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1、NO. 57 SEPTEMBER 2022IntroductionElectrolysers for the Hydrogen RevolutionChallenges, dependencies, and solutionsDawud Ansari, Julian Grinschgl, and Jacopo Maria PepeDue to Europes gas crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, ramping up the hydro-gen market has become more urgent than ever for Eu
2、ropean and German policymakers. However, ambitious targets for green hydrogen present an enormous challenge for the European Union (EU) and its young hydrogen economy. Apart from the demand for electricity, there is above all a lack of production capacities for electrolysers. The envisioned producti
3、on scaling of electrolysers is almost impossible to achieve, and it also conflicts with import efforts and cements new dependencies on suppliers of key raw materials and critical components. Although a decoupling from Russias raw ma-terial supply is generally possible, there is no way for the EU to
4、achieve its goals with-out China. Aside from loosened regulations and the active management of raw material supply, Europe should also reconsider its biased preference for green hydrogen.The ongoing energy crisis and Russias inva-sion of Ukraine have pushed hydrogen into an increasingly central role
5、 in the EUs climate and energy policy plans. Already in 2020, the EU set ambitious targets in its hydrogen strategy. Yet, the European Com-missions (EC) latest proposal, REPowerEU, now specifies and raises those targets dra-matically. First, the previously demanded 10 million tonnes of annual hydrog
6、en pro-duction within the EU are to be comple-mented by another 10 million tonnes of an-nual imports by 2030. Second, REPowerEU corrects the previous estimate for the required domestic electrolysis capacity: Not 40 gigawatts (GW), but 120 GW of electroly-sis capacity will be needed to produce 10 mil
7、lion tonnes of hydrogen in Europe. The revised targets are intended to achieve theEU Fit for 55 emission targets as well as energy independence from Russia.The EC plans to rely exclusively on green hydrogen. It is obtained by separating water molecules (H2O) into hydrogen (H2) and oxy-gen (O2) in an
8、 electrolyser powered by renewable electricity without direct car-bon dioxide (CO2) emissions. However, there are also other, low-carbon technologies that produce hydrogen, such as steam reforming with natural gas, including CO2 capture so-called blue hydrogen.It is questionable whether the ambitiou
9、s EU goals can be realised while only relying on one technology. The additional renew-able electricity needed to produce 10 mil-lion tonnes of hydrogen would amount to almost the entire EU-27 electricity genera-tion from wind and solar power in 2021.Yet, manufacturing the electrolysers them-selves w
10、ill be even more challenging: The electrolysis capacity currently installed in the EU will need to increase almost 900-fold within just eight years. Moreover, Europe faces the dual challenge of ramping up elec-trolysis capacity while simultaneously securing its own market share in electrolyser manuf
11、acturing.In the emerging technology-based energy world and given the intensifying eco-nomic and geopolitical competition a rapid expansion of electrolysis capacity and the capacity to construct electrolysers can become decisive factors in determining the location of industrial activity. Currently, E
12、uropes position in the market is still strong, and the EU is trying to emphasise its sovereignty in industrial and energy policy. For example, the Green Deal and the Euro-pean Industrial Strategy call for the crea-tion of strategic value chains around renew-able energy technologies. With the Clean H
13、ydrogen Alliance, the EU aims at promot-ing private-sector pilot projects and rapidly increasing hydrogen production. The issue of resilient raw material supply chains is also rising on the EUs agenda.However, current plans hardly seem to consider geopolitics, industrial policy, and resources policy
14、, especially vis-vis elec-trolysers. Against the background of the threatening fragmentation of the world economy and the emergence of a globalisa-tion characterised by mercantilism, the first thing to do is to identify possible depend-encies and vulnerabilities for the European electrolyser industr
15、y to guard against (geo-political) risks. It is imperative to consider supply chains for raw materials and the sourcing of critical components on the one hand, as well as the increasing market dominance of competitors in electrolyser manufacturing on the other.Which electrolysers for Europe?The vari
16、ous electrolysis technologies differ mainly in the components used and the maturity of the technologies themselves.SWP Comment 57September 2022Currently, only two technologies are suffi-ciently mature, and they will likely account for the lions share of the electrolyser capac-ities to be installed o
17、ver the coming decades: alkaline electrolysers (AEL units) and polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) electrolysers.AEL is the oldest, most mature, and with 61 per cent of the worlds installed capacity most widespread type of elec-trolyser. Its advantages lie in the relatively simple electrolyser design
18、 and, hence, a comparatively simple manufacturing pro-cess. AEL units are flexible enough to react with sufficient speed to intermittent solar and wind power generation. However, at more than 50 minutes, its cold-start time is quite long the technology is therefore more suitable for base-load operat
19、ion than for peaks.PEM electrolysers are younger than their AEL counterpart. Their global market share is currently just below 31 per cent, but it is growing rapidly. Above all, PEM technology offers a very fast cold-start time of only 10 to 20 minutes and an even faster reaction time to fluctuating
20、 electricity production. PEM units are therefore particularly suit-able for peak hours in power grids with a high share of renewables. However, in tech-nical terms, they are less mature and, as they require rare metals for their manufac-ture, they are usually more expensive than AEL models.Although
21、Europe has committed itself to green hydrogen, its policy seems indifferent regarding the electrolysis technology. This is wise, since electrolysis capacity from every possible source will come in handy to meet production targets.Raw material supply chains and critical componentsThe massive expansio
22、n of Europes elec-trolyser fleet requires taking a critical look at the supply chains of both electrolysis technologies. A distinction must be made between upstream raw material supply chains and critical components (i.e. indus-trially produced plant parts).2FigureSources: U. S. Geological Survey, M
23、ineral Commodity Summaries 2022 (Reston, VA, 2022); Gian Andrea Blengini et al., Study on the EUs List ofCritical Raw Materials (2020). Final Report (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).Nickel and platinum: Indonesia and South Africa are (hardly) an alternative to Russia and
24、 ChinaAEL units require no rare metals. Only nickel and (nickel-plated) stainless steel are needed. Although nickel deposits are neither rare nor spatially concentrated, the supply of nickel is problematic. To date, between 35 per cent and almost 50 per cent meas-ured in either trade value or weight
25、 of all nickel imports to Germany and the entire EU originate from Russia. The country ranks fourth in the world for nickel reserves and is therefore a relevant player for both unrefined and refined nickel (see Figure). Other countries, such as India (22 per cent), the Philippines (5 per cent), and
26、Australia(22 per cent), account together for almost half of the worlds global nickel reserves; they also hold a similar share in global nickel mining output (see Figure). Thus, they may represent an alternative to Rus-sian supply. However, in 2020, Indonesia prohibited the export of raw nickel to ke
27、ep nickel refining and its value added within its borders. The EU has already raised a complaint with the World Trade Organiza-tion against Indonesias policy. The Philip-pines are pursuing a similar strategy. Aus-tralias refining capacity, on the other hand, covers only 7 per cent of the global mark
28、et.China is a key player in nickel smelting (an important precursor to refining) and refining, despite Indonesian and PhilippineSWP Comment 57September 20223ambitions. Although China does not pos-sess major nickel reserves, its smelting and refining operations are estimated to exceed three-quarters
29、and one-third of global sup-ply, respectively. Thus, the EU has to decide between purchasing smelted or refined nickel from Indonesia for which it will compete with China or raw nickel from Australia and the Philippines that has mostly been smelted in China thus far. The pro-spective costs and risks
30、 that arise with the ambitions to break away from Russia are significant.Yet, the situation concerning PEM elec-trolysers is even more challenging. Cath-odes and anodes in PEM units are usually made from platinum and iridium, respec-tively. They belong to the so-called plati-num-group metals (PGMs)
31、and are among the most scarce, carbon-intense, and expen-sive metals. There are no known alterna-tives for the use of iridium in PEM units. Europes import dependency on platinum and iridium reaches 98 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively.Global PGM deposits are strongly concen-trated in South Afr
32、ica, which is the worlds largest supplier of platinum and iridium (see Figure). The current mining rates of both metals will only allow for an annual increase of PEM electrolysis capacity from 3 to 7.5 GW. However, the demand is expected to increase massively by 2030 which will require a substantial
33、 growth in mining activity.The iridium shortage is less a result of geological scarcity than one of the social and economic conditions required for in-creased mining activity. In 2013, for exam-ple, violent protests against working con-ditions in South African platinum mines led to a temporary expor
34、t ban and high price spikes. Russia is the worlds and Europes second-most important supplier of platinum, as it accounts for 13 per cent of all supply. Decoupling from Russia will therefore further cement Europes import dependence on South Africa. Zimbabwe (which currently supplies 7 per cent of all
35、 platinum in the world and 5 per cent of iridium) faces conditions that are similarlySWP Comment 57September 2022fragile as those in South Africa, and is there-fore exposed to the same risks. A genuine diversification of PGM supply is virtually impossible, since South Africa has also by far the larg
36、est reserves (90 per cent). More stable mining countries, such as the United States (US) and Canada, will experience an increase in PGM demand themselves especially since US companies are also eying manufacturing PEM electrolysers. The US is relying on the Defense Production Act to push domestic PGM
37、 production to supply its own demand, which is why the US, which accounts for only 2 per cent of global platinum supply, might cease to supply the world market.As a bottom line, diversifying the nickel supply away from Russia yields consider-able yet surmountable costs, whereas Europes dependence on
38、 nickel smelting in China and PGMs from South Africa has no workaround.Dependencies on critical components for PEM electrolysersThe production of AEL units does not re-quire any components whose security of supply poses specific risks. All components are ordinary industrial materials and can be obta
39、ined from within Europe.The supply chain for PEM electrolysers is similar to that for AEL units, albeit less developed and with fewer suppliers. The high market concentration creates depend-encies, mainly on firms from the US, Japan, and the United Kingdom (UK) (see Figure). Although they hardly pos
40、e a geopolitical risk, the market concentration makes the EU vulnerable to price developments and logistics issues.Three PEM components are considered to be especially critical: polymer electrolyte membranes, support catalysts, and the membrane electrode assembly (MEA).Polymer electrolyte membranes
41、replace the liquid electrolyte used in AEL models and are critical to the performance of PEM electrolysers and the purity of the hydro-gen. There is a Europe-based producer that supplies the membranes raw material, so4that risk is manageable. However, the mem-branes themselves have to be imported fr
42、om the UK, the US, or Japan. This allows these three countries to maintain existing advantages in technology and production scaling.Support catalysts in PEM electrolysers enhance the electrochemical reactions of the cell. The three leading companies for these components are based in the EU, the UK,
43、and Japan, respectively. Also in this case, the incumbents technological lead is a major entry barrier for newcomers.The MEA a harmonised assembled stack of proton exchange membranes, cata-lysts, and electrodes is essential for the electrolysers performance. One of the lead-ing producers is based in
44、 the UK, but other manufacturers worldwide, especially in China, are scaling up their manufacturing capacity.Upscaling the manufacture of electrolysersEurope has a strong position, but there are barriers to upscalingThe (lack of) production capacities for elec-trolysers is another obstacle to the re
45、alisa-tion of the EUs goals. According to the EC, reaching the REPowerEU targets for domes-tic production alone will require 120 GW of electrolysis capacity. However, the EU-wide electrolysis capacity in 2021 was just 0.135 GW, and the global production capacity in 2020 was capped to some 2 GW per y
46、ear. The EU already announced 118 GW of elec-trolysis capacity for 2030 (of which 73 GW will be in Spain), but the final investment decisions are still pending in most cases. Only 64 out of 750 pilot projects within the Clean Hydrogen Alliance deal with elec-trolyser manufacturing.Europe already hos
47、ts electrolyser manu-facturers with expertise in all variants, as well as strong research facilities. These actors include both large industrial players, such as thyssenkrupp and Siemens, as well as smaller companies, which often focus onemerging technologies that are not yet mature. Currently, 60 p
48、er cent of global electrolyser manufacturing capacity and 40 per cent of electrolysis capacity are located in the EU. Moreover, Europe has the lead in terms of technology: It holds approximately 40 per cent of all relevant patents. Its lead is particularly strong when it comes to PEMs.Electrolyser manufacturers, however, often complain that their customers have yet to make final investment decisions, which is why manufacturing capacities can-not be scaled up. Their customer