电子商务环境下双渠道供应链协调的价格折扣模型.pdf

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1、?27?3?20126?JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERINGVol.27 No.3Jun.2012?,?(?,?400044)?:?,?Stackelberg?,?.?,?,?.?,?.?,?.?:?;?;?;?:C931?:A?:10005781(2012)03034407Price discount model for coordination of dual-channelsupply chain under e-commerceXU Guang-ye,DAN Bin(College of Economics and Business Administration

2、,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)Abstract:For the dual-channel mode of the coexistence of traditional retail channel and electronic directchannel under e-commerce,this paper establishes a price discount model to coordinate dual-channel supplychain when the manufacturer is a leader in Sta

3、ckelberg game.Under the price discount coordination mech-anism,it is proved that the profits of the dual-channel supply chain and retailer are increased,but the profitof the manufacturer is reduced.With regards to this,a transfer payment mechanism is designed to enable themanufacturer and retailer t

4、o achieve a win-win situation.Finally,a numerical example is used to verify theeffectiveness of the designed coordination mechanisms.Key words:dual-channel;supply chain coordination;price discount;e-commerce1?,?,?IBM?1.?,?“?”?(double marginalization)2,?3,4.?,?,?,?,?,?5.?,?,?,?.?:20091222;?:20100506.

5、?:?(70972056);?(CDJXS11022202).?3?:?345?,?.Chiang?6?,?,?,?.?,Yan?7?,?,?,?.Tsay?8?,?.Kurata?9?,?.?10?Stackelberg?Bertrand?,?,?,?Pareto?.?,?.?,?.?,Seong?11?,?,?.?12?,?,?,?.?13?,?;Chiang14?,?;?Boyaci5?,?.?5,13,14?,?,?,?.?13?,?;?5,14?,?.?,?,?,?,?.?.2?,?,?.?,?.?,?1?,?2?.?I?,?PD?,?NPD?,?*?.?:1?;2?;d1?;d2?

6、;w?;c?;p1?,p1 w;p2?,p2 w.?,?.?d1=sa p1+bp2,(1)d2=(1 s)a p2+bp1,(2)?a(a 0)?,s(0 s 1)?,b(0 b 0,(1 s)a p2 0,?.3?,?.?,?.?,?II=(p1 c)(sa p1+bp2)+(p2 c)(1 s)a p2+bp1).(3)?(3)?,?,?(3)?p1?p2?0,?pI1=(s+(1 s)b)a+(1 b2)c2(1 b2),(4)pI2=(1 s)+sb)a+(1 b2)c2(1 b2).(5)?,?I=?12(1 s)(1 b)sb?a2(1 b2)ca+(b3 b+1)c22(1 b

7、2).(6)?,?,?.4?,?,?,?Stackelberg?(leader),?(follower).?w(p2)=c+k(p2 c).(7)?k?,?0 k 1,?w(p2)?c w(p2)0,?sa c sa pPD1=sa p1 0,?pPD1 wPD 0,?.?.?1?,?,?.?,?PD1=(sa (1 b)c)24,(21)PD2=(1 s+sb)a (1 b2)c)24(1 b2).(22)?(21)?(22)?PD=PD1+PD2=?12(1 s)(1 b)sb?a2(1 b2)ca+(b3 b+1)c22(1 b2)=I.(23)?,?,?.?,?,?.?,?,?;?,?

8、,?.?,?348?27?Pareto?,?,?,?.?,?.5?Pareto?,?,?NPD1=(p1 w)(sa p1+bp2),(24)NPD2=(w c)(sa p1+bp2)+(p2 c)(1 s)a p2+bp1).(25)?,?(24)?(25)?,?(24)?(25),?,?NPD1=(sa+bc c)216,(26)NPD2=(s2b2+4(1 s)sb+3s2 4s+2)a28(1 b2)2(1 b2)(2 s+bs)ca+(1 b2)(b2 2b+3)c28(1 b2),(27)NPD=(s2b2+8(1 s)sb+7s2 8s+4)a28(1 b2)2(1 b2)(4

9、s+bs)ca+(1 b2)(b2+6b 7)c28(1 b2).(28)?,?,?2.?2?,?.?(23)?(28)?,?=(sa+bc c)2/16 0,(29)?(21)?(26),?11=3(sa+bc c)2/16 0,(30)?(22)?(27),?22=(sa+bc c)2/8 0.(31)?(29)?(30)?(31)?.?.?2?,?.?Stackelberg?,?.?,?,?Pareto?,?3.?3?,?T?T 2,1?,?Pareto?.?(30)?(31)?3,?.?3?,?,?.?,?,?3?:?349?,?.?,?,?,?.6?,?.?a=200,?s=0.4,

10、c=10,1=1 T,2=2+T.?k?b,?.?1b?,T?,?1?.?1?4?7?10?,?T?,?b?;?b?;?b?.?,?T?,?,?,?,?,?b?.?,?1?,?b=0.8?,?,?,?T=750?2=760?3.?,?,?T.?1?,?3,?,?Pareto?.?1T=750?Table 1 The optimal result of T=750bPD1NPD11PD2NPD22PDNPD0.3582.25333.06249.195 749.455 665.5883.876 331.705 998.64333.060.4619.00342.25276.756 887.196 8

11、21.6965.507 506.197 163.94342.250.5656.25351.56304.698 502.088 455.2146.879 158.338 806.77351.560.6694.00361.00333.0010 951.0010 923.0028.0011 645.0011 284.00361.000.7732.25370.56361.6915 067.0615 058.198.8715 799.3115 428.75370.560.8771.00380.25390.7523 350.1123 360.61 10.5024 121.1123 740.86380.25

12、?2T?,b?,?2?.?2?4?7?10?,?b?,?T?;?T?;?,?.?b?,?,?T?,?.?,?2?2?3?4?,?T=600,650,700?,?,?,?T=600,650,700?2=703.125?3.?,?,?T.?2?4,?.?2b=0.5?Table 2 The optimal result of b=0.5TPD1NPD11PD2NPD22PDNPD600806.25351.56454.698352.088455.2103.139158.338806.77351.56650756.25351.56404.698402.088455.2153.139158.338806

13、.77351.56700706.25351.56354.698452.088455.21 3.139158.338806.77351.56750656.25351.56304.698502.088455.2146.879158.338806.77351.56800606.25351.56254.698552.088455.2196.879158.338806.77351.56?,?T?(?T=100),?,?Stackelberg?,?,?350?27?,?.7?.?,?,?.?,?,?.?,?,?,?.?,?.?:1 Wilder C.HPs online push N.Informatio

14、n Week,19990531.2 Spengler J J.Vertical restraints and antitrust policyJ.Journal of Political Economy,1950,58(1):347352.3 Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:Strengths and limitationsJ.ManagementScience,2005,51(1):3044.4?,?,?.?J.?,2009,24(2):173177.Xu Zu

15、i,Zhu Daoli,Zhu Wengui.Buy back contract design in a supply chain under price-dependent demandJ.Journal of SystemsEngineering,2009,24(2):173177.(in Chinese)5 Boyaei T.Competitive stoking and coordination in a multi-channel distribution systemJ.IIE Transactions,2005,37(5):407427.6 Chiang W K,Chhajed

16、D,Hess J D.Direct marketing,indirect profits:A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain designJ.Management Science,2003,49(1):120.7 Yan R,Pei Z.Retail services and firm profit in a dual-channel marketJ.Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services,2009,16(4):306314.8 Tsay A A,Agrawal N.Channel c

17、onflict andcoordination in the e-commerce age channel conflict and coordination in thee-commerceAgeJ.Production and Operations Management,2004,13(1):93110.9 Kurata H,Yao D Q,Liu J J.Pricing polices under direct vs.indirect channel competition and national vs.store brand competitionJ.European Journal

18、 of Operational Research,2007,180(1):262281.10?,?,?.?J.?,2008,23(5):570576.Guo Yajun,Qu Daogang,Zhao Liqiang.Analysis of pricing policies of hybrid distribution channels in e-marketJ.Journal ofSystems Engineering,2008,23(5):570576.(in Chinese)11 Seong Y P,Hean T K.Modeling hybrid distribution channe

19、ls:A game-theoretic analysisJ.Journal of Retailing and ConsumerServices,2003,10(3):155167.12?,?,?.?J.?,2007,15(3):98102.Yan Nina,HuangXiaoyuan,Liu Bing.Stackelberg gamemodels of supply chain dual-channel coordination in E-MarketsJ.ChineseJournal of Management Science,2007,15(3):98102.(in Chinese)13?

20、,?.Internet?J.?,2007,27(8):111.Xie Qinghua,HuangPeiqing.Aquantity discount modelfor coordinationof internet-based hybridchannelsJ.Systems Engineering:Theory and Practice,2007,27(8):111.(in Chinese)14 Chiang W K.Product availability in competitive and cooperative dual-channel distribution with stock-out based substitutionJ.European Journal of Operational Research,2010,200(1):111126.?:?(1983),?,?,?,?,Email:;?(1966),?,?,?,?,?,?:?,Email:.

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