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1、PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICSRebuilding the Global EconomyNicholas R. Lardy is the Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an expert on the Chinese economy. His most recent books are The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Refor
2、m in China? (2019) and Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (2014).UA A series outlining policy priorities ana solutionsMEMORANDUM ONPRIORITIES FOR 2021 ECONOMIC TALKSWITH CHINATo: The Chair of the US Delegation for Bilateral Economic Talks with China From: Nicholas R. Lardy Octob
3、er 2020Background: Economic negotiations with China must be a component of a consistent overall strategy to promote US interests, rather than one element of a menu of mutually inconsistent and constantly changing initiatives. The foundation of this strategy should be a comprehensive program of US ec
4、onomic renewal that maintains American technological leadership, rather than a defensive strategy that seeks to slow Chinas technological and economic rise. This strategy of addressing problems at home must include the rebuilding of crumbling infrastructure, reversing recent cuts in federal support
5、for research and development (R&D), and a smarter immigration policy that brings to the United States talented science and technology specialists who will strengthen the US economy.The overall strategy must recognize that regime change from the Chinese Communist Party, a crisis of the Chinese econom
6、y, or even a sharp decline it its growth trajectory are all unlikely over the time horizon of this administration. The incoming administration should assume that Chinas economy and its influence on the overall world economy will continue to expand.Neither a general decoupling from China nor the prom
7、otion of regime change should be an element of this overall strategy.PRIORITY 1: Be selective with requestsRecognize that economic negotiations with China are likely to continue to generate only modest results if the United States makes simultaneous demands for far-reaching changes in multiple Chine
8、se economic policies. Better to start with well formulated requests on one or two high priority areas where there is at least a modicum of potential Chinese receptivity. Recently, for example, the authorities in China have themselves emphasized that most state- owned enterprises should be increasing
9、ly evaluated on their economic returns. This opens the door to potentially productive negotiations leading to a curtailment of subsidies to state- owned companies.A corollary of this approach is that the US delegation should be relatively small: Not every government department and agency needs to be
10、 represented.1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW | Washingtonz DC 20036-1903 USA | +1.202.328.9000 | MEMORANDUM ON PRIORITIES FOR 2021 ECONOMIC TALKS WITH CHINAChinas share of global trade is rising even more strongly in 2020, year to date, while the US share is collapsing.c. China has substantially liber
11、alized access by foreign firms to its immense domestic financial market and is now an increasingly important destination for foreign portfolio investment.i. Chinese regulators have allowed multiple securities, asset management, insurance, and other financial firms from the United States, Europe, and
12、 Japan to convert existing minority positions in joint ventures with Chinese partners to majority foreign-owned firms and have licensed a number of new wholly foreign- owned financial firms.ii. US investors now hold well over $1 trillion in Chinese bonds and equities, up from $240 billion in 2007.PR
13、IORITY 5: Avoid a policy of decoupling”Recognize that the implication of the above is that a US-led general decoupling from China is likely to be a high-cost, low-benefit policy for the United States and a nonstarter for its allies and partners.a. Other countries have shown little interest in partic
14、ipating in a US-led decoupling strategy, given Chinas growing global economic and financial role. Their appetite for joining a US-led effort to promote regime change in China is even less. China accounted for 30 percent of global economic expansion in 2019, and its share in 2020 will almost certainl
15、y be larger. Thus, a US decoupling strategy would be a policy of economic self-isolation from a major source of global growth and trade. Non-US firms would quickly fill the void left by a unilateral US decoupling, gaining a larger and larger share of Chinas imports, currently running at $2 trillion
16、annually.b. A unilateral US decoupling would impose huge costs on US households and businesses that have benefited from the availability of lower-cost goods from China.c. Even a narrower US decoupling in technology is likely to be a high-cost strategy for the United States.i. Shutting US semiconduct
17、or companies out of the China market, as the United States now seems to be doing, for example, would reduce their revenue sharply, causing capital expenditures by these firms to fall by $13 billion and leading to the loss of 124,000 US jobs.ii. More importantly, declining revenue would lead to deep
18、cuts in R&D expenditures by US semiconductor firms, meaning the United States could lose its long-standing global leadership position in an industry that is crucial for US economic competitiveness and national security.ACTIONABLE TO-DO LIST: Craft a coherent China policy to promote US interests. Ado
19、pt and work toward obtainable goals. These would not include slowing Chinas economic rise or promoting regime change. Coordinate with allies that share concerns on Chinese trade and investment practices, including state subsidies and protection of intellectual property.Focus economic negotiations on
20、 one or two high priority topics where there is at least some indication of Chinese receptivity. Avoid an omnibus approach that includes demands for far-reaching changes in multiple Chinese policies.Avoid weaponizing trade policy, for example through tariffs on Chinese imports, since the costs to the United States will likely exceed anticipated benefits.