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1、目录目录1.Introduction2.Literature Review3.Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game4.Benchmark:First-Best Under Complete Information5.Signaling with Verifiable Inventory 5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5.2 Pe
2、rformance-Based Contract6.Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory 6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract7.Extensions:Efficiency Enhancement Strategies 7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers8.Conclusions第1页/共19页1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCR
3、BC可靠性私有信息使用备用库存维护背景介绍背景介绍第2页/共19页文献回顾文献回顾2.Literature ReviewlPBC for outsourced serviceslasymmetric information in operations managementlthe use of warranties as a signaling mechanism第3页/共19页建模建模3.Model3.1 Repair Process and Inventory PolicyN:identical copies;B:inventory backorder;s:inventory;The ex
4、pected backorders in steady state isAvailability is equal to 第4页/共19页建模建模3.2 Cost StructureEach time a product failure occurs,the buyer incurs a fixed cost r 0.The buyers expected cost is equal toThe vendors expected cost is equal to第5页/共19页建模建模3.3 Information StructureWe assume that the product off
5、ered by the vendor is one of two possible types,L or H,where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability.Hazard rate ordering（危险率序）:Excess wealth ordering（剩余财富序）:第6页/共19页建模建模3.4 Contract Types and PayoffsWe can write the buyers expected payoff asThe vendors expected payoff is given byRB
6、C:PBC:第7页/共19页建模建模3.5 Signaling GameWe assume that the vendor,who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product,chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer.The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued a
7、t.We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE)that is also renegotiation-proof.第8页/共19页建模建模4.Benchmark:First-Best Under Complete InformationGiven the vendor type,the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.第9页/共19页建模建模5.Signaling with Verifiable InventoryWe now consider the
8、 setting in which the vendor possesses private information about product reliability.5.1 Resource-Based ContractThe value of set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable.第10页/共19页建模建模5.1 Resource-Based ContractIn summary,successful signaling by
9、 the reliable vendor is possible under RBC when her inventory choice is verifiable,but it comes at a cost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.第11页/共19页建模建模5.2 Performance-Based ContractTherefore,successful signaling by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and PBC wh
10、en the inventory is verifiable.However,PBC presents an advantage because its risk sharing mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.第12页/共19页建模建模6.Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory6.1 Resource-Based ContractWith inventory no longer verifiable,the payoff functions for the vendor an
11、d the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the verifiable inventory case.An underinvestment in inventory causes economic inefficiency.第13页/共19页建模建模6.2 Performance-Based ContractThe reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium.Overall,we find that the interaction between the vendors
12、 discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive creates subtle dynamics that impact the relative efficiency of after-sales service contracts in nontrivial ways.第14页/共19页建模建模Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer?Thus,the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her t
13、ype with PBC more than compensates for the cost associated with overinvestment in inventory and any benefit presented by RBC,which does not improve upon a pooling outcome.第15页/共19页扩展扩展7.Extensions:Efficiency Enhancement StrategieslEndogenizing Inventory VerifiabilitylPooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers第16页/共19页结论结论8.ConclusionsSuggestions:The key to bring efficiency to the supply chain is inventory transparency.An alternative way to bring efficiency is to utilize inventory pooling,in case the vendor manages inventories across multiple buyers.第17页/共19页谢谢！谢谢！第18页/共19页感谢您的观看。第19页/共19页