity ofpricing across location within mainland Britain. Note it is crucial to the success of a uniform pricing policy that there is prior commitment to such a policy, rather than simultaneous choice of pricing policy and prices themselves. We s
9、how that UK supermarkets have made such commitments. Given this underlying commitment, we demonstrate at a very general level that a profit incentive exists in favor of uniform pricing, in some but not all situations of best response symmetry. The argument is essentially as follows: It is well known
10、 that in a differentiated product market setting with Bertrand price competition, both players in a duopoly can benefit if one can commit to a higher price. A commitment to uniform pricing will provide a commitment to a higher price if demand facing the firm in a monopoly market is less elastic than
11、 in the duopoly market. Then if the gain in profits from the duopoly market exceeds the loss from the monopoly market, the strategy is profitable.We go on to further characterize analytically the type of market for which this incentive will exist. A key feature is that larger markets have consumers
12、with a wider range of tastes than do small markets. Following this general analysis, we demonstrate using a parameterized example that a very wide range of degrees of competitive intensity is consistent with profits either being enhanced or at least reduced only slightly by a policy of uniform prici
13、ng. Thus, small positive benefits arising from otherAspects of uniform pricing (including reductions in promotional costs and lessening of antitrust attention) may well be sufficient to ensure that uniform pricing develops as a resilient practice across the industry.We proceed as follows. The next s
14、ection sets out the nature of pricing and pricing commitment in the UK supermarket industry as an illustrative case. Following this, section 3 develops the general Analytical framework just outlined and characterizes the circumstances where there can be a unilateral profit incentive for uniform pric
15、ing. Section 4 utilizes a parameterized example to illustrate the range of market circumstances conducive to uniform pricing being more profitable local pricing .Section 5 extends the domain to incorporate joint incentives to adopt uniform pricing in the presence of competing chain-store retailers,
16、also practical considerations where local pricing may be more expensive to operate than national pricing. Section 6 contains our concluding remarks.2. Uniform Pricing in UK Grocery RetailingIn this section we chart sufficient material related to UK grocery retailing to show the very considerable ext
17、ent to which the major chains price uniformly across areas despite facing very different competitive environments (and costs) across those areas. We also document the commitments firms use in maintaining their uniform pricing policies.Grocery retailing represents the largest retail sector in the UK,
18、 worth around $160bn in 2005.Four retailers Tesco, Sainsbury, Ads (a Wal-Mart subsidiary) and Morrison/Safeway dominate the national market, accounting for 75% of sales of grocery items (i.e., food and drink, cleaning products, toiletries and household goods), and indeed 30% of all retail sales in t
19、he UK. These four supermarket retailers have primarily positioned themselves as “one stop shops”, operating with very wide product ranges in large format stores. As such, they jointly account for 95% of grocery sales for stores exceeding 1,400 sq meters (which has been viewed by the UK competition a
20、uthorities as the critical size distinguishing one-stop grocery shops, serving primary shopping needs, from smaller stores catering for “top-up” and “convenience” grocery shopping).While most of the retail grocery chains operate on a national level in the UK, there is considerable variation in regio
21、nal and local market shares and concentration levels. Table 1 provides some summary evidence, based on a very detailed report into the sector undertaken by the UKs Competition Commission (“CC” hereafter) in 2000. In particular, high levels of local concentration were found in more rural areas (notab
22、ly in Scotland and Wales) and certain urban areas where a proliferation of stores from the same chain existed. In addition to market structure differences, consumer income levels also differ from region to region (tending to be higher in the southern part of the UK) and from district to district (te
23、nding to be higher in urban areas as opposed to rural areas),suggesting the presence of variation in local consumer demand, incomes and possibly willingness to pay.With differences in both local competition and local demand conditions, it might be thought that retailers would seek to take advantage
24、of opportunities to set prices differently from store to store. In particular, retailers might set higher prices in areas where local competition was limited and/or average income levels were high, while setting lower prices in areas of more intense local competition and/or low average incomes. Howe
25、ver, for the sector as a whole, the CC (2000) found an almost even split between those firms that adjusted prices on a local basis and those that adopted uniform prices across all their stores. Of the fifteen main grocery chains operating in the UK, seven were found to vary prices from store to stor
26、e based on local competition and demand conditions while eight used national pricing, with no local variation in prices.Table 2 shows the extent and character of local price flexing identified by the CC amongst the big 5 firms in 1999. To this we have added data from a later CC report in 2003. In 19
27、99, individual product prices were found in some retailers to vary considerably (by as much as 100%), but average prices differed across each chain by less than 3%. The CC investigated the basis on which local pricing operated, identifying the critical factors influencing store-level pricing. For th
28、e retail groups that did vary prices, both differences in local demand (in respect of income or regional effects) and local competition (in respect of local market power or facing particular price-focused competitors) were found to be important in determining the price band applied to individual sto
29、res and the variation in prices across the store chain. Cost elements (like differences in store size) were also found to play a role, but not so significantly as to explain the full extent of store-to-store price variation. However, the pattern of pricing practices in the sector changed markedly ov
30、er the following four years. While price flexing continued to be used by some of the smaller chains, by 2003, both Sainsbury and Tesco had voluntarily moved away from store pricing based on location. Furthermore, in March 2004, Morrison acquired Safeway and set about converting all the latters store
31、s into the Morrison format, in the process abandoning Safeways store-by-store promotional pricing policy in favor of its national pricing policy. Remarkably, uniform pricing has become the dominant form of pricing in this sector, and the major retailers, including Tesco, reportedly the worlds third
32、largest retailer, have eschewed the opportunity to customize prices on a store-by-store basis in favor of national pricing.If national pricing is to have any possible strategic role in influencing the pricing decisions of rival retailers (i.e. be seen as beyond mere “cheap talk”), then the chain-sto
33、re retailer would need visibly to pre-commit to uniform pricing in such a fashion that the other retailers could be certain that the chain stores hands are tied when it comes to actual determination of prices.Beyond UK supermarkets, uniform pricing is also witnessed in other retail sectors as well.
34、As Dobson and Watterson (2005) observe, these further examples illustrate the range of possible commitment devices and policies that may be employed to support the credibility of a uniform pricing strategy. For instance, a retail chain may rely on some expensive commitment mechanism that would rende
35、r its position worse were it not to adopt uniform pricing than if it did so. In the case of some retailers this comes about by publishing all prices in a catalogue which then applies across the whole country, e.g. IKEA in furniture and furnishings or Argos in the UK for general merchandise, with no
36、scope for local price deviations. An alternative commitment can arise through national advertising to inform consumers about prices or through use of integral price tags standard across a country, or even the whole Euro zone (e.g. top clothing retailers such as Swedens multinational H&M and UKs Mark
37、s & Spencer).A further possibility is for the chain-store retailer to remove local market boundaries to create essentially a national market for its own goods. For example, this might be possible if consumers were allowed full access to the store network regardless of their location, with orders tak
38、en from any part of the country then backed with either home delivery or delivery to the nearest available store (as offered for example by a number of UK clothing retailers including Marks & Spencer and Next). A similar effect could arise through a retailer developing an Internet operation to run a
39、longside its store operations, i.e. become a “clicks and bricks” retailer, making a commitment to offering online prices equal to the lowest store-level prices. Indeed, this is a move that Tesco, Ads and Sainsbury have adopted in developing online grocery sales in the UK and is also being rolled out
40、 by H&M for clothing. 5. Further ConsiderationsThe results in the previous two sections, and diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 1, point to the scope for uniform pricing offering strictly higher profits than under local pricing being quite restricted. However, there may be other practical consid
41、erations, as we alluded to in the Introduction, which may extend the scope for adopting uniform pricing. In this section we build on the linear demand analysis in the previous section to illustrate two possible considerations: first, where other, rival chain-store retailers exist and they can coordi
42、nate their pricing policy choices; second where local pricing may involve some additional costs that reduce net profits under this pricing policy choice.6. ConclusionLarge nation or regional chain-store groups now dominate most sectors of retailing. They have the cost savings and marketing clout of
43、a large purchaser coupled with the potential flexibility to tailor offers across the local markets they serve. This potential flexibility has been realized through developments in information gathering and processing, allowing marketers to customize marketing mix variables to the store-level (Montgo
44、mery, 1997). In contrast, our focus has centered on competitive aspects. Specifically, hic price discrimination may impact on competition across the network of local markets served. In this context we have shown quite generally that market conditions exist where it will be both individually and join
45、tly profitable for retailers to eschew customizing prices and instead set uniform prices across their stores. This means the retailer forgoes high prices and high profits in the local markets where it has monopoly power and instead leverages this market power across all its markets to raise prices i
46、n those markets where the intensity of competition otherwise makes them low. It entails sacrificing some local profits, but with the benefit of softening competition more broadly and sufficiently to raise firm profits overall.出处：Paul Dobson and Michael Watterson. Chain-store competition: customized
47、vs. uniform pricing J. Marketing Sci. 2008.49(11), pp. 29-40标题：连锁店的竞争:企业差别定价和统一定价译文：摘要:不同零售处有我们在这里所关注的不同的费用和不同程度的竞争。例如,工资水平可能会随着地理位置的不同而不同，某一特定市场的人员在同一位置可能会面临相对其他一些地方更少的竞争对手。因此,我们可以期望价格根据位置来定制。以具有里程碑意义的美国联邦贸易委员会提出的斯台普斯办公车厂合并反垄断调查作为例子。在这里,一个关键的因素是,联邦贸易委员会发现根据不同的地点和竞争强度定价,跟有相似类型和价格水平的竞争商店的数量有明显的联系。这是三
48、度差别定价,但是在寡头垄断的背景下产生的。一个普遍持有的看法是公司最好掌握这种针对不同的位置之间的竞争强度形式的歧视价格。对这种观点,卡特(1998)和其他后来著作者的情况表明,在“最佳反应不对称”的情况下,如果那里是玩家的强大的市场也是其他人的疲软市场，公司运用价格歧视将会使情况更糟。作为个体所指出的那样,“如果公司有不同的目标市场,积极的定价和竞争力反应较强,在所有市场价格可能下降。”但在多数零售的场合,例如办公设备用品，竞争公司关于哪个市场力量强大,哪个力量弱作为不同程度竞争的结果会有同样的看法-这是对称最好的反应局面而不是不对称。在这些情况下,一个清晰的困惑是为什么在一些突出的案例有明
49、显对称性,最好的台普斯办公车厂是公司统一定价,而不是根据不同的位置定价。这个迷将是本文的重点。我们的文章详细介绍在英国超市行业的关键参与者,营业额超过5倍美国办公设备市场,他们在英国大陆内保持或增强他们的不均匀性政策。注意这是成功的关键,统一价格政策应致力于这一政策,而不是同时选择的定价政策和自己定价。我们展示的英国超市做了这样的承诺。考虑到这个潜在的承诺,我们证明了在一个很普遍的水平,利润激励存在赞成统一定价,只有部分好的反应的情况下最好是对称。其中的论点本质上如下:众所周知,在分化的产品市场设置下,波特兰德的价格竞争,在双寡头垄断中如果一个人能确认了一种更高的价格它就将受益。承诺统一定价将提供一个承诺,以一种更高的价格如果需求面向公司垄断市场比寡头垄断的市场缺少弹性。如果在寡头垄断的市场中获得的利润超过损失,他们的策略是有利可图。我们继续进一步描述的这个刺激会存在的类型的市场分析。一个主要特点是大的市场比小市场让消费者到更广泛的体会。综合分析之后,我们证明了有非常广泛的有竞争强度的参数化的例子利润是一致的,采用统一定价利润被增强，或至少轻微减少。于是,从其他统一定价方面产生的