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1、2020彼得森国际经济研究所 备忘录 20212021年与中国经济年与中国经济对话对话的的优先事项优先事项 至：美国至：美国对华对华双边经济对话代表团团长双边经济对话代表团团长 来自：尼古拉斯来自：尼古拉斯R R拉拉迪迪 20202020年年1010月月 背景：与中国的经济谈判必须是促进美国利益的一贯总体战略的组成部分，而不是一系列相互矛盾、不断变化的举措中的一部分。这一战略的基础应该是一个全面的美国经济复兴计划，它保持美国的技术领先地位，而不是旨在减缓中国技术和经济增长的防御战略。解决国内问题的战略必须包括重建摇摇欲坠的基础设施，扭转最近联邦政府对研发（R&D）支持的削减，以及更明智的移民政
2、策，为美国带来有才华的科技专家，他们将加强美国经济。 总体战略必须认识到，在本届政府任期内，中共政权更迭，中国经济危机，甚至其经济增长轨迹急剧下降都不太可能发生。即将上任的政府应该假设中国经济及其对整个世界经济的影响将继续扩大。 与无论是从总体上与中国脱钩，还是促进政权更迭，都不应成为这一总体战略的一个组成部分。 优先事项优先事项1 1：有选择地提出要求：有选择地提出要求 认识到，如果美国同时要求对中国的多项经济政策进行深远的改革，与中国的经济谈判可能只会继续产生些许的结果。最好从一两个高度优先领域的精心设计的要求开始，在这些领域中至少有一点潜在的中国接受能力。例如，最近，中国当局本身就强调，
3、大多数国有企业的经济效益应该得到越来越多的评估。这为可能导致削减对国有企业补贴的富有成效的谈判打开了大门。 这种方法的必然结果是，美国代表团应该相对较小：并非每个政府部门和机构都需要代表。 尼古拉斯尼古拉斯R R拉拉迪迪是彼得森国际经济研究所的Anthony M. Solomon高级研究员，也是中国经济专家。他的最新著作是The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China? (2019) 和 Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (2014)。 西北马萨
4、诸塞州大道1750号|华盛顿特区20036-1903美国| +1.202.328.9000 | 翻译：报告厅翻译组 更多相关内容请参考： 1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW | Washington, DC 20036-1903 USA | +1.202.328.9000 | 2020 Peterson Institute for International EconomicsNicholas R. Lardy is the Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for Internatio
5、nal Economics and an expert on the Chinese economy. His most recent books are The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China? (2019) and Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (2014).MEMORANDUM ONPRIORITIES FOR 2021 ECONOMIC TALKS WITH CHINATo: The Chair of the US Deleg
6、ation for Bilateral Economic Talks with ChinaFrom: Nicholas R. LardyOctober 2020Background: Economic negotiations with China must be a component of a consistent overall strategy to promote US interests, rather than one element of a menu of mutually inconsistent and constantly changing initiatives. T
7、he foundation of this strategy should be a comprehensive program of US economic renewal that maintains American technological leadership, rather than a defensive strategy that seeks to slow Chinas technological and economic rise. This strategy of addressing problems at home must include the rebuildi
8、ng of crumbling infrastructure, reversing recent cuts in federal support for research and development (R&D), and a smarter immigration policy that brings to the United States talented science and technology specialists who will strengthen the US economy. The overall strategy must recognize that regi
9、me change from the Chinese Communist Party, a crisis of the Chinese economy, or even a sharp decline it its growth trajectory are all unlikely over the time horizon of this administration. The incoming administration should assume that Chinas economy and its influence on the overall world economy wi
10、ll continue to expand.Neither a general decoupling from China nor the promotion of regime change should be an element of this overall strategy.PRIORITY 1: Be selective with requests Recognize that economic negotiations with China are likely to continue to generate only modest results if the United S
11、tates makes simultaneous demands for far-reaching changes in multiple Chinese economic policies. Better to start with well formulated requests on one or two high priority areas where there is at least a modicum of potential Chinese receptivity. Recently, for example, the authorities in China have th
12、emselves emphasized that most state-owned enterprises should be increasingly evaluated on their economic returns. This opens the door to potentially productive negotiations leading to a curtailment of subsidies to state-owned companies.A corollary of this approach is that the US delegation should be
13、 relatively small: Not every government department and agency needs to be represented.与中国进行中国进行20212021年经济危机优先事项备忘年经济危机优先事项备忘录录 2 2020彼得森国际经济研究所 优优先事项先事项2 2：与盟友合作：与盟友合作 尽最大可能与美国盟友和伙伴协调。他们对中国的产业政策，特别是补贴，以及其他不公平的贸易和投资行为有着同样的担忧。如果中国听到来自欧洲、日本、韩国、加拿大以及美国的一致信息，而不是面对美国的单方面要求，中国更有可能修改其经济领域的政策。记住，中国没有盟友。美国在这
14、一领域有着巨大的优势；应该充分利用美国的优势，而不是通过对日本、韩国、印度、加拿大、墨西哥、土耳其、欧盟和澳大利亚的商品征收关税而被浪费掉。 优优先事项先事项3 3：认识到：认识到“关税战争关税战争”已经失败已经失败 认识到美国对中国商品进口征收的关税未能实现其宣布的任何目标： a. 美国与中国的双边贸易差额进一步恶化，美国的全球贸易逆差也在恶化，这两种情况都是由于各种宏观经济相关的原因。无论如何，美国全球贸易地位的大小不受关税政策的影响；而是由美国国内投资储蓄失衡决定的。 b. 相反的，特朗普政府声称，尽管如此，中国出口商并没有支付关税，而是迄今已对美国进口商征收了近500亿美元的税，其中大
15、部分已被美国消费者吸收。 c. 关税并没有导致美国制造业就业机会的复苏；确实，甚至在COVID-19大流行导致经济衰退之前，制造业的就业机会就已经丧失了。 优优先事项先事项4 4：认识到中国不可阻挡的扩张作用：认识到中国不可阻挡的扩张作用 即使“遏制”中国或政权更迭被认为是可取的，但美国也无能为力来大幅减缓中国经济崛起及其在全球经济中日益重要的作用。同样，任何政权更迭都可能源于中国的内部动力而非外部影响。而且，无论如何，美国与非民主政权的经济和其他形式的合作有着悠久的历史。 a. 中国正在引领全球从COVID-19大流行中复苏，主要是因为中国在最初爆发的三个月内成功地控制住了大流行。相比之下，
16、美国和其他几个发达经济体在疫情最初爆发六个多月后仍在苦苦挣扎。 i. 中国在2020年第二季度和第三季度出现了V型经济复苏。国际货币基金组织现在预测，中国经济在2020年和2021年将分别增长2%和8%。 ii. 因此，2021年中国经济规模将比2019年增长10%左右。2021年美国和几乎所有其他经济体的经济规模都将比2019年小。 b. 中国在全球贸易中继续不断壮大。 i. 尽管美国征收关税减少了中国对其最大市场的出口，但其2019年的出口总额增长了5%，而全球出口下降了3%。 2MEMORANDUM ON PRIORITIES FOR 2021 ECONOMIC TALKS WITH C
17、HINA 2020 Peterson Institute for International EconomicsPRIORITY 2: Work with allies Coordinate, to the maximum extent possible, with US allies and partners. They share many of the same concerns about Chinas industrial policies, especially subsidies, and other unfair trading and investment practices
18、. China is more likely to modify its policies in the economic realm if it hears a consistent message from Europe, Japan, South Korea, Canada, as well as the United States rather than facing unilateral demands from the United States. Remember that China has no allies. The United States has a huge adv
19、antage in this space; it should be leveraged to its advantage rather than being squandered by imposing tariffs on goods from Japan, South Korea, India, Canada, Mexico, Turkey, the European Union, and Australia. PRIORITY 3: Recognize that the “tariff war” has failed Recognize that US tariffs imposed
20、on imports of Chinese goods have failed to achieve any of their announced objectives:a. The US bilateral trade balance with China has deteriorated further and the US global trade deficit has also gotten worse, in both cases for a variety of macroeconomically related reasons. In any case, the size of
21、 the US global trade position cannot be influenced by tariff policy; rather it is determined by the US domestic investment-savings imbalance.b. Trump administration claims to the contrary notwithstanding, tariffs have not been paid by Chinese exporters, but rather so far have imposed a tax of almost
22、 $50 billion on US importers, most of which has been absorbed by US consumers.c. Tariffs have not led to a resurgence of manufacturing jobs in the United States; indeed, even before the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, manufacturing jobs were being lost.PRIORITY 4: Recognize Chinas
23、 unstoppable expanding roleEven if “containing” China or regime change were judged to be desirable, there is little the United States can do to significantly slow Chinas economic rise and its increasing role in the global economy. Similarly, any regime change is likely to stem from Chinas internal d
24、ynamics rather than external influences. And, in any case, the United States has a long history of economic and other forms of cooperation with non-democratic regimes.a. China is leading the global recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily because it was successful in controlling the pandemic w
25、ithin three months of the initial outbreak. In contrast, the United States and several other advanced economies continue to struggle more than six months after their initial outbreaks.i. China has had a V-shaped economic recovery in both the second and third quarters of 2020. The International Monet
26、ary Fund now forecasts that Chinas economy will expand by 2 percent and 8 percent, respectively, in 2020 and 2021.ii. Thus, Chinas economy in 2021 will be about 10 percent larger than in 2019. The United States and almost all other economies in 2021 will be smaller than in 2019. b. China continues t
27、o go from strength to strength in its global trade.i. Although US imposed tariffs reduced Chinas exports to its largest market, its total exports were up 5 percent in 2019, while global exports fell by 3 percent.与中国进行中国进行20212021年经济危机优先事项备忘年经济危机优先事项备忘录录 3 2020彼得森国际经济研究所 ii. 年初至今，中国在全球贸易中的份额在2020年增长得
28、更加强劲，而美国的份额却在急剧下降。 c. 中国已经大幅放开了外国公司对其庞大的国内金融市场的准入，现在中国成为了外国证券投资日益重要的目的地。 i. 中国监管机构已允许来自美国、欧洲和日本的多家证券、资产管理、保险和其他金融公司将与中国合作伙伴的合资企业中现有的少数控股转换为多数控股外资企业，并为一些新的外商独资金融公司颁发了许可证。 ii. 美国投资者目前持有超过1万亿美元的中国债券和股票，高于2007年的2400亿美元。 优先优先事项事项5 5：避免：避免“脱钩脱钩”政政策策 认识到上述情况的含义是，由美国主导的与中国的总体脱钩对美国来说可能是一项高成本，低收益的政策，而对其盟国和伙伴来
29、说却是无望成功的计划。 a. 鉴于中国在全球经济和金融领域的作用日益增强，其他国家对参与美国主导的脱钩战略兴趣不大。他们更不愿意加入由美国主导的促进中国政权更迭的努力。中国在2019年占全球经济扩张的30%，2020年的份额几乎肯定会更大。因此，美国的脱钩战略将是一种经济自我孤立的政策，与全球增长和贸易的主要来源隔离开来。非美国企业将很快填补美国单方面脱钩留下的空白，在中国进口中获得越来越大的份额，目前每年达到2万亿美元。 b. 美国单方面脱钩将给受益于从中国获得低成本商品的美国家庭和企业带来巨大成本。 c. 即使是美国更狭窄的在技术上的脱钩，对美国来说，也可能是一项高成本战略。 i. 例如，
30、像美国现在似乎正在做的那样，将美国半导体公司退出中国市场，将大幅减少它们的收入，导致这些公司的资本支出减少130亿美元，并导致12.4万个美国工作岗位的流失。 ii. 更重要的是，收入下降将导致美国半导体企业大幅削减研发支出，这意味着美国可能失去在这个对美国经济竞争力和国家安全至关重要的行业中存在已久的全球领导地位。 可可执行的执行的待办事项清单：待办事项清单： 制定一个连贯的中国政策，以促进美国的利益。 采纳并朝着可实现的目标努力。这些将不包括减缓中国经济增长或促进政权更迭。 与那些对中国的贸易和投资行为，包括国家补贴和知识产权保护，有共同担忧的盟友进行协调。 3MEMORANDUM ON
31、PRIORITIES FOR 2021 ECONOMIC TALKS WITH CHINA 2020 Peterson Institute for International Economicsii. Chinas share of global trade is rising even more strongly in 2020, year to date, while the US share is collapsing. c. China has substantially liberalized access by foreign firms to its immense domest
32、ic financial market and is now an increasingly important destination for foreign portfolio investment.i. Chinese regulators have allowed multiple securities, asset management, insurance, and other financial firms from the United States, Europe, and Japan to convert existing minority positions in joi
33、nt ventures with Chinese partners to majority foreign-owned firms and have licensed a number of new wholly foreign-owned financial firms.ii. US investors now hold well over $1 trillion in Chinese bonds and equities, up from $240 billion in 2007.PRIORITY 5: Avoid a policy of “decoupling” Recognize th
34、at the implication of the above is that a US-led general decoupling from China is likely to be a high-cost, low-benefit policy for the United States and a nonstarter for its allies and partners.a. Other countries have shown little interest in participating in a US-led decoupling strategy, given Chin
35、as growing global economic and financial role. Their appetite for joining a US-led effort to promote regime change in China is even less. China accounted for 30 percent of global economic expansion in 2019, and its share in 2020 will almost certainly be larger. Thus, a US decoupling strategy would b
36、e a policy of economic self-isolation from a major source of global growth and trade. Non-US firms would quickly fill the void left by a unilateral US decoupling, gaining a larger and larger share of Chinas imports, currently running at $2 trillion annually.b. A unilateral US decoupling would impose
37、 huge costs on US households and businesses that have benefited from the availability of lower-cost goods from China. c. Even a narrower US decoupling in technology is likely to be a high-cost strategy for the United States.i. Shutting US semiconductor companies out of the China market, as the Unite
38、d States now seems to be doing, for example, would reduce their revenue sharply, causing capital expenditures by these firms to fall by $13 billion and leading to the loss of 124,000 US jobs.ii. More importantly, declining revenue would lead to deep cuts in R&D expenditures by US semiconductor firms
39、, meaning the United States could lose its long-standing global leadership position in an industry that is crucial for US economic competitiveness and national security.ACTIONABLE TO-DO LIST: Craft a coherent China policy to promote US interests. Adopt and work toward obtainable goals. These would n
40、ot include slowing Chinas economic rise or promoting regime change. Coordinate with allies that share concerns on Chinese trade and investment practices, including state subsidies and protection of intellectual property.与中国进行中国进行20212021年经济危机优先事项备忘年经济危机优先事项备忘录录 4 2020彼得森国际经济研究所 把经济谈判的重点放在一两个高度优先的话题上
41、，这些话题至少能显示出中国的接受度。避免采取包括要求对中国多项政策进行深远变革的综合性方法。 避免武器化贸易政策，例如通过对中国进口产品征收关税，因为对美国的成本可能会超过预期的收益。 4MEMORANDUM ON PRIORITIES FOR 2021 ECONOMIC TALKS WITH CHINA 2020 Peterson Institute for International Economics Focus economic negotiations on one or two high priority topics where there is at least some indication of Chinese receptivity. Avoid an omnibus approach that includes demands for far-reaching changes in multiple Chinese policies. Avoid weaponizing trade policy, for example through tariffs on Chinese imports, since the costs to the United States will likely exceed anticipated benefits.