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1、HPG working paperKerrie Holloway,Reem Al Masri and Afnan Abu YahiaOctober 2021Readers are encouraged to reproduce material for their own publications,as long as they arenot being sold commercially.ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication.For online use,we ask readers to link to
2、 the original resource on the ODI website.The viewspresented in this paper are those of the author(s)and do not necessarily represent the views ofODI or our partners.This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.How to cite:Holloway,K.,Al Masri,R.and Abu Yahia,A.(2021)Digital identity,biometricsand in
3、clusion in humanitarian responses to refugee crises.HPG working paper.London:ODI(https:/odi.org/en/publications/digital-identity-biometrics-and-inclusion-in-humanitarian-responses-to-refugee-crises).This PDF has been prepared in accordance with good practice on accessibility.Cover graphic:Fingerprin
4、t.Muhammad Ridho/Noun ProjectAcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank the refugees and contacts in Jordan and key informants whogave their valuable time to participate in this study,including the many informants who also peerreviewed this publication and gave invaluable comments.Thanks to Bar
5、naby Willitts-King for hisguidance during the study and to Sorcha OCallaghan,Oliver Lough and John Bryant who alsoprovided comments on an early draft.The study could not have been completed without thesupport of Cat Langdon(Project Manager),Laura Mertsching(Project Manager),Katie Forsythe(Editor)and
6、 Hannah Bass(Senior Publications Officer).About the authorsKerrie Holloway is a Senior Research Officer at ODIs Humanitarian Policy Group(HPG).Reem Al Masri is a Senior Researcher at 7iber Magazine in Jordan.Afnan Abu Yahia is an independent consultant.ContentsAcknowledgements/3List of boxes and tab
7、les/5Acronyms/61 Introduction/71.1 Methodology/91.2 Limitations/112 Digital identity and biometrics in the humanitarian sector/122.1 How we got here:the history of biometrics/142.2 Where are we now:biometrics,cash and refugees in Jordan/182.3 Where we are going:the future of biometrics/203 Digital i
8、dentity and inclusion/223.1 Reasons for and implications of exclusion from digital identity systems/233.2 Experiences of exclusion from refugees in Jordan/254 Three areas of concern for employing biometrics for digital identity/294.1 Choice and informed consent/294.2 Privacy and data protection/314.
9、3 Ethics and data responsibility/345 Conclusion and recommendations/365.1 Recommendations/37References/39List of boxes and tablesBoxesBox 1Box 2Box 3Box 4Box 5Box 6Terminology/8Why Jordan was chosen for this study/11Why use biometrics for cash and voucher assistance?/14Biometrics,digital identity an
10、d Covid-19/16Biometrics and financial inclusion/23Jordan-specific procedural recommendations,based on interviews/38TablesTable 1Table 2Stakeholder interviews conducted/9Number of refugees interviewed,by geographic region/10AcronymsAIartificial intelligenceAMLATFanti-money launderinganti-terrorist fi
11、nancingATMCaLPCCFCOautomated teller machineCash Learning PartnershipCommon Cash Facilitycountry officeCVADIGIDDRCFSPcash and voucher assistanceDignified IDDemocratic Republic of Congofinancial service providerGDPRIASCICRCIDGeneral Data Protection RegulationInter-Agency Standing CommitteeInternationa
12、l Committee of the Red Crossidentity documentINGOIOMJDinternational non-governmental organisationInternational Organization for MigrationJordanian DinarKYCOCHAOIOSPINknow-your-customerOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsOffice of Internal Oversight Servicespersonal identification numb
13、erSustainable Development GoalUnited NationsSDGUNUNHCR UN Refugee AgencyUNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near EastWFPWorld Food Programme7HPG working paper1 IntroductionDigital identity and biometrics have long been divisive topics in the humanitarian sector
14、.On the onehand,they have the potential to be more inclusive and reach people in need at scale due to perceivedefficiency gains.A legal identity for everyone as part of the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs)hasspurred the drive to innovation and registration,particularly in the aid and development
15、sectors.On theother hand,serious questions have been raised around their potential for harm,particularly related todata privacy.As the use of digital identity and biometrics continues to grow,the humanitarian sector must findways to improve the systems that are in place and mitigate potential risks.
16、These risks go beyondtechnical failure and relate to broader issues.The addition of technology has often deepened,ratherthan solved,long-standing structural issues,such as the unequal power dynamics between aid giverand aid receiver,and questions of inclusion and exclusion,such as who gets to decide
17、 who is includedand how these decisions are made.Due to their immutable nature,the use of biometrics has thrownup several human rights issues around choice,informed consent,privacy and data protection forthose who need humanitarian assistance,as well as highlighting wider issues around ethics and da
18、taresponsibility in the sector.Biometrics have been used to create digital identities in the humanitarian space since the early2000s,though little research has been conducted on how end users in this case,those who registerfor humanitarian assistance understand and experience using this technology t
19、o receive aid.This1report seeks to work towards filling this gap by sharing the perspectives of(mostly Syrian)refugeesin Jordan on their experiences with biometrics alongside information and analysis on the largerissues of digital identity(for terminology,see Box 1).1Some notable exceptions include
20、Casswell(2019);Baker and Rahman(2020);Schoemaker et al.(2020)andIazzolino(2021).8HPG working paperBox 1 TerminologyFor the purposes of this paper,digital identity refers to a set of electronically captured andstored attributes and credentials that can uniquely identify a person(Casswell,2019:64).It
21、canbe used as either a foundational identity(a legal or personal identity,such as a birth certificateor passport)or a functional identity(an identity used to access services,such as a library cardor an automated teller machine(ATM)card).An identity document(ID)provides proof of onesiidentity.Occasio
22、nally,the use of biometrics negates the need for a physical ID,when the captureof biometrics links directly to records stored in central databases,rather than on paper(Ucciferriet al.,2017).Often,however,biometrics are used in conjunction with a physical ID.Biometrics are the biological or physiolog
23、ical characteristics(fingerprints,facial structures,irisor retinal patterns,voice recognition,gait,etc.)measured and assessed for either identification who are you?or verification are you who you say you are?of an individual throughcomparison with a database of previously collected samples.Biometric
24、s are sometimes used tofacilitate digital identity for service delivery,but this use rises significantly with cash and voucherassistance(CVA),which has become a key component of humanitarian responses,due to thehigher level of assurance required by donors when giving cash.Identification by biometric
25、s istypically viewed as more invasive than other means of identification,such as personal detailslike names and addresses,because of their immutability.By contrast,biometrics have also beenpromoted as a way to prevent identity theft because it is tied to a unique identifier.i See Gelb and Clark(2013
26、),Kuner and Marelli(2020)and Manby(2021)for more on this distinction.9HPG working paper1.1MethodologyThis study used a qualitative approach based on in-depth interviews with global stakeholders andrefugees in Syria.Thirty-three interviews with key stakeholders globally were conducted in English by a
27、researcher in the UK between December 2019 and March 2021.Tw o interviews with key stakeholders inJordan were conducted by researchers in Jordan(see Table 1).The location of these interviews will notbe used throughout the report to ensure all respondents anonymity.Interviews with 45 refugees living
28、outside camps in Jordan took place remotely due to Covid-19restrictions between February and April 2021.These interviews were conducted in Arabic byresearchers located in Jordan.All of the interviewees had had their biometric data,including irisscans,collected during the registration process,and all
29、 of the interviewees were receiving or hadpreviously received assistance via the iris authentication modality.Some were also receiving or hadpreviously received assistance via a pre-paid ATM card.As of 30 April 2021,88.3%of refugees underthe mandate of the United Nations Refugee Agency(UNHCR)in Jord
30、an were Syrian.Likewise,40 of245 interviewees(88.9%)were from Syria.The age and gender of respondents varied,as did place ofresidence(see Table 2).Table 1Stakeholder interviews conductedType of organisationNumberAdvocacy organisationInternational non governmental organisation INGORed Cross/Red Cresc
31、ent movementPrivate sector6Research institutionUN agency7Total352This figure does not include Palestinian refugees,of which there are more than 2.2 million registered in Jordan,under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East(UNRWA)(www.unrwa.or
32、g/where-we-work/jordan).10 HPG working paperTable 2Number of refugees interviewed,by geographic regionGovernorateRefugee population%of total refugee populationiNumber interviewedAmmanIrbid272,236137,72887,54436.118.311.66.8244MafraqZarqaOtherTotal11551,419205,523754,45027.2100145i See footnote Sourc
33、e:UNHCR bRefugees in Jordan were self-selected by responding to a post on a Facebook group for refugeesreceiving aid through iris scans which described the research the research team and the aims of theresearch Within this post there was a link to a form where they added their information and theres
34、earch team in Jordan called them for further verification such as the date from which they startedto receive assistance and the method through which they collect it Once this had been completeda time was set for the interviews which were carried out remotely Some of the interviewees werefound throug
35、h snowballing where interviewees from the Facebook group suggested further contactsTo accompany the publication of this report a link to the Arabic version will be posted in the sameFacebook group and sent directly to all interviewees via WhatsAppConducting remote interviews allowed for a broader ge
36、ographical range although peoples answersremained remarkably consistent across locations For this reason age gender and location are not usedthroughout the report to ensure respondents anonymityFor more on why Jordan was chosen see Box 11 HPG working paperBox 2 Why Jordan was chosen for this studyJo
37、rdan was selected for this working paper because it has a relatively stable refugee population,which has been using biometrics for registration and to access CVA for several years without anymajor documented issues.As of 30 April 2021,85.4%of the refugee population under UNHCRsmandate had been regis
38、tered using biometrics,with 14.6%awaiting biometric processing(UNHCR,2021b).Urban refugees were chosen as interviewees because they make up the majorityof refugees in Jordan under UNHCRs mandate 83%as of 30 April 2021(UNHCR,2021b).TheJordanian government has shown a willingness to act on progressive
39、 policies for refugees,such asaccess to the labour market through the Jordan Compact,and Jordan is already equipped to useiris scan equipment for refugees and citizens alike at the border and in the banking industry(seesection 2.2).Working with other refugee populations who are undergoing biometric
40、registrationat a large scale,such as the Rohingya in Bangladesh,would have posed a much bigger possibilityfor harm(particularly emotional and social),and interviews or questions around the use ofbiometrics would have been more likely to reignite pre-existing concerns around data protectionand identi
41、ty(see Islam,2018;Baker and Rahman,2020).By doing the interviews with a moresettled population,the experiences and recommendations can inform other programmes,withoutsparking rumours or increasing fear in a system that refugees often must agree to use to survive.1.2 LimitationsThe research underpinn
42、ing this paper took place over the course of 18 months from December 2019to May 2021 due to the challenges of Covid-19.Interviews in Jordan were set to take place,in person inMarch 2020,but were limited to phone interviews,conducted in early 2021.The population sampled wasnot representative of the r
43、efugee population in Jordan.It was limited by the recruitment method,whichsaw respondents self-selected by volunteering to participate and through those respondents contacts.Thisexcluded people who do not have social media from participating in the interviews,though 82%of urbanrefugees in Jordan hav
44、e used mobile internet and 73%own a smartphone(Casswell,2019).There was also anuneven gender split among refugees interviewed,with more women agreeing to be interviewed than men,though responses across the entire sample remained consistent and did not vary based on gender.This paper largely focuses
45、on the use of biometrics and digital identity in refugee contexts,ratherthan providing a comprehensive and global assessment,in order to give more detail of a situationwhere it is used often,rather than to provide a shallower overview.Moreover,the focus on iris scansas the biometric modality in the
46、refugee context in Jordan also limits the studys potential applicabilityto other biometric modalities,each of which has its own risk and protection profiles.Deploymentstyles whether the biometric is stored in a database or not,whether there is a single mode of accessor multiple also vary and impact
47、the amount of risk involved.It is the authors hope that this deepdive spurs further conversation around different types of biometric modalities and how they areexperienced by those who use them on a daily basis.12 HPG working paper2 Digital identity and biometrics in thehumanitarian sectorOver the p
48、ast decade,governments around the world have turned to foundational digital identities,often with biometric verification,to register citizens and non-citizens alike.Foundational identities arelegal or personal identities,such as civil registries or national ID cards(Gelb and Clark,2013).In part,thed
49、igitisation of foundational IDs is supported by SDG 16.9,which calls for legal identities for everyonein a push to safeguard rights such as access to education,healthcare and financial inclusion,amongothers.However,this SDG does not stipulate that these identities be digital or include biometrics,an
50、dits only indicator is focused on birth registration.Nevertheless,governments and biometric companieshave used SDG 16.9 as justification to implement biometric identity systems,due to a perceivedreliability of these systems to determine unique identity as well as the increasing availability of thist