《粮食安全的地缘政 治：零饥饿可持续发展目标的障碍.docx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《粮食安全的地缘政 治：零饥饿可持续发展目标的障碍.docx（18页珍藏版）》请在taowenge.com淘文阁网|工程机械CAD图纸|机械工程制图|CAD装配图下载|SolidWorks_CaTia_CAD_UG_PROE_设计图分享下载上搜索。
1、SUMMARYw Assessing the prospects for Zero Hunger-Sustainable Development Goal 2requires an understanding of food security that goes beyond developmental or humanitarian issues, to include linkages with geopolitics. Geopolitical challenges cut across areas such as natural resources, trade, armed conf
2、lict and climate change where unilateralism and zero-sum approaches to security directly hamper e仔orts to eradicate hunger and undermine the frameworks that govern those efforts. Competition for agricultural resources can be both a cause and a consequence of geopolitical rivalry. International trade
3、, while essential for food security, also creates vulnerabilities through supply disruptions-sometimes politically motivated. Armed conflict is a driver of food insecurity, which can itself feed into social unrest and violence. Climate change interacts with all three phenomena, reshaping both the ph
4、ysical landscape and political calculus. These overlapping linkages require further integrated policy engagement and analysis.THE GEOPOLITICS OF FOOD SECURITY: BARRIERS TO THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL OF ZERO HUNGERj IAyl ZHOU, LISA MARIA DELLMUTH, KEVIN M. ADAMS, TINA-SIMONE NESET AND NINA VON
5、UEXKULL This work is funded by the Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research (Mistra) through the research programme Mistra Geopolitics.1. IntroductionThe United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sets out 17 ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030. T
6、he second of these goals, Zero Hunger, seeks to zEnd hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.1 But since the goals were adopted in 2015, the number of people who are undernourished has actually increased to 690 million in 2019, up by almost 60 million
7、 since 2014.2 If the current trajectory continues, then, far from achieving Zero Hunger by 2030, the number of undernourished people will have increased to 840 million.3 Moreover, those estimates do not take account of the impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on global hunger d
8、uring 2020, which could add 130 million people to the total.4There are complex and interrelated factors that hinder international efforts to eradicate hunger and achieve SDG 2, from the economic to the environmental. However, food insecurity represents, in particular, a political failure; indeed, gl
9、obal food production has long surpassed the level necessarily to keep all people fed.5 On that basis, this paper highlights geopolitics as an important dimension of that political failure. It seeks to give geopolitics a more prominent place in the food security debate, outlining its impact across a
10、range of areas that directly affect food security.1 UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1, Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development。25 Sep. 2015, A/RES/70/1,21 Oct. 2015, p. 14.2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultur
11、al Development (IFAD), United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO), The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020: Transforming Food Systems for Affordable Healthy Diets (FAO: Rome, 2020), p.4.3 Food and Agriculture Organization
12、 of the United Nations etaL (note 2), p. 8.4 World Food Programme (WFP), COVID-19: Level 3 Emergency, External Situation Report no. 10,3 July 2020.5 Timmer, C. P., Falcon, W. P. and Pearson, S. R., Food Policy Analysis Johns Hopkins University Press for The World Bank: Baltimore, MA, 1983); and Holt
13、-Gimenez, E. et al., zWe already grow enough food for 10 billion people . and still cant end hunger, Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, vol. 36, no. 6 (2012), pp. 595-98. See also Sen, A., Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford University Press: New York, 1981).operati
14、ons that seem to infringe on national sovereignty. Diehl, P. F., Triage or substitution? The changing face of UN peacekeeping in the era of Trump and nationalism, International Peacekeeping, vol. 26, no. 5 (2019), pp. 540-44. The inadequate response of the international community to major crises is
15、now more obvious than ever, as disputes among the permanent members of the UN Security Council meant that it took three months to agree on a global ceasefire even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. UN News, Stalled Security Council resolution adopted, backing UNs global humanitarian ceasefire ca
16、lf, 1 July 2020; and UN Security Council Resolution 2532,1 July 2020.While it is clear that armed conflict affects food security, climate change has led to more attention being paid to the opposite relationship: the possible impact of food insecurity on armed conflict and social unrest, with repercu
17、ssions in the international system. Increasing attention has been given to the role that food insecurity and food prices may play in precipitating or exacerbating armed conflict, and the vicious cycle that can result.% Hendrix, C. and Brinkman, H. J., Food insecurity and conflict dynamics: Causal li
18、nkages and complex feedbacks, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, vol 2, no. 2 (2013), article 26; von Uexkull, N., Sustained drought, vulnerability and civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, Political Geography, vol. 43 (Nov. 2014), pp. 16-26; and Rudolfsen, I., Food insecuri
19、ty and domestic instability: A review of the literature, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 32, no. 5 (2020), pp. 921-48. Overall, there is evidence that there are indeed such links, but only under certain conditions. Rudolfsen, L, zFood price increase and urban unrest: The role of societal orga
20、nizations, Journal of Peace Research, July 2020. Social unrest following food price shocks Ai med conflicts and social uni est events |s more likely in semi-democracies and democracies, where that are partly driven by food insecurity mobilization for protest is relatively easier.6 Hendrix, C. S. and
21、 Haggard, S., Global food prices, regime type, and urban unrest in the developing world, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 52, no. 2 (Mar. 2015), pp. 143-57. In these countries, can have geopolitical repercussionscivil society organizations can channel grievances andorganize protests. Rudolfsen (note
22、59). However, food is not all that drives people to the street-there are often additional grievances such as corruption and inequality. Heslin, A., Riots and resources: How food access affects collective violence, Journal of Peace Research, Apr. 2020; and Rudolfsen (note 59). Whereas social unrest a
23、nd riots are predominantly urban phenomena, in rural areas food production shocks may increase the risk of intrastate conflicts. Specifically, there is evidence that shocks to agricultural production aggravate risks of intrastate conflict, in the presence of other risk factors, such as in countries
24、where a large part of the population work in agriculture and where the government excludes relevant ethnic groups from political power.Vesco, P. et al., Climate variability, crop and conflict: Exploring the impacts of spatial concentration in agricultural production, Journal of Peace Research, forth
25、coming 2021; and von Uexkull, N. et al., Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 113, no. 44 (1 Nov. 2016), pp. 12391-96.It is clear that armed conflicts and social unrest events that are partly drive
26、n by food insecurity can have geopolitical repercussions. The 2008 riots over food prices that spread across the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, and eventually led to the Arab Spring of 2010-11, is one such example. Costello, M., Jenkins, J. C. and Aly, H.,Bread, justice, or opportuni
27、ty? The determinants of the Arab Awakening protests, World Development, vol. 67 (Mar. 2015), pp. 90-100. Yet, because precise pathways are highly context-specific, two important tasks are to advance the understanding in general of whenand under what circumstances food insecurity drives armed conflic
28、t; and to understand how this applies during particular major events of geopolitical importance, such as the Syrian War. In terms of policy interventions, there is a need for further research on measures that can effectively address food insecurity and conflict simultaneously. Recent work on the lin
29、kages includes Delgado, C. et al., The World Food Programmes Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace, Preliminary report (SIPRI: Stockholm, June 2019); Martin-Shields, C. P. and Stojetz, W., Food security and conflict: Empirical challenges and future opportunities for research and policy m
30、aking on food security and conflict, World Development, vol. 119 (July 2018), pp. 150-64; and Briickand dErrico (note 52).VI. The impact of climate changeClimate change interacts with the above three phenomenaresource security, trade and armed conflictin their various effects on food security.Moreov
31、er, the global food system currently contributes up to one quarter of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Poore, J. and Nemecek, T., Reducing foods environmental impacts through producers and consumers, Science, 1 June 2018. It thus makes a substantialClimate change interacts with resource secur
32、ity, trade and armed conflict in their various effects on food securityClimate change interacts with resource security, trade and armed conflict in their various effects on food securitycontribution to increases in global mean temperature and resulting adverse effects for human societies. At the sam
33、e time, agriculture is one of the sectors most vulnerable to climate change. The most recent assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that, while estimates of the medium-term impact of climate change on agricultural production vary, significant long-term pro
34、blems for food security are likely, particularly under high-emission scenarios. Mbow et al. (note 35). Beyond the direct effects on food security, key actors-including the UN Security Council-are also increasingly discussing how climate change intersects with other political, social and economic fac
35、tors to have an impact on both geopolitics and human security simultaneously. European Commission, Climate change and international security。Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, SI 13/08,14 Mar. 2008; UN News, Climate change recognized as “threat mu
36、ltiplier, UN Security Council debates its impact on peace, 25 Jan. 2019; and Remling, E., The European Green Deal: A chance to promote a people- centred take on climate security, SIPRI Backgrounder, 17 June 2016.Importantly, the medium-term effects of climate change on agricultural and food systems
37、are likely to be uneven: low-latitude countries are most exposed, while northern latitudes may even benefit in certain cases. Porter, J. R. et al., Food security and food production systems, eds C. B. Field, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, part A, Global and Sectoral Asp
38、ects, Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2014), pp. 485-533. Given that food insecurity is currently concentrated in developing countries in low latitudes, climate change may exacerbate
39、and widen inequality on an international scale.7 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO), The State of Food Security a
40、nd Nutrition in the World 2019: Safeguarding against Economic Slowdowns and Downturns (FAO: Rome, 2019). Increased pressure on agricultural production due to climate change may also accentuate existing geopolitical tensions over resources. Widening gaps and shifting distributions of material power d
41、ue to climate change have the potential to create new geopolitical leveragepointsfor instance in the context of trade. Hilden, M. et al., Cascading climate impacts: A new factor in European policy-making Policy brief, Cascades, Jan. 2020; and Hedlund, J. et al., Quantifying transnational climate imp
42、act exposure: New perspectives on the global distribution of climate risk, Global Environmental Change, vol. 52 (Sep. 2018), pp. 75-85. Russia, for example, is currently positioning itself to become a major agricultural exporter, with grain exports already described as its second oil. Russian Presid
43、ential Decree zOn national goals and strategic objectives of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2024。no. 204, 7 May 2018 (in Russian); and Russia has emerged as an agricultural powerhouse, The Economist, 1 Dec. 2018.Recent studies suggest that climate risks can be transmitted via agricultur
44、al trade networks, affecting consumers many thousands of kilometres away.7 Hedlund et al. (note 71). These transboundary climate risks can be especially problematic in cases of high import dependency or when multiple concurrent events disrupt global food production and distribution, generating for i
45、nstance price spikes. Cottrell, R. S. et al.z Food production shocks across land and sea, Nature Sustainability vol. 2,no. 2 (Feb. 2019), pp. 130-37.As a plausible response, some have argued that import diversification and reduction in trade barriers constitute an effective adaptation strategy. Jans
46、sens, C. et al., Global hunger and climate change adaptation through international trade, Nature Climate Change, vol. 10, no. 9 (Sep. 2020), pp. 829-35. However, while this may reduce transboundary risks in some cases, it will be less effective for large importers and well-integrated economies that
47、already have substantial and diverse import portfolios. Adams, K. M. et al., Climate Change, Trade, and Global Food Security (Stockholm Environment Institute: Stockholm, forthcoming 2020). As trade policy is already a subject of geopolitical contestation, efforts by governments to address transbound
48、ary climate risks have the potential to accentuate existing tensions but they can also present new opportunities to promote food security through multilateral cooperation.Warmer temperatures may also contribute to the opening of new shipping lanes and transportation routes in the Arctic, in particul
49、ar the North West Passage. Analysts have already pointed to the vulnerability of strategic nodes or chokepoints of the global food system to politically motivated restrictionsand these sorts of risk could potentially also apply to the Arctic in the future. Bailey, R. and Wellesley, L., Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in the Global Food Trade(Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs: London, June 2017);