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1、Tim Sweijs and Mattia Bertolini May 2022How wars endWar terminations:insights for the Russia-Ukraine WarHow wars endWar terminations:insights for the Russia-Ukraine WarAuthors:Tim Sweijs and Mattia BertoliniCover photo source:Unsplash May 2022 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.All rights reserv
2、ed.Nopart of this report may be reproduced and/or published in any form by print,photo print,microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from HCSS.All images are subject to the licenses of their respectiveowners.Table of ContentsIntroduction 1Every war must end:insights on war term
3、ination 2The conditions for war termination 5The end of the Russia-Ukraine war is not yet in sight 7What comes next?11Risks of escalation 12A ceasefire is not war termination 13Recommendations 14Annex 1:War Termination A Preliminary Assessment 15How wars end|War terminations:insights for the Russia-
4、Ukraine WarIIIIntroductionHow do wars end?As the Russia-Ukraine war enters its third month,the fighting continues unabated.Despite staggering military losses and enormous human suffering,the wars termi-nation is not yet in sight.The Ukrainian people and their President Zelensky are determined to def
5、end their country.They even have hopes of pushing back the Russian forces to their pre-war positions.Russia meanwhile seems intent on consolidating its gains and expanding control over eastern Ukraine,and perhaps more.The outcome will no doubt be partially dictated by how things turn out on the grou
6、nd,in the open lands of the Donbas.But absent any decisive Waterloo type of Battle,whether parties continue the war or even escalate it is determined by factors that transcend the battlefield,including their perceptions of prospects of victory,military,economic and humanitarian costs,international a
7、nd domestic pressure,and faith in any post war settlement.This note considers what we can learn from war termi-nations in the past:how long they last,how they end,whether they relapse,what factors contribute to their end,and what this implies for the Russia-Ukraine war.1How wars end|War terminations
8、:insights for the Russia-Ukraine WarEvery war must end:1 insights on war terminationHow and when have wars ended in the past and what can they tell us about war termination?In the period 1946-2005,63 interstate wars have been recorded globally.2 Only about one fifth(21%)of them had a decisive outcom
9、e in which one party ended up as the victor and the other as the loser(i.e.,total victory/defeat).Almost one third(30%)of these wars ended in a ceasefire,while only one sixth(16%)were concluded with a peace agreement.The remaining cases had an outcome without clear victory/defeat nor any type of pea
10、ce settlement.(see figures on the next page).3 Worryingly,of the negotiated peace agreements between 1975 and 2018 almost four out of ten(37%)broke down following a reignition of the war between the same parties.Moreover,more than three quarters(76%)of the peace agreements that broke down did so wit
11、hin two years,12%lasted for two to five years,and another 12%lasted for more than five years but eventually broke down.4 Wars that end in a tie as opposed to a decisive victory,where both sides share an acrimonious history,and where one sides exist-ence is threatened,are significantly more likely to
12、 be repeated.5 Clearly,an initial ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine does not mean an end to the war.An important mitigating factor in the prevention of renewed conflict is a so-called thick peace agreement.These are peace agreements that contain formal and detailed agreements on peaceke
13、eping contingents,demilitarised zones,and joint commissions for dispute resolution,and contain explicit third-party guarantees are more likely to last.6 Any potential peace agree-ment between the Russia and Ukraine should take note of such measures to decrease the chance the conflict between the two
14、 sides will reignite.1 Fred Charles Ikl,Every War Must End,2nd rev.ed(New York:Columbia University Press,2005).2 For similar data on war terminations over the past 200 years,see Dan Reiter,How Wars End(Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009);Virginia Page Fortna,Peace Time:Cease-Fire Agreements a
15、nd the Durability of Peace(Princeton:Princeton University Press,2004).3 For example,one side may have chosen to withdraw for tactical purposes or fighting may have continued but did not reach the minimum of 25 battle-related deaths a year anymore,see Joakim Kreutz,How and When Armed Conflicts End:In
16、troducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,Journal of Peace Research 47,no.2(1 March 2010):24350,https:/doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353108.4 Therse Pettersson and Magnus berg,Organized Violence,19892019,Journal of Peace Research 57,no.4(July 2020):597613,https:/doi.org/10.1177/0022343320934986.5
17、Virginia Page Fortna,Scraps of Paper?Agreements and the Durability of Peace,International Organization 57,no.2(2003):33772,https:/doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303572046,p.351.6 Fortna,p.363.2How wars end|War terminations:insights for the Russia-Ukraine WarFigures 1,2,and 3:Interstate war outcomes and pea
18、ce agreementsPettersson,Therese;Stina Hgbladh&Magnus berg(2019)Organized violence,1989-2018 and peace agreements.Journal of Peace Research 56(4).Pettersson,Therese;Stina Hgbladh&Magnus berg(2019)Organized violence,1989-2018 and peace agreements.Journal of Peace Research 56(4).Kreutz,J.(2010).How and
19、 when armed conflicts end:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset.Journal of Peace Research,47(2),243-250.Arreguin-Toft,Ivan(2001).How the weak win wars.International security 26(1),pp.93-1281850-18991900-19491950-199613237%22363%Peace agreementsBroke downLasted(1975-2018)Kreutz,J.(2010).H
20、ow and when armed conflicts end:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset.Journal of Peace Research,47(2),243-250.Arreguin-Toft,Ivan(2001).How the weak win wars.International security 26(1),pp.93-1281850-18991900-19491950-199613237%22363%Peace agreementsBroke downLasted(1975-2018)1312%1312%8
21、276%Peace agreements broke down within:0-2 years2-5 yearsMore than 5 years(1975-2018)16%33%21%30%Interstate war outcomesPeace agreementCeasefireVictoryOther outcome(1946-2005)Pettersson,Therese;Stina Hgbladh&Magnus berg(2019)Organized violence,1989-2018 and peace agreements.Journal of Peace Research
22、 56(4).Kreutz,J.(2010).How and when armed conflicts end:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset.Journal of Peace Research,47(2),243-250.Arreguin-Toft,Ivan(2001).How the weak win wars.International security 26(1),pp.93-1281850-18991900-19491950-199613237%22363%Peace agreementsBroke downLast
23、ed(1975-2018)1312%1312%8276%Peace agreements broke down within:0-2 years2-5 yearsMore than 5 years(1975-2018)3How wars end|War terminations:insights for the Russia-Ukraine WarRussian military equipment is both quantitatively and at least on paper qualitatively supe-rior to that of Ukraine,which make
24、s Ukraine a comparatively weaker actor in the conflict.7 What are Ukraines chances in its fight against the Russian armed forces?Between 1800 and 1998,in over 70%of the wars involving a strong and a weak actor,the strong actor won.In the other nearly 30%of cases the weak actor won or the war ended i
25、n a stalemate.Interestingly,over time a trend has emerged where asymmetric wars are less likely to be won by the stronger actor and have mixed outcomes(see charts below).8 Recent asymmetric conflicts,such as the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States and the frozen conflict in Georgia
26、,confirm this trend.The outcome to the Russia-Ukraine war is still uncertain,but Ukrainian persistent resistance to Russias offensive campaign,bolstered by a group of more than 40 nations coordinating military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine,9 does increase Ukraines chances against the Russia
27、n armed forces,if not to defeat them than at least to create some sort of stalemate.7 Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow,How Do the Militaries of Russia and Ukraine Stack Up?,Council on Foreign Relations,4 February 2022,https:/www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-do-militaries-russia-and-ukraine-stack.8 Ivan Arre
28、guin-Toft,How the Weak Win Wars,International Security 26,no.1(2001):93128.9 John Ismay,A New U.S.-Led International Group Will Meet Monthly to Focus on Aiding Ukraine.,The New York Times,26 April 2022,sec.World,https:/ victory by type of actorStrong actorWeak actorStrong actorWeak actor(1800-1998)A
29、rreguin-Toft,Ivan(2001).How the weak win wars.International security 26(1),pp.93-12870.829.2302010040506070803020100405060801009070Assymetric victory by type of actorStrong actorWeak actorStrong actorWeak actor88.279.565.14511.820.534.955Assymetric victory by type of actor1800-1849Arreguin-Toft,Ivan
30、(2001).How the weak win wars.International security 26(1),pp.93-128Pettersson,Therese;Stina Hgbladh&Magnus berg(2019)Organized violence,1989-2018 and peace agreements.Journal of Peace Research 56(4).Pettersson,Therese;Stina Hgbladh&Magnus berg(2019)Organized violence,1989-2018 and peace agreements.J
31、ournal of Peace Research 56(4).Kreutz,J.(2010).How and when armed conflicts end:Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset.Journal of Peace Research,47(2),243-250.Arreguin-Toft,Ivan(2001).How the weak win wars.International security 26(1),pp.93-1281850-18991900-19491950-1996Figures 4 and 5:As
32、ymmetric victory by type of actor4How wars end|War terminations:insights for the Russia-Ukraine WarThe conditions for war terminationThere are two necessary conditions for the termination of war.First,the culminating point(Kulminationspunkt),formulated by Carl Von Clausewitz,stipulates the necessary
33、 precon-dition for a war to be brought to an end.10 The point is reached when the attacking force in a military conflict can no longer sustain its advance,due to supply problems,the need for rest,or the opposing force.Whereas the goal of the attacker is to complete its objectives before this point i
34、s reached,the task of the defender is to lead the attacker to its culminating point before its objectives are achieved.Second,ripeness,set forth by I.William Zartman,lays out the conditions necessary for the initiation of negotiations between belligerents.11 Two elements constitute a ripe moment in
35、a war,namely a mutually hurting stalemate(MHS)and a way out.A MHS occurs when the belligerents find themselves locked in a stalemate where absolute victory becomes unattainable,and the stalemate is painful to both parties.This,in turn,leads to both sides seeking a way out.No specific solution has to
36、 be identified,only an under-standing that both parties share a sense and willingness to search for a negotiated solution.Reaching the culminating point and the ripe moment in the Russia-Ukraine war depends on different factors that affect war termination.The existing war termination literature iden
37、tifies the five following key parameters of influence on war termination:121.The prospect of success/victory as a function of the military balance of power between the parties and the attainability of the objectives set out by each party.When objectives seem unattainable through a continuation of a
38、war,belligerents are incentivized to bring an end to the war.13 It must be noted though that in some cases a low prospect of success does not always deter a state from continuing a war if the costs of ending the war are toohigh.142.The human,economic,and military costs of the war.The human costs of
39、the conflict are measured in casualties,injuries and displacements(i.e.,refugees).The economic costs of the conflict include all the economic ramifications that the war has on each side(e.g.,GDP growth rate,interest rate,unemployment rate,government debt).The military costs of the conflict are measu
40、red in military casualties and loss or damage of military equipment.If 10 Carl von Clausewitz,On War,reissued,Oxford Worlds Classics(New York:Oxford University Press,2008).11 I.William Zartman,International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War(Washington,D.C.:National Academies Press,2000),https:/
41、doi.org/10.17226/9897.12 Dan Reiter,How Wars End(Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009);Steve Chan,Explaining War Termination:A Boolean Analysis of Causes,Journal of Peace Research 40,no.1(2003):4966;Ivan Arreguin-Toft,How the Weak Win Wars;D.Scott Bennett and Allan C.Stam,III,The Duration of In
42、terstate Wars,1816-1985,American Political Science Review 90,no.2(1996);Fortna,Scraps of Paper?;Virginia Page Fortna,Peace Time:Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace(Princeton,N.J:Princeton University Press,2004);Tansa George Massoud,War Termination 33,no.4(1996):49196;Michaela Mattes an
43、d T.Clifton Morgan,When Do They Stop?Modeling the Termination of War,Conflict Management and Peace Science 21,no.3(July 2004):17993,https:/doi.org/10.1080/07388940490487261.13 Dan Reiter,How Wars End(Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009),chapter 3.14 Chan,Explaining War Termination;Kristopher W
44、.Ramsay,Settling It on the Field:Battlefield Events and War Termination,Journal of Conflict Resolution 52,no.6(1 December 2008):85079,https:/doi.org/10.1177/0022002708324593.5How wars end|War terminations:insights for the Russia-Ukraine Warcosts are high belligerents are incentivised to make concess
45、ions and reach for a settle-ment in the war.15 Furthermore,wars with higher costs are often followed by more durable peace.163.The tangible external pressure exerted by the international community or third parties on the belligerents through,for example,mediation,intervention,or sanctions.The decisi
46、on-making calculus to end or continue a war is shaped in part by the external pressure exerted on the warring states.17 Most notably,third parties can exert pressure on client states to reach for a war settlement,such as for example in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and the 1956 Suez Crisis.184.The int
47、ernal pressure exerted on the key decisionmakers on each side,measured through domestic public opinion,domestic political standing,and pressure exerted by political and military elites.Be it a major or minor power,a democracy or an autocracy,significant internal pressure creates conditions conducive
48、 to war termination and incentivise a leader to seek a negotiated settlement.195.The positive incentives to reach a settlement of the conflict for each party.Belligerents are less likely to reach for a war settlement if they are afraid a potential peace agreement would be violated by the other party
49、.Specifically,a belligerent worried about a credible commitment problem(i.e.,fear that a potential peace agreement will be violated)is more likely to seek a definitive resolution through the continuation of the war.20 Positive incen-tives complemented by explicit third-party guarantees are more like
50、ly to push belligerents to reach a settlement at the negotiating table.21In addition to an examination of the existing war termination literature and the existing quanta-tive evidence,we coded eight wars,namely the First World War(1914-1918),the Second World War(1939-1945),the Korean War(1950-1953),