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1、叙利亚危机【英文】叙利亚危机【英文】AgendaBackground on Syria and MapsOpposition Players in SyriaRecent game-changing ThresholdsThe Perspective of the Assad RegimeLikely outcomes ahead for Syria2Background on SyriaSyria Overview4Ethnic Distribution in Syria5Syria OverviewHIMSDIMASHQDIMASHQTARTUSAL LADHIOIYAHHAMAIDLIB
2、HALABAR RAQQAHDAYR AZ ZAWRAL HASAKAHAS SUWAYDADARA6Syria OverviewAa7How is the situation in Syria different from that in LibyaSyrias conflict has important implications for the entire region(Libyas less so)The balance of regional power would significantly shift with a fall of the Assad regimeOther r
3、egional players have an interest in sustaining the Assad regimeThe Syrian government has air defences which prevent easy airspace control by the WestThe Syrian government has the military power to crush a poorly armed oppositionThere are no easy or obvious arms supply routes to the oppositionThe Lib
4、yan civil war was largely a two dimensional conflictPrimarily a geographically east-west conflictPrimarily a conflict between the peoples of the east(Cyrenica)and the west(Tripoli and the Qadhadhfa)The West was comfortable with the ideology of the opposition Libya.Not so in Syria.8How is the situati
5、on in Syria different from that in EgyptOpposition to Assad grew gradually,and had different various origins.Massive opposition to Mubarak was immediate,universal,and overwhelming.Syrias conflict has sectarian overtones which have implications across the region.The struggle to depose Mubarak was wit
6、hout a sectarian angleIf the Assad regime falls,it is not clear who/what will fill the power vacuum.With Egypt,there was the army.The Assad regime has demonstrated that it is willing to use lethal force against its people.Mubarak demonstrated relative restraint9Opposition Players in SyriaSyrian Nati
7、onal Council(SNC)The Syrian National Council(SNC),founded in Oct.2011,is a coalition of seven groups outside of Syria.It seeks to serve as a single point of contact for the international community.The SNC wants to:Overthrow the regime using all legal meansAffirm national unity,reject ethnic strifePr
8、otect national independence and sovereignty,and reject foreign military interventionIn March 2012,the SNC created a military bureau to co-ordinate armed anti-government groups in Syria.The FSA said it would not co-operate with the new bureau.The SNC is dominated by Syrias majority Sunnis,and has not
9、 attracted much support from Christians or AlawitesThe SNC is not yet as credible as Libyas NTC,but intl community still interested11National Co-ordination Council(NCC)National Co-ordination Committee(NCC),formed inside Syria in September,2012,is made up of 13 left-leaning political parties,three Ku
10、rdish political parties,and independents.The NNC wants:Wants to dialogue with the regime,conditional on military withdrawal from the streetsNo foreign intervention that would involve military measures,such as a no-fly zoneEconomic sanctions and other diplomatic measures to increase pressure on Assad
11、The NCC has also been reluctant to affiliate itself with the SNC and has challenged the SNCs primacy12Free Syrian ArmyThe Free Syrian Army(FSA)was formed in August 2011 by army deserters based in Turkey.The FSA says it wants to:Topple the regimeProtect the countrys resources Stand up to the Syrian a
12、rmy which supports the Assad regimeThe FSA claims to have 15,000 fighters,but may have lessAnalysts say that the FSA is no longer only deserters,but also an umbrella group for civilians who have taken up armsThe UN Human Rights Council said it had documented human rights abuses committed by the FSA.
13、The FSA said field commanders made independent decisionsThe FSA and SNC have found it difficult to work together13Areas of Fighting14Current Status of Situation in SyriaThe UNs(Annans)six-point peace plan1.Syrian-led political process to address the aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people2.UN-
14、supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians3.All parties to ensure provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting,and implement a daily two-hour humanitarian pause4.Authorities to intensify the pace and scale of release of a
15、rbitrarily detained persons5.Authorities to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists6.Authorities to respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefullyThe UNs(Annans)six-point peace plan1.Syrian-led political process to address the aspirations and concern
16、s of the Syrian people2.UN-supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians3.All parties to ensure provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting,and implement a daily two-hour humanitarian pause4.Authorities to intensify the pac
17、e and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons5.Authorities to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists6.Authorities to respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefullySyria Observer MissionUN Security Council resolution 2042 approves a team of
18、up to 300 unarmed observersAs of this week there are about 100 unarmed observers in SyriaViolence continues despite the presence of observers.Even a convoy including observers escorted by the Syrian Army was attacked on May 9th.Currently,bomb attacks are on the rise,and pitched battles are much less
19、 frequent than one month ago15Recent Game-Changing ThresholdsThe Assad regime is getting more and more brutal in its repressionThe regime has begun to use heavy weapons in residential areas,trapping civilians in the crossfireThe regime did not make efforts to spare civilians,and it has not shown con
20、cern for civilians who were displacedThere is evidence of looting by regime forcesThere are allegations that the regime forces have engaged in grave atrocitiesThe regime is no longer holding back as it did earlier with the uprisings(although it always beat demonstrators,tortured detainees,etc.)Regim
21、e began to declare“victories”over the opposition,but at a high civilian cost.Regime forces ultimately radicalized segments of the population with their abuse of armed power Israeli soldiers detain Palestinian men on a street in the West Bank.Administrative detention of Palestinians by Israel is a co
22、mmon human rights abuse.Thousands of Palestinians are in Israeli jails today uncharged of any crime.17The Syrian opposition responds by becoming more savvy&strategicThe opposition got more savvy,and more creative.The governments attempt to divide and conquer and compartmentalize the country didnt wo
23、rk.Opposition groups worked hard to bridge geographic and sectarian linesSome opposition groups started to go on the offensive,including using arms(weeding out informants,tracking snipers,attacking checkpoints,ambushing regime security forces)There was also evidence of the criminalization of both th
24、e regime and opposition forces(e.g.kidnapping,carjacking,etc.)Two opposition narratives emerged:that of the peaceful and virtuous activist;and that of the armed opposition18Other alarming developmentsBomb attacks on security installations,esp.in Damascus and Aleppo,whether by opposition,or plants by
25、 regime forces.This creates a normalization of high levels of violence.It also gives the regime the excuse to“fight against terrorism”as it pursues its endBut as the violence of the regime causes it to lose touch with its population,its ability to use anything but violence diminishesMassacres create
26、 a new excuse for cyclic violence and brutality.Even before the opposition became violent,the regime sought to convince the Alawite community that they were in dangerAlthough its suspected that some of the worst massacres have been committed by Alawite militias,its uncertain that the Assad regime wo
27、uld order such attacks.Probably because of the massacres,protests are taking a more sectarian tone.With its new military-based oppression(replacing its security-based oppression),the regime gains a new comfort that it will remain in power,despite the fact that the country is coming apart19Possible d
28、irections now between regime and oppositionAs the regime systematically targets opposition strongholds,the opposition will adopt new methods too:guerrilla warefare,and an“insurgency/counter-insurgency”cycle will begin.This will make it increasingly difficult to create a space for peaceful protest.As
29、 the opposition splits between“popular movement”and“insurgency,”several negative repercussions are possible:The armed opposition will become more scattered,and theres the danger it could re-emerge with a more religious ideological underpinningThe armed opposition could become more violent as it beco
30、mes more desperate,and more isolatedThe Gulf states may try to influence the ideology of the armed opposition,again with less altruistic motives.20The Perspective of the Assad RegimeThe Regimes defence of itselfThe regime defends itself with some of the following argumentsThey feel its clear that do
31、mestic and foreign opposition is uniquely designed to overthrow the regime.They say concessions would only embolden the oppositionThey insist reforms will come once the situation improves.(But these reforms should have been implemented early in 2011,before the situation got out of control.At this po
32、int,small reforms will not be sufficient for Syrians harbouring much deeper grievances than before.)They feel the regime was never given a chance.By asking early on for regime change,the opposition shut the door on reform.The regime needs to ensure stability in Syria.No amount of suffering should be
33、 allowed to destabilize the country.The Syrian Army continues to support the Assad regime,partly because many Alawites hold key posts.22Internationally,Syria is more isolated than everRussia(unenthusiastically followed by China)is its sole backerThe Assad regime has no more political or ideological
34、cards to play It used to claim that it was the vanguard against US imperialism and Israeli hegemony,but its only goal now is self-survivalAs it wages war against its own people,it exposes the country to foreign influences.Regime ties to important key sectors within the country are now brokenSlow but
35、 surely,its military capacity is eroding through a continuous trickle of defectors,declining recruitment and plummeting moraleThe economy is weak,between sanctions and disruption to the agricultural sector from the conflictDespite announcements of elections in May,there is no indication that anythin
36、g fundamental will changeThe regime talks about dialogue with the opposition,but continues to intimidate and jail even the most moderate23Other key realities with the Assad RegimeCritical issues for any genuine political change are off-limits for the regime:the presidents legitimacy;the ruling famil
37、ys role;the security services behaviour;etc.Calls for the toppling of the regime have empowered the regime hardlinersThe regime would like the outside world to stop pushing for dramatic change,and to accept incremental change over timeThe regime cannot revert back to the former status quo,but it can
38、“endure”indefinitely with the ruling family still in placeThe regime does not really fear a“failed/dysfunctional state,”as the regime would be unconcerned with a humanitarian crisis.24The international community has admitted its inability and reluctance to interveneUltimately,the regime is convinced
39、 that its not in too much danger,so it need not cede anything to the oppositionThe international community remains powerless weeks of bombing civilian areas did not change the powerlessness of the international communityFrom the regimes perspective,the US softened its position The US conceded that t
40、he regime was gaining groundThe US expressed concern over the prospect of civil warThe US expressed caution over military interventionThe US expressed caution over arming the oppositionThe US noted the disunity within the oppositionThe US noted the growing jihadi presence in SyriaThe regime didnt se
41、e any concrete outcome from two“Friends of Syria”meetings:February in Tunisia and April in Turkey25Key realities for the Opposition and International CommunityThe opposition will likely never accept the“hard sell”expected from the regime:rule by the same president,the same family and security servic
42、es.The exiled opposition the Syrian National Council has so far proved fragmented,lacking vision,and ineffective.The SNC has almost become an asset to the Assad regimeThe opposition is now more of an“irritant”than a“menace,”as the regime has regained control of previously“liberated”territoryThe econ
43、omys slow collapse will not drive the regime to make concessions the regime is only interested in its own survival.For the sympathizers of the regime,much of what they fear from a“transition”will not likely now take place even without a transition(i.e.sectarian violence,instability,economic chaos,et
44、c.)26Likely outcomes ahead for SyriaThe four international postures on SyriaThere are four postures on the situation in SyriaAssads allies,Iran and Hezbollah,have unconditionally supported it,and will continue to do so.Russia and China are taking a hands off approach,blaming Assads domestic and inte
45、rnational opponents for the escalation.They call on domestic players to sign on to a vague dialogue;and international players to cease pressureThe West is frustrated and ambivalent,having exhausted all sources of diplomatic and economic pressure,fearful of what might happen,and tiptoeing around mili
46、tary optionsSaudi Arabia and Qatar have stated intentions to arm and compensate the opposition,but its not clear how they would get arms to Syria,and even if they do,Assads regime is strong and would not be easily toppled.Things will likely only change if theres a different balance of power:There co
47、uld be a different political balance of power,if Russia changes its attitudeThere could be a different military balance of power,through a change on the ground28Unrealistic expectations on all sidesIn SyriaThe regime wants the opposition to surrenderMany Syrians bank on international interventionSom
48、e think Russia and the West will go through a rapprochementSome thing the opposition will be eradicated,and the former status quo will returnRussia and China driven by their aversion to popular protests,and Western intervention will hope that Assad somehow calms things,whether through military or do
49、mestic political means.Russia realizes that its continued relevance depends on its continued role as maverickThe West is hoping the violence will disappear(whether through Tahrir-like demonstrations;military defections;or a palace coup);or the opposition will become more cohesive,and more clearly sy
50、mpathetic to Western interestsSNC chairman Burhan Ghalioun has had trouble uniting the opposition,and has recently changed his posture in support of armed opposition.29The Likely Scenario for Syria and the International PlayersThe Assad regime is going to want to drag out any process of diplomacy or