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1、PDFM由微信 索1r巴菲特致股东的信1977年Buffetfs Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1977Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 pershare, were moderately better than anticipated a year ago. Of these earnings, $1.43 per share resulted from substantial realized capital gains by Blue Chip Stamps which, to
2、the extent of our proportional interest in that company, are included in our operating earnings figure. Capital gains or losses realized directly byBerkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries are not included in our calculation of operating earnings. While too much attention should not be
3、paid to the figure for any single year, over the longer termthe record regarding aggregate capital gains or lossesTextile operations came in well below forecast, whileValueFirstl the results of the Illinois National Bank as well as theoperating earnings attributable to our equity interest in Blue Ch
4、ip Stamps were about as anticipated. However, insurance operations, led again by the truly outstanding results of Phil Liesche s managerial groupat National Indemnity Company, were even better than our optimistic expectations.(Most companies define urecordn earnings as a new high 牛in earnings per sh
5、are. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing 资particularly noteworthy in a management performance. 投.combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even atotally dormant steadily直 savings account w
6、ill produce.earningsPDFeach year becauserising interest价of号compounding.Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important JRassets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values),webelieve a more appropriate measure of managerialeconomic performance
7、 to be return on equity capital. In1977年本公司的营业净利为2,190万美元，每股约当22. 54美元，表现较 料年前的预期稍微好一点，在这堂盈余 中，每股有1.43美元的盈余，盆蓝筹 邮票大量实现的资本利得，本公司依研照投资比例认列投资收益所贡献，全 投于伯克希尔本身及其保诲子公司已实现的资本利得或损失，则不列入营业 更利益计算，建议大家不必太在意单一多 期间的静奈数字，因为长期累积的资 本利得益损失才是真正的重点所在。纺织事业的表现远低于预估，至于伊 利诺国家银行的成绩以及蓝筹邮票贡献给我们的投资利益则大致如预期， 另外，由Phil Liesche领导
8、的国家产 险保险业务的表现甚至比我们当初最 乐观的期望还要好。通常公司会宣称每股盈余又创下历史 新高，然而由于公司的资本会随着盈 余的累积扩增，所以我们并不认为这 样的经营表现有什么大不了的，比如 说每年股本扩充10%或是每股盈余成 长5%等等，毕竟就算是静止不动的定存帐户，由于复利的关系每年都可稳定地产生同样的效果。（搜1977 our operating earnings on beginning equity capital amounted to 19%, slightly better than last year and above both our own long-term a
9、verage and that ofAmerican industry in aggregate. But, while our operating earnings per share were up 37% from the year before, our beginning capital was up 24%, making the除非是特殊的情况（比如说负债比例 特别高或是帐上持有重大资产未予重估），否则我们认为“股东权益报酬率”应该是衡量管理当局表现比较合 理的指针，1997年我们期初股东权益 的报酬率约为19%,这比去年同期稍 微好一点，但远高于本身过去长期以 及当年美国企业整
10、体的平均数，所以 虽然我们每股的盈余成长了 37%,但 由于期初的资本也增加了 34%,这使 得我们实际的表现并没有想象中那么working with him.Insurance companies offer standardized policies which can be copied by anyone. Their only products are promises. It is not difficult to be licensed, and rates are an open book. There are no important advantages fromtrade
11、marks, patents, raw material sources, differentiation tolocation, etc. , andproducecorporate longevity, very little consumer insulation fromcompetition. It is reports, to stress Sometimes this iscommonplace,in corporate annualthe difference that people make.true and sometimes it isn t. But保险公司提供的制式保
12、单很容易为其 它同业所模仿，他们唯一的产品就是 承诺，保险执照不难取得，而费率也 是公开的，这行业商标、专利、地点、 企业年资、原物料等都不重要，消费 者对于产品也很难产生特别的偏好， 在企业的年报中，常常看到有人强调 料 自己不同十其它同业的特殊之处，有 咨 时这样的说法有道理，有时没什么道理，但不可否认的是，保险事业的本there is no question that the nature of the insurancebusiness magnifies the effect which individual managers have on company performance.
13、 We are very fortunate tohave the group of managers that are associated with us.Insurance InvestmentsDuring the past two years insurance investments at cost的影响具有举足轻重的地位，很幸运多 的是与我们共事的是一群优秀的经理Ao保险事业的投资下(excluding the investment in our affiliate, Blue Chip Stamps) have grown from $134.6 million to $252
14、.8 )million. Growth in insurance reserves, produced by ourlarge gain in premium have accounted for securities. In turn,volume, plus retained earnings, this increase in marketable net investment income of theEDITORInsurance Group has improved from $8.4 million pre-tax in 1975 to $12. 3 million pre-ta
15、x inValueFirstl 1977.(过去两年我们保险事业投入的资金成 本i扣除对关系企也蓝筹邮票的投资） 已从原先的1.346亿美元成长到2. 528亿美元，保险准备的成长，主 要是由于保费收入的大幅增加，加上 保留的盈余，是我们投资部位之所以 大幅增加的原因，也因此，我们整体 保险事业因为投贫血增加的净收益也 由1975年税前840万美元的利益成长 到1977年的1,230万美元。信 微 索 搜除了股利与利息收入之外，我们还实 现了税前690万美元的资本利得，四 分之一来自债券，剩下的则来自股票， 至于1977年年底未实现的资本利得 大约在7,400万美元之谱，对于这个数字，就像任何
16、单一日期的数字，（1974年底帐上有1,700万美元的未 实现损失）大家小必看得太认真，因为 我们持股部位比较大的投资，往往要 持有很长一段时间，所以我们的投资绩效依据的是这些被投资公司在这段 期间的经营表现，而不是特定时期的 股票价格，就像我们认为买下一家公 司却只关心他的短期状况是件很傻的 事，同样地持有公司部份所有权-也就 是股票，我们认为只关心短期盈余或In addition to this income from dividends and interest, 股we realized capital gains of $6.9 million before tax,q 牛about
17、 one-quarter from bonds and the balance from资stocks. Our unrealized gain in stocks at yearend 1977投approx lately $ 74 nd lion but this figure, likeother figure of 直 a single date (we had an unrealized lossshould notof $17 million 介 at thePDFend of 1974), be takentoo seriously. Most of our large stoc
18、k positions are 号going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our众dMfsIcns (II be prcAIdcC trr btlne5sresults over that period, and not by prices on anygiven day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound
19、 to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company;i. e. , marketable common stocks.者是盈余短暂的变动也不应该。A little digression illustrating this point may be 离题一下，有一点很有趣足以说明上PDFMinteresting. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and 述情况
20、,伯克希尔纺纱与 HathawayHathaway Manufacturing were merged in 1955 to form 工业是在 1955 年合并成为伯克希尔Berkshire Hathaway Inc. In 1948, on a pro forma combinedbasis, they had earnings after tax of almost $18 millionHathaway公司的，再将时间往回推到1948年，在拟制合并的基础下，当年and employed 10,000 people at a dozen large mills他们合计税前盈余达到1,80
21、0万美throughout New England. In the business world of that元，旗下拥有十个遍布新英格兰地区period they were an economic powerhouse. For example, in that same year earnings of IBM were $28 million (now $2.7 billion), Safeway Stores, $10 million, Minnesota Mining, $13 million, and Time, Inc., $9 million. But, in the dec
22、ade following the 1955 merger aggregate sales of $595 million produced an aggregate loss for BerkshireHathaway of $10 million. By 1964 the operation had been reduced to two mills and net worth had shrunk to $22 million, from $53 million at the time of the merger. So much for single year snapshots as
23、 adequate portrayals of a business.的工厂，员工人数一万人，在当时的 环境，他们算是经济成长的重要动？ 之一，因为IBM在同一年度的盈点也 咨不过2, 800万美元(现在的年获利达人研到27亿美元)，另外Safeway商店投志则为900万，然而在双方合并后的多十年内，累计营收虽然有5.95亿，但 更结算万损却达到1,000万关兀，时至 载1964年，公司的营运仅剩两家工J ， 下净值更从合并时的5, 300万美元大幅缩标至2,200万美元，所以我们可以 这样说，单一年度所透露出公司营运 的景况实在是极其有限。We select our marketable e
24、quity securities in much the我们投资股票的选择方式与买进整家same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition企业的模式很相近，我们想要的企业in its entirety. We want the business to be (1) one that EDITOR we can understand, with favorable long-term必须是我们可以了解的行业具 有长期竞争力由才德兼具的人士prospects, (3) operated by honestandValueFirstland (
25、4) availablecompetent people, at a very attractiveprice.Weordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for 股anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short牟term. In fact, if their business experience continues资to satisfy us, we welcome lower marketthing at a betterprices of stocks投 值所经营(4)吸引人的
26、价格，我们从来不 试看去买进一些短期股价预期有所表 现的股票，事实上，如果其企业的表 现符合我们的预期，我们反而希望他 们的股价不要太高，如此我们才有机 会以更理想的价格买进更多的股权。我们过去的经验显示，一家好公司部 份所有权的价格，常常要比协议谈判 买下整家要来得便宜许多，也因此想 要拥有价廉物美的企业所有权，直接购并的方式往往不可得，还不如透过 间接拥有股权的方式来达到目的，当 价格合理，我们很愿意在某些特定的 公司身上持有大量的股权，这样做不 是为了要取得控制权，也不是为了将 来再转卖出或是进行购并，而是期望 企业本身能有好的表现，进而转化成 企业长期的价值以及丰厚的股利收price.
27、PDFOur experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly M价outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities号markets at very large discounts from the prices they众J 公entire companies. Consequently, bargains inbusiness ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquis
28、ition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results byPDFMco
29、rporations will translate over the long term into 入，不论是少数股权或是多数股权皆这类的投资初期对于我们的经营利益 的助益或许不大，举例来说，1977年 我们投资了 L 090万美元在资本城通 讯公司之上，去年依照持股比例应可 分得的盈余约为130万美元，但实在 反应在找们财务报表上的却只角咨区 4万美元的现金股利。研资资本城拥有优良的资产与优异的管理投阶层.而达钱普我扶除为林也设都至营运面及资金管理面，想要直接买下多 资本城所要花费的成本可能是两倍于更 间接透过股票市场投资，更何况直接 载拥有权对我们并没有多大的好处，控 下制权虽然让我们拥有
30、机会，但同样也 带粢责任去管理企业的营运及资源， 我们根本就没有能力提供现有管理阶 层关于这些方面额外任何的助益，事 实上，与其管还不如不管，更能得到 好的结果，这样的观念或许很反常， 但却是我们认为比较合适的。EDITOR银行业achievea rate of earnings on assets about three times that of 股.most large banks. As usual, this record was achieved 牛while the bank paid maximum rates to savers and 资maintained an asse
31、t position combining low risk and投1977年伊利诺国家银行的资产报酬率约为其它规模较大I可业的三倍,exceptional liquidity. Gene Abej：K forned the buiearnings amounted to价PDF$8,782. Since that time, no如往常，这样的成绩，还搭配给予存 户最优惠的利率，同时维持风险最低 流动性最高的资产组合，Gene Abegg 在1931年以25万美元成立这家银行， 在第一个完整的营业年度，盈余就达newcapital has been contributed to the ba
32、nk; on the 号contrary, since our purchase in 1969, dividends of $20众million have been paid. LirninK in 1977 atxrncd to$3.6 million, more than achieved by many banks two到8, 782美元，从那时候开始,银行 就没有冉办理任何一次增资，相反地， 当我们在1969年买下该公司时，马上 就领到了 2,000万美元的现金股利，彳口 three times its size.微1977年的盈余更达到360万美元，甚至比规模大他两三倍的银行同
33、业还 多。correspondingly excellent market value and dividend 是如此。 results for owners, minority as well as majority.Such investments initially may have negligible impact on our operating earnings. For example, we invested $10. 9 million in Capital Cities Communications during 1977. Earnings attributable
34、to the shares we purchased totaled about $1. 3 million last year. But only the cash dividend, which currently provides $40,000 annually, isreflected in our operating earnings figure.Capital Cities possesses both extraordinary properties and extraordinary management. And these management skills exten
35、d equally to operations and employment ofcorporate capital. To purchase, directly, properties such as Capital Cities owns would cost in the area of twice our cost of purchase via the stock market, and direct ownership would offer no important advantages tous. While control would give us the opportun
36、ity - and the responsibility - to manage operations and corporate ) resources, we would not be able to provide management in either of those respects equal to that now in place. In effect, we can obtain a better management result through non-control than control. This is an unorthodoxview, but one w
37、e believe to be sound.BankingIn 1977 the Illinois National Bank continued to去年现年80岁依然一马当先专注于 银行营运的Gene,要求新的接任者接 手，因此前奥玛哈美国国家银行的总 裁Peter Jeffrey于3/1正式加入伊 利诺国家银行担任新总裁。Late last year Gene, now 80 and still running a banking operation without peer, asked that a successor be brought in. Accordingly, Pete
38、r Jeffrey, formerly President and Chief Executive Officer of American National Bank of Omaha, has joined the Illinois NationalPDFMBank effective March 1st as President and ChiefExecutive Officer.Gene continues in good health as Chairman. We expect a continued successful operation at Rockford s leadi
39、ng bank.老当益壮的Gene依然担任董事长，我 EDITOR们预期该银行仍将成为Rockford地区首区一指的银行（伊利诺州城市）。Blue Chip Stamps蓝筹邮票We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12. 9 million from operations and, in addition, h
40、ad realized securities gains of $4 1 million.我们再度增加对蓝筹邮票的持股权 益，截至1977年底，持有的假权比例 大约是36. 5%,蓝筹邮票去年的表现 研相当小错，营业利益达到1,290万美 投兀，此外还有410刀的已实现负本利 得。 多Both Wesco Financial Corp., an 80% owned subsidiary ofBlue Chip Stamps, managed by Louis Vincenti, and See s Candies, a 99% owned subsidiary, managed by Chuc
41、k Huggins, made good progress in 1977. Since See s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4. 2 millionValueFirstl to $12.6 million with little additional capital 420 investment. See s achieved this record while operating in an industry
42、 experiencing practically no unit growth.PDFShareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may obtain the annual report of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting it from Mr. Robert II. Bird, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern (Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.蓝筹邮票持有80%股权的Wesco金融 载 :更，Vincenti所管理）公司（由Louis及持
43、有99%股权的子公司喜斯糖果（由 Chuck Huggins所管理）在1977年都 有重大进展，自从喜斯糖果在1972 年被蓝筹邮票所买下后，就没有挹注）任何额外的资本，其税前盈余从万美元成长到1,260万美元，尤其难 得的是喜斯所处的产业环境，几乎没 有成长，若有需要伯克希尔的股东可 向Mr. Robert （地址加州洛杉矶5801 South Eastern Avenue）索取蓝筹邮票 的年报。股 牛 资 投 值PDFM价号众公信微索搜（gain in earnings per share considerably less impressive 好。 than it might appe
44、ar at first glance.We expect difficulty in matching our 1977 rate of return during the forthcoming year. Beginning equity capital is up 23% from a year ago, and we expect the trend of insurance underwriting profit margins to turn down well before the end of the year. Nevertheless, we expect a reason
45、ably good year and our present estimate, subject to the usual caveats regarding the frailties of forecasts, is that operating earnings will improve somewhat on a per share basis during 1978.我们预期未来年度将很难再达到1977年这样的报酬率水准，一方面是 因为期初资本又增加了 23%, 一方面 我们预期保险核保利润率会在年底以 前开始反转，尽管如此，大家还是可 以期待丰收的一年，血找们现在的诂 咨计是，虽然
46、预测有其先天上的限制，研我认为每股肯业利益在1978年应该Textile Operations纺织事业The textile business again had a very poor year in 1977. We have mistakenly predicted better results in each ofthe last twoforecastingyears. This may say something about our abilities, the nature of the textile1977年纺织事业的表现依旧低迷不更振，过去两年我们乐观的预期纷纷落 载空，这
47、手许也说明了我们预测能力的 薄弱，晟是纺织产业的本质，尽管一industry, or both.Despite strenuous efforts, problems再地努力与挣孔，行销与制造的问题依旧存在，虽然市场上面临的困境与 产业情势相关，但也有不少问题是我 们自己造成。in marketing difficultiesand manufacturing have persisted. Many) experienced in the marketing area are dueprimarily to industry conditions, but some of the problems have been of our own making.the wisdom ofEDITORover the longerA few shareholders have questioned remaining in the textile business which, term, is unlikely to produce returnsV Hill FifStl on capital部份股东开始质疑我们是否应该继续 留在纺织产业，虽然就长期而言其投 资报酬率明显低于其它的投资，但我comparable to those available in many othe