《Decisions(策略决策)44333.pptx》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《Decisions(策略决策)44333.pptx（106页珍藏版）》请在taowenge.com淘文阁网|工程机械CAD图纸|机械工程制图|CAD装配图下载|SolidWorks_CaTia_CAD_UG_PROE_设计图分享下载上搜索。
1、Managerial EconomicsChapter 10 Game Theory and Competitive StrategyGuan XizhanSchool of Management,Fudan UniversityE-Mail:Topics to be Discussedn Gaming and Strategic Decisions（策略决策）n Dominant Strategies（上策，占优策略）n The Nash Equilibrium Revisitedn Repeated Games（重复博弈）1Topics to be Discussedn Sequentia
2、l Games（序贯博弈）n Threats,Commitments,and Credibility（威慑、承诺与可信性）n Entry Deterrence（进入阻止，进入威慑）n Bargaining Strategy（讨价还价策略）2Gaming and Strategic Decisionsn“If I believe that my competitors are rational and act to maximize their own profits,how should I take their behavior into account when making my own
3、 profit-maximizing decisions?”3Gaming and Strategic Decisionsn Noncooperative versus Cooperative Gamesn Cooperative Game（合作博弈）n Players negotiate binding contracts（有约束力的契约）that allow them to plan joint strategiesn Example:Buyer and seller negotiating the price of a good or service or a joint venture
4、 by two firms(i.e.Microsoft and Apple)n Binding contracts are possible4Gaming and Strategic Decisionsn Noncooperative versus Cooperative Gamesn Noncooperative Gamen Negotiation and enforcement of a binding contract are not possiblen Example:Two competing firms assuming the others behavior determine,
5、independently,pricing and advertising strategy to gain market sharen Binding contracts are not possible5Gaming and Strategic Decisionsn Noncooperative versus Cooperative Gamesn“The strategy design is based on understanding your opponents point of view,and(assuming you opponent is rational)deducing h
6、ow he or she is likely to respond to your actions”6Gaming and Strategic Decisionsn An Example:How to buy a dollar bill1)Auction a dollar bill2)Highest bidder receives the dollar in return for the amount bid3)Second highest bidder must pay the amount he or she bidn Question:How much would you bid for
7、 a dollar?7Acquiring a Companyn Scenarion Company A:The Acquirern Company T:The Targetn A will offer cash for all of Ts sharesn What price to offer?8Acquiring a Companyn Scenarion The value of T depends on the outcome of a current oil exploration project.n Failure:Ts value=$0n Success:Ts value=$100/
8、sharen All outcomes are equally likely9Acquiring a Companyn Scenarion Ts value will be 50%greater with As management.n A,must submit the proposal before the exploration outcome is known.n T will not choose to accept or reject until after the outcome is known only to T.n How much should A offer?10Dom
9、inant Strategiesn Dominant Strategyn One that is optimal no matter what an opponent does.n An Examplen A&B sell competing productsn They are deciding whether to undertake advertising campaigns11Payoff Matrix for Advertising GameFirm AAdvertiseDontAdvertiseAdvertiseDontAdvertiseFirm B10,5 15,010,2 6,
10、812Payoff Matrix for Advertising GameFirm AAdvertiseDontAdvertiseAdvertiseDontAdvertiseFirm B10,5 15,010,2 6,8n Observationsn A:regardless of B,advertising is the bestn B:regardless of A,advertising is best13Payoff Matrix for Advertising GameFirm AAdvertiseDontAdvertiseAdvertiseDontAdvertiseFirm B10
11、,5 15,010,2 6,8n Observationsn Dominant strategy for A&B is to advertisen Do not worry about the other playern Equilibrium in dominant strategy14Dominant Strategiesn Game Without Dominant Strategyn The optimal decision of a player without a dominant strategy will depend on what the other player does
12、.1510,5 15,020,2 6,8Firm AAdvertiseDontAdvertiseAdvertiseDontAdvertiseFirm BModified Advertising Game1610,5 15,020,2 6,8Firm AAdvertiseDontAdvertiseAdvertiseDontAdvertiseFirm BModified Advertising Gamen Observationsn A:No dominant strategy;depends on Bs actionsn B:Advertisen Questionn What should A
13、do?(Hint:consider Bs decision17The Nash Equilibrium Revisitedn Dominant Strategiesn“Im doing the best I can no matter what you do.”n“Youre doing the best you can no matter what I do.”18The Nash Equilibrium Revisitedn Nash Equilibriumn“Im doing the best I can given what you are doing”n“Youre doing th
14、e best you can given what I am doing.”19n Examples With A Nash Equilibriumn Two cereal companiesn Market for one producer of crispy cerealn Market for one producer of sweet cerealn Each firm only has the resources to introduce one cerealn NoncooperativeThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedProduct Choice Pr
15、oblem20Product Choice ProblemFirm 1Crispy SweetCrispySweetFirm 2-5,-5 10,10-5,-5 10,1021Product Choice ProblemFirm 1Crispy SweetCrispySweetFirm 2-5,-5 10,10-5,-5 10,10n Questionn Is there a Nash equilibrium?n If not,why?n If so,how can it be reached22Beach Location Gamen Scenarion Two competitors,Y
16、and C,selling soft drinksn Beach 200 yards longn Sunbathers are spread evenly along the beachn Price Y=Price Cn Customer will buy from the closest vendor23Beach Location Gamen Where will the competitors locate(i.e.where is the Nash equilibrium)?Ocean0 B Beach A 200 yardsC24Beach Location Game2)Examp
17、les of this decision problem include:n Locating a gas stationn Presidential electionsOcean0 B Beach A 200 yardsC25The Nash Equilibrium Revisitedn Maximin Strategies（最大最小策略）n Scenarion Two firms compete selling file-encryption softwaren They both use the same encryption standard(files encrypted by on
18、e software can be read by the other-advantage to consumers)26The Nash Equilibrium Revisitedn Maximin Strategiesn Scenarion Firm 1 has a much larger market share than Firm 2n Both are considering investing in a new encryption standard27Maximin StrategyFirm 1Dont invest InvestFirm 20,0-10,1020,10-100,
19、0Dont investInvest28Maximin StrategyFirm 1Dont invest InvestFirm 20,0-10,1020,10-100,0Dont investInvestn Observationsn Dominant strategy Firm 2:Investn Nash equilibriumn Firm 1:investn Firm 2:Invest29Maximin StrategyFirm 1Dont invest InvestFirm 20,0-10,1020,10-100,0Dont investInvestn Observationsn I
20、f Firm 2 does not invest,Firm 1 incurs significant lossesn Firm 1 might play dont investn Minimize losses to 10:maximin strategy30n If both are rational and informedn Both firms investn Nash equilibriumThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMaximin Strategy31n Considern If Player 2 is not rational or complet
21、ely informedn Firm 1s maximin strategy is to not investn Firm 2s maximin strategy is to invest.n If 1 knows 2 is using a maximin strategy,1 would investThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMaximin Strategy32Prisoners DilemmaPrisoner AConfess Dont ConfessConfessDontConfessPrisoner B-5,-5-1,-10-2,-2-10,-133P
22、risoners DilemmaPrisoner AConfess Dont ConfessConfessDontConfessPrisoner B-5,-5-1,-10-2,-2-10,-1n What is the:n Dominant strategyn Nash equilibriumn Maximin solution34n Pure Strategy（纯策略）n Player makes a specific choicen Mixed Strategy（混合策略）n Player makes a random choice among two or more possible a
23、ctions based on a set of chosen probabilitiesThe Nash Equilibrium RevisitedMixed Strategy35Matching Pennies（猜硬币）Player AHeads TailsHeadsTailsPlayer B1,-1-1,11,-1-1,136Matching PenniesPlayer AHeads TailsHeadsTailsPlayer B1,-1-1,11,-1-1,1n Observationsn Pure strategy:No Nash equilibriumn Mixed strateg
24、y:Random choice is a Nash equilibriumn Would a firm set price based on random choice assumption?37The Battle of the SexesBoyFootball MovieFootballMovieGirl2,1 0,01,2 0,038The Battle of the SexesBoy Football MovieFootballMovieGirl2,1 0,01,2 0,0n Pure Strategyn Both play(watch)footballn Both watch mov
25、ien Mixed Strategyn Boy chooses footballn Girl chooses movie39Repeated Gamesn Oligopolistic firms play a repeated game.n With each repetition of the Prisoners Dilemma,firms can develop reputations about their behavior and study the behavior of their competitors.40Pricing ProblemFirm 1Low Price High
26、PriceLow PriceHigh PriceFirm 210,10 100,-5050,50-50,10041Pricing ProblemFirm 1Low Price High PriceLow PriceHigh PriceFirm 210,10 100,-5050,50-50,100n Non-repeated gamen Strategy is Low1,Low2n Repeated gamen Tit-for-tat strategy is the most profitable42Repeated Gamesn Conclusion:n With repeated game
27、n The Prisoners Dilemma can have a cooperative outcome with tit-for-tat strategy43Repeated Gamesn Conclusion:n This is most likely to occur in a market with:n Few firmsn Stable demandn Stable cost44Repeated Gamesn Conclusionn Cooperation is difficult at best since these factors may change in the lon
28、g-run.45Oligopolistic Cooperationin the Water Meter Industryn Characteristics of the Marketn Four Producersn Rockwell International(35%),Badger Meter,Neptune Water Meter Company,and Hersey Products(Badger,Neptune,and Hersey combined have about a 50 to 55%share)46Oligopolistic Cooperationin the Water
29、 Meter Industryn Characteristics of the Marketn Very inelastic demandn Not a significant part of the budget47Oligopolistic Cooperationin the Water Meter Industryn Characteristics of the Marketn Stable demandn Long standing relationship between consumer and producer n Barriern Economies of scalen Bar
30、rier48Oligopolistic Cooperationin the Water Meter Industryn Characteristics of the Marketn This is a Prisoners Dilemman Lower price to a competitive leveln Cooperaten Repeated Gamen Questionn Why has cooperation prevailed?49Competition and Collusionin the Airline Industryn What Do You Think?n Is the
31、re cooperation&collusion in the airline industry?50Sequential Gamesn Players move in turnn Players must think through the possible actions and rational reactions of each player51Sequential Gamesn Examplesn Responding to a competitors ad campaignn Entry decisionsn Responding to regulatory policy52n S
32、cenarion Two new(sweet,crispy)cerealsn Successful only if each firm produces one cerealn Sweet will sell bettern Both still profitable with only one producerSequential GamesThe Extensive Form（扩展形）of a Game53Modified Product Choice ProblemFirm 1Crispy SweetCrispySweetFirm 2-5,-5 10,20-5,-5 20,1054Mod
33、ified Product Choice ProblemFirm 1Crispy SweetCrispySweetFirm 2-5,-5 10,20-5,-5 20,10n Questionn What is the likely outcome if both make their decisions independently,simultaneously,and without knowledge of the others intentions?55n Assume that Firm 1 will introduce its new cereal first(a sequential
34、 game).n Questionn What will be the outcome of this game?Modified Product Choice ProblemThe Extensive Form of a Game56Sequential Gamesn The Extensive Form of a Gamen Using a decision tree（决策树）n Work backward from the best outcome for Firm 1The Extensive Form of a Game57Product Choice Game in Extensi
35、ve FormCrispySweetCrispySweet-5,-510,2020,10-5,-5Firm 1CrispySweetFirm 2Firm 258Sequential Gamesn The Advantage of Moving Firstn In this product-choice game,there is a clear advantage to moving first.59Sequential Gamesn Assume:DuopolyThe Advantage of Moving First60Sequential Gamesn DuopolyThe Advant
36、age of Moving First61Choosing OutputFirm 17.5Firm 2112.50,112.50 56.25,112.500,0 112.50,56.25125,93.75 50,7593.75,12575,50100,10010 157.5101562Choosing OutputFirm 17.5Firm 2112.50,112.50 56.25,112.500,0 112.50,56.25125,93.75 50,7593.75,12575,50100,10010 157.51015n This payoff matrix illustrates vari
37、ous outcomesn Move together,both produce 10n Questionn What if Firm 1 moves first?63Threats,Commitments,and Credibilityn Strategic Movesn What actions can a firm take to gain advantage in the marketplace?n Deter entryn Induce competitors to reduce output,leave,raise pricen Implicit agreements that b
38、enefit one firm64Threats,Commitments,and Credibilityn How To Make the First Moven Demonstrate Commitmentn Firm 1 must constrain his behavior to the extent Firm 2 is convinced that he is committed65Threats,Commitments,and Credibilityn Empty Threats（空头威胁）n If a firm will be worse off if it charges a l
39、ow price,the threat of a low price is not credible in the eyes of the competitors.66Pricing of Computers and Word ProcessorsFirm 1High Price Low PriceHigh PriceLow PriceFirm 2100,80 80,10010,20 20,067Pricing of Computers and Word ProcessorsFirm 1High Price Low PriceHigh PriceLow PriceFirm 2100,80 80
40、,10010,20 20,0n Questionn Can Firm 1 force Firm 2 to charge a high price by threatening to lower its price?68Threats,Commitments,and Credibilityn Scenarion Race Car Motors,Inc.(RCM)produces carsn Far Out Engines(FOE)produces specialty car engines and sells most of them to RCMn Sequential game with R
41、CM as the leadern FOE has no power to threaten to build big since RCM controls output.69Production Choice ProblemFar Out EnginesSmall cars Big carsSmall enginesBig enginesRace Car Motors3,6 3,08,3 1,170n Questionn How could FOE force RCM to shift to big cars?Threats,Commitments,and Credibility71Modi
42、fied Production Choice Problem0,6 0,08,3 1,1Far Out EnginesSmall cars Big carsSmall enginesBig enginesRace Car Motors72n Questions1)What is the risk of this strategy?2)How could irrational behavior give FOE some power to control output?Modified Production Choice Problem73Wal-Mart StoresPreemptive In
43、vestment Strategyn Questionn How did Wal-Mart become the largest retailer in the U.S.when many established retail chains were closing their doors?n Hintn How did Wal-Mart gain monopoly power?n Preemptive game with Nash equilibrium74The Discount Store Preemption GameWal-MartEnter Dont enterEnterDont
44、enterCompany X-10,-10 20,00,0 0,2075The Discount Store Preemption GameWal-MartEnter Dont enterEnterDont enterCompany X-10,-10 20,00,0 0,20n Two Nash equilibriumn Low leftn Upper rightn Must be preemptive to win76Entry Deterrencen To deter entry,the incumbent firm（在位企业）must convince any potential com
45、petitor that entry will be unprofitable.77Entry PossibilitiesIncumbentEnter Stay outHigh price(accommodation)Low Price(warfare)Potential Entrant100,20 200,0130,0 70,-1078Entry Deterrencen Scenarion Incumbent monopolist(I)and prospective entrant(X)n X single cost=$80 million to build plant79Entry Deterrencen Scenarion If X does not enter I makes a profit of$200 million.n If X enters and charges a high price I earns a profit of$100 million and X earns$20 million.n If X enters and charges a low price I earns a profit of$70 million and X earns$-10 million.80