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1、为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益目录目录1.Introduction2.Literature Review3.Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game4.Ben
2、chmark:First-Best Under Complete Information5.Signaling with Verifiable Inventory 5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5.2 Performance-Based Contract6.Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory 6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract7.Extensions:Efficiency Enhancement Strategies 7.1 Endogenizin
3、g Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers8.Conclusions为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCRBC可靠性私有信息使用备用库存维护背景介绍背景介绍为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益文献回顾文献回顾2.Literature ReviewlPBC for outsourced serv
4、iceslasymmetric information in operations managementlthe use of warranties as a signaling mechanism为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模3.Model3.1 Repair Process and Inventory PolicyN:identical copies;B:inventory backorder;s:inventory;The expected backorders in steady state
5、isAvailability is equal to 为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模3.2 Cost StructureEach time a product failure occurs,the buyer incurs a fixed cost r 0.The buyers expected cost is equal toThe vendors expected cost is equal to为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和
6、职工的合法权益建模建模3.3 Information StructureWe assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two possible types,L or H,where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability.Hazard rate ordering（危险率序）:Excess wealth ordering（剩余财富序）:为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建
7、模建模3.4 Contract Types and PayoffsWe can write the buyers expected payoff asThe vendors expected payoff is given byRBC:PBC:为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模3.5 Signaling GameWe assume that the vendor,who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly devel
8、oped product,chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer.The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at.We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE)that is also renegotiation-proof.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法
9、权益建模建模4.Benchmark:First-Best Under Complete InformationGiven the vendor type,the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模5.Signaling with Verifiable InventoryWe now consider the setting in which the vendor posse
10、sses private information about product reliability.5.1 Resource-Based ContractThe value of set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模5.1 Resource-Based ContractIn summary,successf
11、ul signaling by the reliable vendor is possible under RBC when her inventory choice is verifiable,but it comes at a cost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模5.2 Performance-Based ContractTherefore,successful signal
12、ing by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and PBC when the inventory is verifiable.However,PBC presents an advantage because its risk sharing mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模6.Signaling with Unverifiab
13、le Inventory6.1 Resource-Based ContractWith inventory no longer verifiable,the payoff functions for the vendor and the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the verifiable inventory case.An underinvestment in inventory causes economic inefficiency.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障
14、用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模6.2 Performance-Based ContractThe reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium.Overall,we find that the interaction between the vendors discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive creates subtle dynamics that impact the relative efficiency of after-sales ser
15、vice contracts in nontrivial ways.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益建模建模Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer?Thus,the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her type with PBC more than compensates for the cost associated with overinvestment in invento
16、ry and any benefit presented by RBC,which does not improve upon a pooling outcome.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益扩展扩展7.Extensions:Efficiency Enhancement StrategieslEndogenizing Inventory VerifiabilitylPooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事
17、业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益结论结论8.ConclusionsSuggestions:The key to bring efficiency to the supply chain is inventory transparency.An alternative way to bring efficiency is to utilize inventory pooling,in case the vendor manages inventories across multiple buyers.为了规范事业单位聘用关系，建立和完善适应社会主义市场经济体制的事业单位工作人员聘用制度，保障用人单位和职工的合法权益谢谢！谢谢！