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1、OUR MISSIONThe Foreign Policy Research Institute is dedicated to producing the highest quality scholarship and nonpartisan policy analysis focused on crucial foreign policy and national security challenges facing the United States. We educate those who make and influence policy, as well as the publi
2、c at large, through the lens of history, geography, and culture.Offering IdeasIn an increasingly polarized world, we pride ourselves on our tradition of nonpartisan scholarship. We count among our ranks over 100 affiliated scholars located throughout the nation and the world who appear regularly in
3、national and international media, testify on Capitol Hill, and are consulted by U.S. government agencies.Educating the American PublicFPRI was founded on the premise that an informed and educated citizenry is paramount for the U.S. to conduct a coherent foreign policy. Through in-depth research and
4、extensive public programming, FPRI offers insights to help the public understand our volatile world.Championing Civic LiteracyWe believe that a robust civic education is a national imperative. FPRI aims to provide teachers with the tools they need in developing civic literacy, and works to enrich yo
5、ung peoples understanding of the institutions and ideas that shape American political life and our role in the world.In terms of the ends of Russian strategy. Western observers should understand that Moscow is often comfortable with protracted, low-level conflict and unclear outcomes in ways that We
6、stern governments are not. Russias war in Syria is a limited wan and the Kremlin is comfortable with the fact that limited wars often end inconclusivelyif they end at all. Western governments often strive to conclusively defeat an adversary, set the country where the war happened on the path to secu
7、rity and stability, and bring the troops home. This is a very tall order and is one of the reasons Western wars of the 21st century have largely been seen as failures.Russia does not need such an outcome to see its intervention in Syria as a success. An outcome that restores the governmenfs sovereig
8、nty over most, but not all, of Syria is acceptable, as long as Damascus and the areas around Russias air base and naval base are stable. Similarly, Moscow has neither the appetite nor the means to engage in postwar reconstruction and stabilization in all of Syria. It may assist in the areas importan
9、t to Russia, but will be content to let the rest of the country languish in post-war misery. As noted earlier; it bears watching to see if these minimalist goals are acceptable to theAssad regime. If not, then a rift could develop between Moscow and Damascus.For Western audiences, several lessons em
10、erge from an examination of Russian ways in Syria. First, Moscows lean, flexible approach focused on solving discrete problems, but, in doing so, it created other problems more difficult to solve. For example, the Surrender or die“ strategy the Russian military used in opposition-controlled cities,
11、combined with the offer to let opposition fighters withdraw to Idlib Province, enabled Russia and the Assad regime to capture these cities without doing the hard, bloody work of urban fighting and without running huge prisoner camps for captured fighters. However this strategy created another proble
12、m: Idlib Province is now a Mpetri dish of terrorists, Turkish-backed opposition groups, and the remnants of Western-backed groups. The Assad regimes attempt to resolve this problem by destroying all opposition in Idlib in early 2020 was met with a vicious Turkish counterattack that severely hobbled
13、Syrias military capability. An early March summit between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan resulted in a tenuous ceasefire, but did nothing to resolve the problem that is Idlib.IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST- RUSSIAS WAR IN SYRIA7 “NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons North Atlantic Treaty Orga
14、nization, declassified_138256.htm, accessed June 25, 2020.The means that Russia used to achieve its objectives in Syria also hold implications for the West. Many of these will be examined in the next section of this chapter, but two points are relevant here. First, Russian strategy was not means-dri
15、ven. Moscow never substantially increased the means devoted to Syria, and refused to allow itself to be drawn deeper into the conflict than its limited objectives warranted. For example, when confronted with the fact that the Syrian Arab Army had essentially disintegrated and was unable to provide t
16、he ground force to do the fighting, instead of deploying large numbers of Russian ground forces, Russia patiently cobbled together a ground force from local and regional militias while it reconstituted the Syrian Army. If this pattern holds, then the Kremlin is likely to be able to avoid “quagmires“
17、 of the type that the United States encountered in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Patience, deliberately limited ends, and a refusal to throw more resources at the problem may allow Russia to retain its leverage and not MownH the conflict the way that Western governments often do.EFFECT ON THE CAPABILITIE
18、S OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCESRussia has always been primarily a land power. Even at the height of its Cold War naval power, the Soviet Navy never rivaled the U.S. Navys ability to project power globally. The Red Army and its allies, by contrast, dwarfed their NATO adversaries, at least in terms of t
19、he sheer number of forces and equipment. In 1975, the Warsaw Pact had some 58 divisions facing 27 NATO divisions, and 19,000 tanks facing 6,100 NATO tanks in Central Europe1 Today, the balance of land power in Europe looks drastically different. NATO armies todaytotal some 1.75 million soldiers and
20、9,460 tanks against some 230,000 soldiers and 2,600 tanks for Russia, now stripped of its former Warsaw Pact allies, all of whom have joined NATO.WHERE RUSSIADOES SEEM POISED TO CHALLENGEWESTERN INTERESTSIS IN THE BLACKSEA AND EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN.Despite NATOs clear superiority in land power, some
21、Western politicians, military leaders, and analysts continue to worry about a Russian land invasion of Europe. Concern peaked after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. This concern is overstated: Russia can pose operational dilemmas for NATO, for exampl
22、e by closing the Suwalki Gap between Belarus and Kaliningrad or cutting off NATO forces in the Baltics. Assuming NATO members possess the political will to fight, a major war between Russia and NATO only ends one way: NATO victory. And there is no indication that Russia intends to start a war with N
23、ATO, in the Baltics or anywhere else. Some NATO members might have misgivings about the sanctity of the Alliances Article 5, but Russia shows no sign of wanting to test NATO here. Add to this the facts that Russias State Armament Plan 2011-2020 prioritized modernization for the Aerospace Force and t
24、he Navy, and the fact that these are the services that gained the most experience in Syria, and the focus by some Western analystson the threat of a Russian land invasion of Europe looks misplaced.Where Russia does seem poised to challenge Western interests is in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterran
25、ean. All of Russias three most recent military interventionsGeorgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and Syria in 2015- have occurred in this region. Of these, Syria is the only intervention that has been both overt and long term: the Russia-Georgia War was over in five days; Russias war in Ukraine is unde
26、clared and unacknowledged, so Moscow has been careful to limit the extent of its involvement. The fact that it is taking place where the Russian challenge to the West is greatest and that it has been an overt, long-term war means that the Syrian wars effect on the Russian armed forces deserves serio
27、us study.Ground ForcesIn their chapter, Les Grau and Charles Barties note that Russian ground force operations revolved around a Russian model of military advisors, integrated and modernized fires, mobility and counter-mobility operations, a featured role for military police, and use ofSpecial Force
28、s and private military company (PMC) forces. While the Russian Army was the least affected of the services by its experience in Syria, it nevertheless improved its capabilities in these areas. As Grau and Barties argue, Russias ground force advisors played a significant role in saving the Assad regi
29、me from collapse. Russian military advisors soon realized the army that they were supposed to be advising existed largely in name only. In reality, by the time Russia intervened in September 2015, the Syrian Arab Army was close to collapse. Instead of falling in on coherent units, Russian advisors f
30、ound themselves relying on militias like the Desert Tigers, Desert Falcons, and Hezbollah, while working to rebuild the Syrian Army. Kofman gives an example of this, noting that Russian advisors built the 5th Assault Corps “out of disparate fighting formations and volunteers, plus hiring perhaps 2,0
31、00 mercenaries to fight as battalion tactical groups丁In contrast to the U.S. model of advising, which uses Special Forces or Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) specifically trained in the task, Russia deployed entire staffs from combat units to Syria in advisor roles. While this meant that t
32、he Russian advisors were less familiar with advising partner forces than a U.S. unit would be, the Russian model has the advantage that it produced entire staffs of combat units with advising experience. In an era of warfare where fighting with partner forces is increasingly common, the ability to a
33、dvise and fight at the same time may provide advantages that the U.S. model lacks since U.S. SFABs are not meant to be employed as combat units.Russia employed its artillery extensively and effectively in Syria. The Russian Army learned to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to spot targets for its
34、artillery and to protect lead and flanks of columns of Russian and Syrian forces. The long loiter time and relative invisibility of UAVs give them considerable advantages over helicopters Russias previous platform of choicein this role. The Russian Army also established a combined command and contro
35、l system in order to integrate Russian and Syrian fires, something it had little experience in since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia used almost the entire inventory of its tube and rocket artillery systems in Syria, as well as the Iskander Operational-Tactical Rocket Complex (OTRK). Iskand
36、er fires two short- range ballistic missiles (SS-26 STONE) or two ground-launched cruise missiles (SSC-7), and is capable of hitting targets at ranges of up to 500 kilometers. The use of UAVs to find targets and do battle damage assessment and the integration of Russian and partner force fires are c
37、apabilities that Russia largely developed in Syria. And the use of nearly the entire inventory of the Russian Armys artillery over a long period of time in the Syrian desert doubtless revealed much about how to maintain the capabilities of these systems in a harsh and austere environmentRussian Army
38、 engineers and MPs also played significant roles in Syria. Engineers gained experience in constructing installation defenses, route reconnaissance, road construction, and water purification, among other capabilities. Perhaps most significantly, Russian engineers demonstrated the ability to bridge ri
39、vers under fire. In September 2017, after several failed attempts by Syrian forces to do so, Russian engineers constructed a float bridge across the Euphrates just southof Dayr-az-Zawr; allowing Russia and the Syrian regime to establish a foothold east of the Euphrates, which had long been an operat
40、ional objective. Russian MPs gained experience in a wide range of standard and non-standard MP tasks. Standard tasks exercised include maintaining base security; manning checkpoints and observation posts; ensuring passage to and from de-escalation and de-confliction zones; conducting security patrol
41、s; and controlling civilian traffic. They also monitored ceasefire agreements, escorted humanitarian assistance convoys, and conducted peace support operations, none of which are standard tasks for Russian MPs.RUSSIA USED PMCS, ESPECIALLY THE KREMLIN-LINKED WAGNER GROUP, EXTENSIVELY IN SYRIA.Russian
42、 Special Forces and PMCs were also active in Syria. In contrast to U.S. Army Special Forces, whose missions are unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense (training and assisting partner forces), direct action (raids and attacks on important targets), special reconnaissance, and counterterrori
43、sm, Russian spetznaz in Syria performed a more limited mission set. The primary spetznaz missions in Syria were long-range reconnaissance and spotting targets for artillery, missile, and air strikes. Russian spetznaz have also had a geographic focus that is unlike the Western Special Forces model. W
44、hile Western Special Forces are trained to work in any environment, spetznaz in Syria have generally operated in the deserts and mountains, leaving the cities to conventional forces.Russia used PMCs, especially the Kremlin- linked Wagner Group, extensively in Syria.Grau and Barties conclude that at
45、the high point of its activities, Wagner was estimated to employ 6,000 personnel, with some 2,500 of them working in Syria. Russias use of PMCs in Syria also does not follow the Western model, in which PMCs generally perform personal security detail (PSD) and guard duties. Russian PMCs in Syria were
46、 configured for combat and performed full- scale combat operations. Grau and Barties provide a picture of the Wagner Groups organization for combat. Wagner deployed four reconnaissance and assault brigades to Syria. Each brigade had three companies, and each company had up to 100 personnel. Wagner a
47、lso deployed an artillery, armor, reconnaissance, communications, staff, and support units.PMCs provide the Kremlin “off the books为 and Mnon-attributable,9 combat power in Syria. Augmented by PMCs that do actual fighting, the Kremlin can claim a smaller official footprint in Syria, and it can allow
48、PMCs to conduct missions that it prefers not to be associated with. The best example of this is the February 2018 incident near the town of Khasham in the Dayr-az-Zawr governorate. Wagner Group and allied Syrian forces attacked toward a unit of the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), where U
49、.S. Special Forces Advisors were present. When the U.S. ground de-confliction cell called the Russian headquarters at Khmeimim, Russian officers claimed no knowledge of the attack or control of the attacking forces. Email exchange between the author and the Director of the CJTF-OIR Russian Ground Deconfliction Cell. The resulting U.S. counterattack killed over 100 of the attackers. Kofman argues that poor coordinationand not a deliberate Russian attempt to tes