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1、Center for Preventive ActionDiscussion Paper SeriesApril 2021Major Power Rivalry in East AsiaEvan S. MedeirosCenter for Preventive ActionDiscussion PaperApril 2021Major Power Rivalry in East AsiaEvan S. MedeirosThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organiza
2、tion, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, busi-ness executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices
3、facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by maintaining a diverse membership, including special programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy leaders; convening meetings at its headquarters in New York an
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8、mmunications at 212.434.9888. Visit CFRs website, CFR.org.Copyright 2021 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved.This paper may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reproduction permit-ted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C.
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10、ity of the author.CONTENTS1Introduction4 The Changing Context of Great Power Competition10 Risks of Conflict in East Asia22 Managing Major Power Crisis and Confrontation in Asia29 Recommendations33 Conclusion34Endnotes38About the AuthorContentsiiiINTRODUCTIONWith the arrival of the Joe Biden adminis
11、tration and the evolution once againof a U.S. grand strategy under a new president, a familiar question emerges: after Donald Trump, what idea (or set of ideas) will drive national security policy? The Trump administration replaced the “global war on terror” with “great power competition” as the org
12、aniz-ing principle of U.S. national security policy and framed U.S.-China relations as a “strategic competition.”1 Beijing assumed such centrality because Trump largely discounted threats from Moscow and because Beijings external activism and use of coercion grew in scope and fre-quency. The Biden a
13、dministrations early statements and actions in-dicate it has accepted the frame of strategic competition with China “extreme competition” in the words of President Bidenbut that the policy expressions within this framework will differ substantially from its predecessors.The trajectory of U.S. strate
14、gy and policy toward China is perhaps the most salient issue for the geopolitics of East Asia in the coming decades. This region, more than any other, not only is the crucible for U.S.-China competition but will also be the recipient of the resulting dynamics. U.S.-China relations thus will have a d
15、efining influence on the distribution of power across East Asia at the very time that the region becomes the center of global politics, as Europe was during the Cold War. It has become a truism to note that no one in Asia wants to choose between Washington and Beijing and no one wants Beijing to dom
16、inate. Asias geopolitical reality will be the space between these views. Yet the regions lingering questions about American commitment and capability will muddle the choices for Asian policymakers, as do projections of Chinas growth and influence. InIntroduction1this context, the shape and contour o
17、f competitive dynamics will only become more central to East Asian security and prosperity.Thus, how the Biden administration will actually pursue such competition with China is now a paramount question for policymakers and analysts in the United States, in Asia, and globally. U.S. and Chinese perce
18、ptions of each other are hardening at the very time that China is becoming more capable in multiple domains, which intensifies bilateral competition. The United States core challenge is to deter a growing diversity of Chinas behaviors but not increase the risk of a catastrophic conflictwhile still a
19、dvancing U.S. economic interests, many of which are in tension with the former challenge. President Bidens advisors have previously written about pursuing a policy of competitive coexistence with China, but how to achieve such a delicate balance remains an open question.2 Policymakers and analysts n
20、eed to devote more energy and time to identifying and weighing risks of strategic competition bilaterally, regionally, and globally. They will then need to determine the degree of risk and types of costs the United States and its allies can and should assume to shape and deter China without provokin
21、g armed conflict. In other words, the issue of conflictand conflict prevention is only becoming more central to China policy and U.S.-China relations as competition becomes the defining frame for U.S. policy.The U.S.-China relationship currently finds itself in a precarious state due to the damage o
22、f the Trump years as well as the accumulating differences in interests and values. The U.S.-China competition is intensifying and diversifying. In particular, it is assuming an overtly ideological dimension, which will only accentuate distrust and deepen the interest-based competition on both sides.
23、 The fact that a multitude of immediate issues, including Taiwan and maritime disputes, could produce conflict makes the situation even more precarious. These issues exist against the background of an accelerating arms race between the U.S. and Chinese militaries in the western Pacific and specifica
24、lly within the first island chain.Even if the Biden administration adopts a less overtly confrontational approach toward China than the Trump administrations, the risks of conflict are real and growing due to the lack of effective remedies. Washington and Beijing lack the necessary tools to manage t
25、his intensifying competition. Many of the past mechanisms have atrophied, including high-level dialogues, crisis communications, and confidence-building measures. In addition, whether cooperation on common challengesif joint work even materializescan overcome the tension, friction, and mistrust gene
26、rated by structural competition2Major Power Rivalry in East Asiais uncertain. Add to the mix the politicization of U.S.-China relations in both countries, and the result is a cocktail of enduring instability and heightened risk of competition manifesting in conflict.This situation has left the U.S.-
27、China relationship in a precarious place that will require delicate diplomacy in order to achieve some modicum of coexistence amid the diverging interests. Henry Kissinger famously stated in 2019 that the U.S. relationship with China was “at the foothills of a Cold War.”3 Kissinger would perhaps mod
28、ify that claim todaynamely, to say that the U.S.-China relationship is now beyond the foothills and into more treacherous mountain terrain. As U.S. and Chinese policymakers move into such terra incognita, revitalizing the existing tools for managing distrust, reducing the risks of accidents and misc
29、alculations, and generally curbing the intensifying U.S.-China competition will be essential. Even with these steps, the challenge is daunting, and the prospects of success are not robust.Introduction3THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF GREAT POWER COMPETITIONOne of the most common, and indeed curious, features
30、 of the U.S. debate about this new era of major power competition is that it is treated as the latest manifestation of a recurring and timeless phe-nomenon. However, it would be a mistake to draw that conclusion. As RAND Senior Political Scientist and Georgetown University Profes-sor Michael Mazarr
31、argues, “The emerging era does not match the pat-terns of the past. Treating it as though it does risks misunderstanding both the character of todays threats as well as the source of the United States comparative advantages.”4The current global context for major power competition differs from previo
32、us eras in several important ways that redound to the United States benefit.5 Contemporary global order is not purely multipolar, which would allow major power competition to achieve its full expression. As Mazarr notes, “Todays world thus reflects a complex mixture of unipolar, bipolar, and multipo
33、lar elements that does not match the classic vision of a colliding set of roughly equivalent great powers.” Moreover, the current order is not the tabula rasa world of 1945 in which the system needed to be rebuilt from the ground up. Rather, major power competition is reemerging in the context of a
34、diversity of widely accepted rules, norms, and institutions.6 This mediates the competition, affecting both its scope and intensity.Furthermore, unlike past eras, the ambitions and frustrations of major powers are unfolding under the shadow of the nuclear revolution, the conditions of complex econom
35、ic interdependence, and the relative prevalence of democracy. In this context, major power competition manifests less as behaviors, such as territorial conquest and major power war, and more as the accretion of political, economic, military, diplomatic, and cultural influence and often the coercive
36、application of4Major Power Rivalry in East Asiasuch influence for geopolitical gain.7 This context presents the United States and its allies with a different and greater challenge than simply deterring outright aggression. This reality is directly applicable to the challenges presented by China toda
37、y.BILATERAL CONTEXTThe changing nature of the U.S.-China relationship is just as essential as the changing global context to understanding the risks of bilateral competition and conflict in the coming years.8 Although the tone and some priorities in U.S.-China interactions will change under Presiden
38、t Biden going forward, relations will be marked by enduring tensions, occasional crises, and maybe occasional cooperation as well.Elites in both the United States and China have effectively adopted a new paradigm for thinking about U.S.-China ties. Both sides have shifted from a paradigm of “balanci
39、ng cooperation and competition” to one of “balancing competition and confrontation.” This shift in thinking, often implicit, reflects the expansion, intensification, and diversification of the arenas of U.S.-China competition as well as a growing skepticism of the possibilities and benefits of coope
40、ration.New domestic politics in both countries are driving this paradigm shift. In the United States, a majority of elites and the public now view China as a long-term threat. Congress members on both sides of the aisle support a more confrontational approach, with many legislators weaponizing China
41、 policy for political gain. The U.S. business community is broadly frustrated with China and unwilling to publicly defend it, as are the U.S. media and many civil society groups that used to operate in China before President Xi Jinping pushed many ofThe Changing Context of Great Power Competition5th
42、em out. In China, nationalist voices critical of myriad aspects of U.S. policy are on the rise, mostly notably with the emergence of caustic statements from Chinese diplomats in a phenomenon known as wolf warrior diplomacy. The United States and China are entering a phase of their relationship in wh
43、ich domestic politics will play a central, if not defining, role.Furthermore, new dynamics are at play. Both Washington and Beijing are now pursuing more openly competitive, and sometimes confrontational, policies. China is also more capable now, deploying a larger and more diverse tool kit in the c
44、ompetition for power and influence. Both countries are showing greater tolerance for tension and friction, with some voices actively encouraging friction as a means of shaping the other. The collapse of a cooperative agenda under the Trump administration has accentuated this dynamic. From the outset
45、, the Biden team has been clear that it sees U.S.-China relations as a “strategic competition” and has deep concerns about Beijings statements and behaviors. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that China is committing genocide in Xinjiang, and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan
46、called out China for “exporting authoritarianism.” That said, the Biden team has stated support for cooperating with China and resuming some measure of bilateral dialogue, unlike its predecessor.UNDERSTANDING MAJOR POWER COMPETITION IN ASIAThe U.S.-China competition is about both power and ideas. Fi
47、ve core drivers lie at the heart of U.S.-China competition in Asia, and they have been diversifying and intensifying in recent years. This collection of perceptions and interests has led both countries to see the others state-ments and actions as inimical to themselves, now and in the future.Competing Visions for AsiaThe United States and China have contrasting and, by some metrics, competing visions for Asia. These visions are trending toward a high degree of incompatibility as each sides perception of the other hard-ens and as capabilities expand and improve in support of these