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1、1Legitimizing Chinas Growing Engagement in African Security: Change within Continuity of Official DiscourseIlaria Carrozza*AbstractPeace and security were once marginal in Sino-African relations. Recently, however, reflecting Chinas more proactive role as a global security actor, they have become ce
2、ntral. Yet while Chinas actions mirror this shift, the official ChinaAfrica discourse has not changed. This article, based on field-work interviews and discourse analysis of official Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) documents, proposes a theoretically grounded study of Chinas Africa discours
3、e to account for the role it plays in maintain-ing continuity through time. It makes a threefold claim. First, while the ChinaAfrica discourse has not been given much attention in the literature, it is crucial to explaining the overall success of Chinas engagement in the continent. Second, the shift
4、 in Chinas policies towards greater participation in peace and security is not mirrored by changes in the official discourse. Third, and related, this is owing mostly to the successful articulation of the link between the promotion of economic growth and the achievement of stability the securitydeve
5、lopment nexus and to the generally positive reception the discourse has found among African leaders.Keywords: China; Africa; FOCAC; discourse; representations; narrative; securitydevelopment nexusChinas assertive foreign policy in the last few years under the lead of President Xi Jinping 习近平 has pro
6、mpted new debates over its rise. Discussions about Chinas growing global engagement focus on the countrys military expansion abroad and its emergence as a global security actor.1 While in the past China lacked the resources and confidence to broker security beyond Asia, it is now ready to expand its
7、 military power.2 Among the regions where the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has increased its security and military presence, Africa occupies a prime position. Alongside the PRCs more traditional engage-ment in trade and infrastructure building, peace and security, which once played* Peace Researc
8、h Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway. Email: ilacarprio.org.1 Mazarr, Heath and Cevallos 2018; Feigenbaum 2018; Zakaria 2020. 2 Huotari et al. 2017. SOAS University of London, 2021. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attributionlicence (http:/creativ
9、ecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 45.92.228.63, on 18 May 2021 at 10:33:34, subject to the CambridgeprovidedCore termstheoriginalofuse,workavailableisproperlyat ht
10、tps:/wwwcited.doi:10.cambridge.1017/S0305741021000242.org/core/terms. https:/doi.org/10.1017/S03057410210002422 The China Quarterly, pp. 126marginal roles, now feature prominently in the policy agenda. Since 2011, when China evacuated thousands of its workers from Libya amid civil war, Beijing has p
11、aid more attention to issues related to Africas security environment, and this has been reflected in growing funding of a range of activities including in-kind and financial contributions to the African Union (AU), greater participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, and the provision
12、 of military training and arms.This shift in Chinas approach to African security reflects the broader shift in the countrys foreign policy globally. Yet this shift is not mirrored by changes in its official Africa discourse, which continues to emphasize mutual benefits and a common path towards econ
13、omic growth. This begs the question of how Chinese leaders continued to maintain the continuity of the ChinaAfrica discourse while gradually making space for increased engagement in peace and security. In addressing this puzzle, this article starts from the premise that the success of Chinas interac
14、tions with most countries across the continent is owing not only to attractive economic incentives but also to the coherent official discourse which articulates China and African countries as fellow members of the Global South, united in the struggle against Western hegemony. Investments are indeed
15、important, but they alone cannot explain the breadth of Chinasengagement. The continent is far from short of investors.3 Rather, in China, Africa has found a new partner offering alternative opportunities. Against this background, the article contends that it is by creating the image of a reliable p
16、art-ner and cultivating personal relations with African leaders that Chinas overallsuccess in the continent can be explained beyond material drivers.4The image of China as a friend and partner has been conveyed through an offi-cial discourse that creates a sense of belonging and “common destiny” for
17、 leaders in developing countries. Created in 2000, the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) has greatly contributed to building the idea of a shared community and is a good example of Chinas efforts to create Chinese-led insti-tutions with the objective of increasing its influence abroad. Utiliz
18、ing LeneHansen and Ole Wvers concept of layered discourse,5 the article shows that while the countrys foreign policy towards the continent has geared towards greater engagement in peace and security, this shift has not been accompanied by changes in the basic discourse (first layer); rather, leaders
19、 have built on exist-ing discursive representations and have added more narratives (in the second and third layers). It is mostly thanks to Chinas use of the securitydevelopment nexus as a key discursive representation that the country has been able to maintain a coherent discourse, despite the ebbs
20、 and flows in Sino-African relations, while introducing the novel security element. Since the concept entails a close link between the promotion of economic growth and social development and the3 Pairault 2020.4 Kavalski 2018; Nordin and Smith 2018; Benabdallah 2020.5 Hansen and Waever 2003.Download
21、ed from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 45.92.228.63, on 18 May 2021 at 10:33:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https:/doi.org/10.1017/S0305741021000242Legitimizing Chinas Growing Engagement3achievement of stability, growing
22、security and military commitments appear legitimate and reasonable to both China and African countries. The generally positive reception the discourse has found among African leaders enhances its endurance.This article contributes to the existing literature on Sino-African relations in four ways. Fi
23、rst, it addresses Chris Alden and Daniel Larges concern that “des-pite the vast amount of research produced in recent years on China-Africa rela-tions, the work has remained largely under-theorised and fragmented.”6 The article takes up this challenge by proposing a theoretically grounded study of C
24、hinas Africa discourse that goes beyond the “events of the day” normally driv-ing existing research on the topic.7 Second, in joining a number of scholars who similarly see the value in adopting discourse (or rhetorics) as the main object of analysis,8 it proposes a more accurate methodological tool
25、box to interpret Chinas foreign policy as a “discursively enacted normative ideal,” adding to pre-dominant analyses focusing on material and economic factors.9 Third, it builds on the increasingly rich debate over Chinas growing engagement in African security by focusing not on what China is doing b
26、ut on how it is doing it.10 Fourth, it places the FOCAC at the centre of ChinaAfrica relations and high-lights its role both as the primary locus for defining the discourse and practice of Chinas Africa policies and diplomacy, and as an exclusive ChinaAfrica plat-form allowing for their relations to
27、 develop outside of the West.11The article thus proposes a study of Chinas Africa discourse and its main representations, as well as their persistency through time, and explains how Chinese leaders have gradually introduced increased engagement in peace and security. Since states are verbal entities
28、 that communicate widely, both domestic-ally and internationally, foreign policy discourses are identified through the read-ing of texts.12 Because the relationship between discourse and politics is co-constitutive, not only does discourse hold power over politicians and policy-makers but the latter
29、 can shape the discourse and use it to justify their preferred policies. As Hansen notes, states may not always follow the policy they publicly declare, and the process of foreign-policy making happens both in public and in private. However, the assumption behind discourse analysis is that “represen
30、ta-tions and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked.”13 Therefore, when investigating the linguistic aspects of foreign policy, one must begin with descriptions of such policy through the language of state officials i.e. statements in which decision makers explain foreign policy go
31、als and which6 Alden and Large 2019, xv; Duggan 2020b.7 Duggan 2020b.8 Strauss 2019; Duggan 2020a; Kuo 2020.9 Alden and Large 2011, 26.10 Alden and Large 2015; Alden et al. 2018; Walsh 2019; Wang, Xuejun 2018; Kuo 2015; He 2019.11 For broad assessments of the FOCAC, see Alden and Alves 2017; Taylor
32、2010; Li, Anshan, and Funeka Yazini 2013.12 Hansen 2006, 23.13 Ibid., 25.Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 45.92.228.63, on 18 May 2021 at 10:33:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https:/doi.org/10.1017/S03057410
33、210002424 The China Quarterly, pp. 126are typically found in speeches, government or semi-government publications, and official meetings. These statements, together with those made by members of the state apparatuses and those appearing in the media, are important asthey provide clues to the content
34、 of official foreign policy.14Following Hansens research methodology, the article focuses “on political lea-ders with official authority to sanction the foreign policies pursued as well as those with central roles in executing these policies, for instance high-ranked mili-tary staff, senior civil se
35、rvants (including diplomats and mediators), and heads ofinternational institutions.”15 In particular, the texts were selected based on three criteria, namely that “they are characterized by the clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they have the for
36、malauthority to define a political position.”16 I collected and read over 250 FOCAC documents including action plans, declarations and speeches given by Chinese and African leaders and top officials (in both English and Chinese), and Chinas Africa White Papers, from the period 2000 to 2019. I also c
37、ollected official statements and coverage in state-sponsored media. The texts were sourced from the FOCAC official website, the Central Peoples Government of the PRC website, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, and official state media such as Xinhua and Peoples Daily. I read all documents in C
38、hinese and translated the excerpts cited in this article, which are the most exemplary and significant. While reading the texts, I dissected the official Chinese policy discourse, focusing on ChinaAfrica relations and, more specifically, on security cooperation. The article further draws on fieldwor
39、k interviews conducted in Beijing, Addis Ababa and New York in the period 2016 to 2018. These interviews granted me more direct access to sources close to foreign policy processes and provided a window through which to look at the reception of Chinas discourse among African elites.Through the analys
40、is, a number of elements emerge, including a focus on the securitydevelopment nexus; continued assistance for developing countries in promoting development as well as increased militarization and securitization of foreign relations; and the promotion of certain norms and practices, such as the Five
41、Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, via both existing organizations and new institutional arenas. In terms of Chinas peace and security strategy in Africa, a long-term vision takes shape which includes a bigger commitment to peacekeeping operations, financial and in-kind contributions to the UN and
42、the AU, and a growing military footprint. It is thus important to analyse the dis-cursive basis upon which the PRCs Africa policies rest as well as the changes and continuities in the official discourse in order to understand the future direction of ChinaAfrica policies.14 Weldes 1999, 11213.15 Hans
43、en 2006, 60.16 Ibid., 85Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 45.92.228.63, on 18 May 2021 at 10:33:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https:/doi.org/10.1017/S0305741021000242Legitimizing Chinas Growing Engagement5Th
44、e article proceeds as follows. First, it shows how official discourse is consti-tutive of Sino-African relations. It then illustrates the discursive layers that form the basis of the discourse. It continues by mapping the discourses main represen-tations as well as the persistence of these represent
45、ations since 2000. The fourth section unpacks how the discourse has gradually made space for a shift in Chinas approach to include more peace and security activities, although no major change in the basic discourse is detectable. Fifth, it shows that the discourse has found broad acceptance among Af
46、rican elites, which contributes to the discourses endurance. Finally, it concludes with a reflection on the future of Chinas Africa discourse and policy.Discourse as Constitutive of the ChinaAfrica (Official) StoryDrawing on Michel Foucaults work, discourse is described by Kevin Dunn and Iver Neuman
47、n as “a system producing a set of statements and practices that, by entering into institutions and appearing like normal, constructs the reality of its subjects and maintains a certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations. Or, more succinctly, discourses are systems of meaning-productio
48、n that fix mean-ing, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of the world and to act within it.”17 Within a discourse, representations construct regimes of truth or knowledge; they not only constitute identities but also foreign policies and their outcomes.18 Representations are phenomena filtered through the existing fabric between the world and ourselves.19 In this context, discourse is able to show how certain representations are constituted and prevail over time, since within specific discourses, certain paths of action become possible while others are ma