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1、IntroductionEven if the post-COVID-19 recovery seems already underwaydespite that millions are still hurting due to the loss of loved ones, record-high unemployment levels, and despair and uncertainty that might last until after a vaccine is effectively distributedsome of the secular trends that pre
2、ceded COVID-19 will likely still accompany us, namely, the global productivity slowdown.The productivity dynamics of Japan, in particular, are quite intriguing. Most developed nations have seen sharp slowdowns in their productivity growth since 2004, but the Japanese case is puzzling because product
3、ivity growth decelerated just as sharply there, even though productivity levels continue to lag well behind countries such as the U.S. and Germany (see Bahar and Strauss, 2020; Baily, Bosworth, and Doshi, 2020)In light of this, Bahar and Strauss (2020) suggest a possible explanation for this phenome
4、non, backed by the evidence at hand: an important dichotomy between the quantity and quality of Japanese innovation. In particular, they find that while Japan allocates more resources on research and development (R&D) and files more patent applications than the U.S. and Germany, the quality of Japan
5、ese innovation severely lags compared to these two nations.This paper digs deeper into this finding to identify possible policy actions that could tackle this reality. Specifically, we identify an aspect of Japanese innovationcompared to that of countries like the U.S. and Germanythat could play a r
6、ole in explaining the lower-quality inventions hindering the creative-destruction process. This aspect is the extent to which Japanese inventors engage in Global Collaborative Patents (GCPs). GCPs are patents where the team of inventors includes individuals residing in two or more countries. As Kerr
7、 and Kerr (2018) show, GCPs tend to be higher-quality innovations than entirely domestic patents.In this context, our study uses patent-level data and document two important stylized facts. First, Japanese inventors tend to engage much less in GCPs as compared to other comparable countries; and seco
8、nd, even if fewer, GCPs by Japanese inventors tend to be of higher measurable quality, consistent with the evidence. Having established these facts, we then find that Japanese firms dominate the production of patents in Japan, with very little innovative activity by foreign firms, where most of the
9、GCPs typically would occur. Thus, based on this, we offer some thoughts about possible directions using policy to facilitate the integration of Japanese inventors into the global stage by (1) pursuing the establishment of foreign R&D centers in Japan and (2) opening the countrys doors to more immigr
10、ation.The paper is divided as follows. The next section describes the data sources used in our analysis. The following section characterizes Japanese innovation using patent-levelIn this context, two important facts are relevant to Japan: GCPs tend to be of higher quality, and Japan lags behind othe
11、r developed nations in terms of global collaborations. These two facts together likely account for at least part of the dichotomy briefly discussed aboveand discussed at length by Bahar and Strauss (2020)on the quantity versus quality of Japanese innovation, which is a crucial determinant of product
12、ivity dynamics. In the next section, we outline policy recommendations that can serve as a basis to address this issue.Integrating Japanese inventors in the global stageNaturally, the choice of inventors in a given location, such as Japan, to work with inventors in other countries is an organic proc
13、ess. Yet, to the extent that market failures hinder this process, including lack of public goods that could facilitate collaborations, there is a role for public policy.Are there any identifiable market failures behind the fact that there are very few GCPs in Japan compared to other countries? To an
14、swer this, we first must rule out some obvious possible explanations that might not relate to market failures per se. In particular, Japan being geographically far away from other countries where innovation happens more intensively, such as the United States and European nations, makes it harder for
15、 inventors to collaborate with peers in other countries. This reality certainly plays a role, but according to our dataset, the evidence suggests that such is not necessarily a binding constraint. There are two main reasons for this. First, with only 3 percent of patents classifying as GCPs in Japan
16、, the same figure is nearly 4.5 percent in Korea and 18 percent in China, all countries in the same geographic neighborhood, suggesting that geography alone cannot explain the gap. Second, perhaps more importantly, as Table 2 shows, the top three nations of inventors with which Japanese inventors co
17、llaborate in terms of GCPs are the United States, Germany, and China. While it is fair to assume that the number of collaborations with U.S.-based inventors is significantly greater given the nature of our dataset of USPTO patents, the data reveals that there are many more global collaborations with
18、 countries further apart, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada, than with neighboring countries, such as China and South Korea, even when ignoring the United States.Table 2. Main collaborators from 2010 to 2015Number of co-inventorsPercentUnited States11,84856.1Germany1,5517.3China1,5387.
19、3South Korea1,0875.2United Kingdom9734.7Singapore6673.2Taiwan4392.1France3961.9Canada3161.5Switzerland2441.2Thus, while the geographic reality might be playing a role, there seems to be important room for growth in collaborations, particularly with inventors in countries with which links have alread
20、y been established. It is important to keep this list of countries in mind when thinking about particular policies that could facilitate more interactions between inventors.Regardless of geographic determinants, we believe there is a role for policy in achieving higher integration when it comes to i
21、nnovation. Given that GCPs have significantly higher patent quality, Japan needs to craft and implement policies to lift the roadblocks inhibiting local inventors from collaborating internationally. We focus on two particular aspects to achieve this: incentives for international R&D centers and migr
22、atory reforms.Attracting foreign R&D-related investmentThe fact is that any economic activity that crosses a border is more costly. We know, for example, that trade and investment across borders are challenging for firms because of persistent information asymmetries, as well as monitoring and coordi
23、nation costs. This phenomenon holds even more so for multi-country R&D efforts, where typical externalities related to innovation are common. Hence, major economies allocate considerable resources to incentivize innovation through direct grants or tax subsidies.However, these incentives do not alway
24、s result in countries, ability to attract foreign firms with productive R&D centers. The case of Japan constitutes a good example, where most of the patenting production is done by domestic firms (see Table 1), suggesting there is space to grow in terms of attracting highly productive foreign firms
25、to establish local R&D centers.Some evidence suggests that foreign firms are less likely to choose Japan as a preferred location for R&D activities, as documented by a recent report by McKinsey & Company (Chokki et al., 2020). In the study, the authors present results from a surveywith chief technol
26、ogy officers (CTOs) and heads of R&D centers for 18 Japanese companies and find that just 24 percent of respondents who work in a multinational corporation (MNC) believed their companies would prefer Japan when deciding on an R&D location. The combination of the aging population and the challenges o
27、f attracting highsk川ed young talents to Japan were listed as the main inhibitors.While some of the factors named in the report are structural, there are ways to address this by revising the existing set of incentives aimed at attracting large foreign MNCs to choose Japan as a home for their R&D acti
28、vities through targeted incentives.In Japan, this task mainly falls on Japans External Trade Organization (JETRO), which has the national mandate of attracting foreign investment into the country, operating under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). A recent report by the OECD and the
29、 Interamerican Development Bank examining several Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) among OECD and Latin-American countries (Volpe Martincus and Sztajerowska, 2018), including J ETRO, gives us some insights about the main differences between several IPAs active around the globe. In such a report,
30、 Japans I PA stands out as being one of the largest in terms of budget, personnel, and the number of offices in the world.However, a few aspects called our attention when focusing on the ability of J ETRO to attract foreign R&D centers. First, J ETRO is one of the few agencies among OECD countries t
31、hat did not undergo any considerable structural reform recently. In contrast, the average of I PA in OECD was reformed more than once during the period 2007-2017. Reforms might be crucial in a fast-changing world. There is an opportunity to make sure that in a forthcoming structural reform, the agen
32、cy can include focused activities in attracting foreign R&D centers.Second, in light of the above, we noticed a few essential aspects that might be taken into account if and when a major reform is enacted. One of them is that J ETRO stands out by having many mandates, thus not being specialized enou
33、gh compared to other leading OECD countries. Another one is that, according to the aforementioned report, the focus of Japans I PA is not on investment generation, which entails identifying and approaching potential investors, and is a common function for many other IPAs in leading OECD nations. Ins
34、tead, JETROs budget is focused on investment facilitation and retention (providing assistance to investors), image-building, and policy advocacy, with very little to none targeting particular industries. In that sense, given the importance of focusing on R&D centers, there is an important opportunit
35、y for a paradigm shift of how the agency typically works. Another important distinction is that Japans I PA has a board of directors only composed of individuals from the private sector, with no seat at the table for individuals representing the research and academic community, which might provide s
36、ubstantial weight towards the agency focusing on foreign R&D activities.Therefore, in the space of attracting foreign R&D centers, we identify that Japans principal agency with such mandate might be underperforming given structural limitations, which might be beneficial to revisit.Finally, it is imp
37、ortant to include local governments as part of these efforts. Local conditions can greatly influence the type of incentives that would encourage foreign firms to invest in their cities or regions. Perhaps the most salient example of successfully attracting foreign R&D investments into Japan assisted
38、 by joint efforts of both national and local governments is the opening of an Apple R&D center in Yokohama, the second-largest city in Japan, in 2017 (Wuerthele, 2017). This center is reported to devote its research efforts to artificial intelligence technologies with breakthrough innovations in the
39、 upcoming years, potentially raising the overall quality of Japanese innovation.In sum, we believe that the broad policy guidelines to attract R&D-related foreign investment, and with it boosting the quality of innovation in Japan, goes by renewing efforts by stakeholders, under the lead of JETRO. T
40、his includes focusing efforts and resources on the promotion of foreign investment particularly for R&D activities, working in conjunction with local authorities. Studying closely the success stories of Japan itself in the past or of other countries in this regard will serve as a crucial input for d
41、esigning comprehensive policy to achieve these goals, and are a matter for further research (a good starting point, we believe, is the study by Volpe Martincus and Sztajerowska, 2018).Comprehensive migratory policies to attract foreign workersAnother factor that is known to play a vital role in fost
42、ering global cooperation in patenting is migration, based on ongoing background research by Bahar and other coauthors. In essence, the inflow of skilled immigrantsmany of them inventors facilitate global collaborations, resulting in higher quality innovations. In ongoing background research by Bahar
43、 et al., the authors investigate the effect of dozens of migration reforms across 15 countries on innovation outcomes. The preliminary results suggest that that reforms easing the inflow of foreigners or of returning citizens result in higher patenting, both domestic and cross- border, and higher qu
44、ality innovation. Analogously, reforms that restrict immigration hinder innovation, both in terms of quantity and of quality.Another factor that is known to play a vital role in fostering global cooperation in patenting is migration, based on ongoing background research by Bahar and other coauthors.
45、 In essence, the inflow of skilled immigrantsmany of them inventors facilitate global collaborations, resulting in higher quality innovations. In ongoing background research by Bahar et al., the authors investigate the effect of dozens of migration reforms across 15 countries on innovation outcomes.
46、 The preliminary results suggest that that reforms easing the inflow of foreigners or of returning citizens result in higher patenting, both domestic and cross- border, and higher quality innovation. Analogously, reforms that restrict immigration hinder innovation, both in terms of quantity and of q
47、uality.Yet, while Japan has experienced much higher migration flows in the recent past, theres the need for even more. The share of foreigners in Japan5s total population strikingly rose from 0.9 percent in 1990 to 1.7 percent in 2015 (UNDESA, 2019), but Japan still significantly lags compared to ot
48、her developed nations (e.g., the share of immigrants in both the U.S. and Germany is of about 15 percent). The importance of a more flexible migration policy is particularly important for STEM occupations: Chokki et al. (2020) report that Japan has an estimated shortage of 240,000 skilled IT profess
49、ionals, and that number is expected to rise to almost 600,000 by 2030.Due to population aging and sk川ed labor shortage, Japans Parliament amended their immigration law in late 2018 to ease restrictions on foreign workers. According to reports, following this law, the country expects an intake of more than 300,000 foreign workers (BBC, 2018). This is a step in the right direction, but theres still the need for amore aggressive policy besides expanding visas to