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1、CONTENTSINTRODUCTION3One year into the crisis: a stocktaking 3SDG INVESTMENTS FOR RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 6Provision of fresh financing6LIQUIDITY SUPPORT 8A new general allocation of SDRs9EXTENSION OF THE DEBT SERVICE SUSPENSION 10DEBT RELIEF AND THE COMMON FRAMEWORK IITHE INTERNATIONAL DEBT ARCHITECT
2、URE13Strengthened architecture through principles 13Building on existing initiatives14CONCLUSIONS AND CALL FOR ACTION 17Debt relief and the Common FrameworkIn my brief dated April 2020,1 urged the international community to consider targeted debt relief beyond a moratorium. I commend the G20 for est
3、ablishing the Common Framework on Debt Treatments Beyond the DSSI in November 2020, a welcome extension of the initial focus on providing liquidity support towards addressing solvency concerns.Early in the pandemic, the IMF had already provided debt service relief to its poorest and most vulnerable
4、members through grants from the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT). The G20s Common Framework for Debt Treatments Beyond the DSSI (the Common Framework) extends the provision of debt relief to all the DSSI-eligible countries. Its goal is to facilitate on a case-by-case basis a timely an
5、d orderly debt restructuring of bilateral official debts with members of the G20, including hybrid lenders. Other, non-G20 official creditors, as well as private creditors are invited to participate and provide debt relief on the same terms. Three countries have so far requested debt restructuring t
6、hrough the Common Framework.The Common Framework, however, faces similar limitations to the DSSI. First, vulnerable middle-income countries remain ineligible. Second, in the absence of additional measures to incentivize or compel private creditor participation, comparable treatment of commercial cre
7、ditors will remain challenging in practice. The recent downgrade of the sovereign credit ratings of one of the countries that applied for debt relief through the Common Framework could further disincentivize countries from approaching their private creditors. Despite these limitations, the Common Fr
8、amework can be an effective platform for creditor coordination, which could serve as a starting point towards creating a more universal and permanent framework for sovereign debt resolution.The international community is urged to: Build on the Common Framework to offer legal and technical advice on
9、options for debt and debt service relief to help countries in need - including debt swaps, debt buy-backs9 credit enhancements, reprofiling or exchanging debt, and/or cancellation 一 depending on a countrys specific circumstances and debt challenges;Extend the eligibility to debt relief under the Com
10、mon Framework to other vulnerable countries on a case-by-case basis; and Consider other mechanisms that would allow countries to access the Common Framework without creating a stigma or compromising the credit rating of the beneficiaries, including funds and other instruments within existing institu
11、tions.The international community should consider an initiative to build on and complement the Common Framework, both by reaching a wider group of countries and by offering capacity building and legal advisory services to debtor countries around a range of debt reduction strategies. Its focus would
12、be on (i) maintaining sound debt management, as well as (ii) freeing up resources for investment in the COVID-19 response, including securing vaccines, and the SDGs, including climate action. In this context, integrated national financing frameworks (INFFs) can play a role in helping debtor countrie
13、s determine their long-term financial needs.In providing debt relief, this complementary initiative to the Common Framework would consider a range of instruments and initiatives, including debt swaps, buy-backs, exchanges, and credit enhancements, and offer a spectrum of tailor-made relief initiativ
14、es depending on the debtor countrys situation. As it would offer a wide range of legal and technical advice, requests from countries for support through this initiative should not per se trigger a downgrade by the rating agencies, unlike what has been observed with the Common Framework. The initiati
15、ve could also help support debtors in debt restructuring negotiations with their creditors. In addition, as indicated by the IMF proposals in the 2020 Annual meetings, international financial institutions could offer complementary credits to countries involved in debt restructurings to facilitate re
16、aching an agreement. Ocampo, J .A. (2021), Future Development Managing developing countries sovereign debt, available at brookings.edu/blog/ future-development/202 l/03/08/managing-developing-countries-sovereign-debt.The international debt architectureWhile the dramatic impact of the current crisis
17、requires an immediate response, the crisis has also highlighted the need to address underlying challenges, both at national levels and in the global architecture. The current debt architecture has been ineffective in both preventing repeated episodes of unsustainable debt buildups and in restructuri
18、ng debts, when needed, in an efficient, fair, and durable manner. It is characterized by numerous gaps in transparency and a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities. More importantly, there are no processes that incentivize all creditors and debtors to act cooperatively in accordance to a u
19、niform set of principles and standards.Architecture reform will require new tools, instruments, and legislative backing, but also a shift in mindset towards a set of principles including responsible borrowing and lending with fair, transparent, efficient and equitable workouts. The new architecture
20、must also be aligned with the SDGs and the goals of the Paris Agreement, and acknowledge the need to transition to a sustainable, inclusive and resilient economy in all of its aspects. Any reforms must be based on a process with accepted legitimacy by a wide range of stakeholders that includes Paris
21、 and non-Paris Club official creditors, private creditors, and sovereign debtors. It is in the interest of all parties that international institutions facilitate this process by providing a space for open dialogue and to build trust and transparency in a systematic way.The reform of the internationa
22、l debt architecture should have two objectives: (i) to facilitate expedient, fair and orderly debt workouts,when needed, and (ii) to address the underlying causes of unsustainable increases in sovereign debts and prevent their recurrence. An effective debt architecture should give countries greater
23、room for investing in sustainable development and play an important role in increasing the resilience and stability of the international financial system in the face of future pandemics or climate-related disasters.STRENGTHENED ARCHITECTURE THROUGH PRINCIPLESAs a basis for the international debt arc
24、hitecture, a wide range of stakeholders should agree on a set of principles and considerations.Possible considerations include the following: Debt transparency and management.Transparency should be promoted in order to enhance the accountability of the actors concerned, which can be achieved through
25、 the timely sharing of both data and processes related to sovereign debt workouts.Gaps in debt transparency have grown larger over time with more diverse creditors. The World Bank reports that half of all IDA countries do not have adequate capacity in their debt management policy and institutions, i
26、ncluding data collection and reporting.Building consensus for new norms and standards for transparency in debt reporting and data is the foundation for a more resilientinternational architecture. One solution is to provide additional technical assistance to improve such capacity. Another is to shift
27、 incentives for all debtors and creditors, public and private, to provide more accurate and complete information. Close collaboration among international organizations, particularly the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank, will be essential in this regard. Sustainability. Workouts from a sove
28、reign debt crisis should aim to restore sound public debt management, while preserving access to financing resources under favourable conditions, including concessional financing which is important in accelerating the achievement of the SDGs and Paris Agreement. Consistent with the Doha Declaration
29、on Financing for Development and the Addis Ababa Action Plan, workouts should not compromise the ability of debtor countries to achieve sustainable development and the SDGs. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda recognizes that while maintaining sustainable debt levels is the responsibility of the borrowing
30、 countries, lenders also have a responsibility to lend in a way that does not undermine a coun- trys sound debt management. Multiple initia- tives by the International Financial Institutions are underway to promote responsible borrow- ing and lending practices, as well as soft-law* approaches such a
31、s the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing or the UNCTAD principles on promoting responsible sovereign lending and borrowing. Include mechanisms that consider the risk of credit rating downgrades, including through an open conversation with investors, market participants and credit r
32、ating agencies. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, United Nations Member States had committed to work towards a global consensus on guidelines for debtor and creditor responsibilities, but such global consensus remains elusive to date. Shared responsibility and fair burden sharing among creditors and
33、 between debtors and creditors. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda recognizes that there is scope to improve coordination between debtors and creditors to minimize both creditor and debtor moral hazards, and to facilitate fair burden-sharing and the need for debtors and creditors to share responsibility
34、to prevent and resolve unsustainable debt situations. The Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructurings of the United Nations provide additional guidance for debtors and creditors in restructuring processes. Develop long-term credit ratings (IO years or more) to complement existing assessments.L
35、ong-term productive investments in the SDGs can enhance long-term debt management, but they are not accounted for in credit ratings. Yet if investments improve debt management in the long term, they should be financeable in the near term. Credit rating agencies should consider issuing long-term rati
36、ngs alongside traditional ratings, building on similar assessments already conducted by the IMF and the World Bank.Indeed, a favourable long-term rating could both create incentives for countries to invest more effectively in sustainable development and help them raise long-term capital for that pur
37、pose.1 9 UNCTAD, Principles on promoting responsible sovereign lending and borrowing, IO January 20 12. Available at s:/unctad.org/ system/files/official-document/gdsddf20 12misc I _en.pdf.20 General Assembly Resolution on Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes (A/69/L.84), J uly
38、 2015.BUILDING ON EXISTING INITIATIVESInclude state-contingent clauses in public debt contracts to automatize standstills in times of crisis, and to set a precedent for private markets.State-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) link debt servicing to a predefined variable such as GDP, national income
39、, exports, or commodity prices. Similarly, some loans contain clauses for extreme events such as hurricanes and other natural disasters. They can be designed to provide additional creditor compensation in good times or relief in bad times such as disasters. They thus build debt standstills into cont
40、racts and eliminate the need for renegotiation in times of stress. In the context of debt restructurings, they may help avoid protracted disputes about the economic outlook by tying debt service to future outcomes.The use of such instruments in the past has been rather limited. To realize their pote
41、ntial, the official sector, including G20 members, should consider incorporating standardized SCDIs in official lending and debt restructurings and enhance data provision to facilitate the use of common state variables not subject to manipulation risk. They would also need to explicitly recognize th
42、e resilience afforded by SCDIs in assessments of the sustainability of debt management. Complement existing instruments for more effective debt crisis resolution, including collective action clauses, anti-vulture legislation and creditor committees.Reforming the international debt architecture is ne
43、cessary, especially to address a potential increase in sovereign debt restructurings in the aftermath of the pandemic, including the risk of a systemic crisis. Reforms should be aimed at providing speedy and sufficiently deep debt relief to countries that need it, benefitting not only these countrie
44、s but the system as a whole.After the IMFs endorsement in 2014, Collective Action Clauses (CACs) have been included in almost all new sovereign bonds to date. CACs allow a qualified majority of bondholders to make a restructuring agreement with a debtor binding to all bondholders, preventing an unco
45、operative minority of bondholders from blocking it. CACs can work in conjunction with anti-vulture fund legislation. Such legislation, currently enacted in a few countries, limits the ability of holdout creditors to receive, through litigation payment at face value, debt bought in secondary markets
46、at deeply discounted values. However, while CACs represent a promising future mechanism for greater debt cooperation, they are not retroactive many developing countries have outstanding debt stock without CACs. The architecture could be strengthened over time if all major financial centres made it m
47、andatory to include CACs in all maturities exceeding one year.Creditor committees have been used to varying degrees in sovereign debt restructurings. They can help bring official and private creditors together and allow the debtor to negotiate with a single body. Once a consensus is reached, committ
48、ees can limit holdouts by endorsing the deal, and applying pressure on others to sign. They can be useful in a world of non-transparent debt data as all creditors receive access to the same financial information and can see what others claims are. Use the G20 Common Framework as a step toward a more
49、 universal and permanent framework for sovereign debt resolution. Launch a global forum for sovereign debt resolution and coordination to build consensus for new norms and standards for debt transparency and management, considering options of mediation and arbitration in debt restructuring.Proposals include the establishment of a sovereign debt forum, which could provide a platform for discussions between creditors and