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1、风险社会视角下的灾害损失柳尝体系研究 中英文内容摘要,司法制度论文摘 要 灾祸损失补偿是一个古老的话题。政治经济学家们从 文明和福利 责任的视角，研究对灾祸损失所应承当的职责，而市场经济学家们从风险损失转移和分散的视角，对灾祸损失融资机制进行不断创新。但是，当代化社会的时代特征是 风险社会 ，与工业化、全球化、技术革新等相伴而生的灾祸风险呈现出越来越频发的趋势，灾祸风险所带来的经济、社会和人口损失也在不断 放大 。风险社会不仅改变了人类所面临灾祸风险的形态，也改变了灾祸损失补偿机制所依靠的传统法则。 本文试图围绕灾祸风险的这些改变，讨论灾祸损失补偿在和市场的博弈关系上应做出的新选择，以构建一个
2、灾祸损失补偿的新体系。 风险社会改变了人类面临的灾祸风险的性质和状态，使得灾祸风险呈现出突变性、弥散性、模糊性和巨损性的新特征，小概率的巨灾风险越来越多地发生，自然灾祸与工业灾祸、环境灾祸、恐惧袭击等社会性灾祸交织发生，界线越来越模糊，灾祸在区际间、在国际范围内的扩散也呈趋势。这些突出的新特征使传统意义上的职责显得乏力，也使传统意义上的风险转移和分摊机制失效。我们重新审视灾祸风险的性质，将灾祸定义为不可抗力造成对相当大的一部分人口范围公共体构成严重剥夺的经过和现象。当灾祸造成 公共体 共同面临的巨额损失时，不可能用完全的私人市场机制来分担风险损失，因而我们提出建立一个公共部门P)-市场(M)-
3、公众P)为一体的灾祸损失补偿形式，这也是一个将灾祸风险的可保性极大延展的灾祸损失融资形式。 提出这种设想的根据是灾祸风险是一种公共风险，这种公共风险不仅有着私人的影响，更有着对国家安全和公信力的影响。灾祸是对 公共体 的严重剥夺，这种剥夺不仅仅是资源的剥夺，还是资源配置关系主要表现为交换权利关系的剥夺，因而灾祸的本质是对资源及资源配置机制的毁坏。那么当剥夺发生之后，既要对灾祸承受公共体的资源进行修复，也要对公共体资源配置关系进行重置，这就是我们所要研究的灾祸损失补偿的任务。它是一个广义的概念，不仅仅是对被毁坏的公共体进行损失度量和经济补偿，对原有资源被剥夺后构成的洼地进行填平，更重要的是施行一
4、系列的经济、政治、环境、人文措施，恢复和社会组织的市场主体功能，重建经济运行的机制，重构资源配置机能。灾祸损失补偿不仅要实现效率和公平的目的，还要实现系统补偿的目的，即对资源环境系统的损失补偿。 从国家安全的角度考虑，针对灾祸风险的变化趋势，以及灾祸本身所具有的公共风险性质，建立新的灾祸风险管理制度，已是国家经济社会发展必须解决、不宜久拖的重要事情。我们主张重新认识风险可保性和大数法则这些灾祸损失补偿的传统法则，以当代技术和当代思维的变革延展可保风险和大数法则，实现灾祸损失补偿的架构设置。在这种设置里，将不仅仅是充当管理者的职能，而且充当灾祸风险的 最终保险人 的角色，并以扩展的市场法则介入到
5、保险、再保险以及整个资本市场，构成一个宏观、开放的保险公共体。 在这个一体化的公共体里：从公众的角度来看，公众是私人产品的需求者，也是私人风险的承当者，与公众的联络，以公众的介入为纽带，而公众与市场的联络，则是以风险合同为纽带；从市场的角度来看，市场是公众风险的集合机制，是一个以保险合同为纽带集结起来的公共体；从的角度来看，是公众的另一种集合机制，它是以法律和伦理社会契约为纽带建立起来公共体。能够而且应该在应对灾祸风险这样非私人风险时，为公众提供公共产品，这是公共选择的需要，也是系统构成的本源。能够以保险、再保险、灾祸风险基金、巨灾债券等方式参与市场，成为损失融资的市场主体。 这里面临的一个问
6、题是，的角色是双重的，即不仅仅是制度的提供者，是市场的监管者，是 裁判员 ，同时也是某些保险产品、担保产品、债券产品的供应者，是市场的主体，是 运发动 。同时承当着裁判员与运发动的双重角色，身份不明确，职责不清楚，往往会使其该履行的职责没有履行，而不该干涉的事情又太多地干涉。但是，这并非作为两种主体而必然产生的矛盾，而恰恰是两类主体的角色不明晰所带来的矛盾。 论文可能的创新之处和缺乏 1、对灾祸损失补偿的研究，通常是从保险学的角度研究损失融资机制在市场上的运用，公共管理学也从管理的视角研究灾祸性公共危机的应急，而本文以具有前瞻性的风险社会理论考察灾祸的时代特征，并从国家风险管理层面来考虑构建与
7、市场一体化的灾祸损失补偿体系； 2、经济学意义上的灾祸损失补偿通常以对自然灾祸的研究为主，本文则着力描绘叙述在风险社会的背景下，自然灾祸与社会性灾祸的模糊性加强，因此主张不对灾祸的自然性和社会性进行严格区分，而将灾祸损失补偿定义为对包括工业灾祸、环境灾祸等在内的各种当代化灾祸风险的损失补偿。 3、传统意义上的灾祸损失补偿主要关注对灾祸直接经济损失的补偿，本文将灾祸损失定义为 公共体 资源剥夺以及资源配置关系的毁坏，将灾祸损失补偿的内涵从经济损失补偿拓展到系统 恢复力 的层面，并试图建立一个系统的、兼顾公平和效率的损失补偿模型。 但是，由于本人学术能力和识见的局限，上述一体化灾祸损失补偿模型仅从
8、框架上进行了界定和定性的分析，没有用计量的方式方法进行充分论证和分析；P-M-P形式在实际操作中怎样实现系统化的补偿，十分是应用到中国所面临的地震、台风、洪水、干旱等频发灾祸风险，怎样实现方案的量化设计，还有待进一步明确。这些问题尚需进一步的研究，在今后的工作和学习中，我将继续不断修正、完善本文的一些想法。 本文关键词语：风险社会；灾祸；公共体；损失补偿；宏观保险 Abstract Hazard loss compensation is an old topic. The plutonomists, from the perspective of civilization and benefi
9、t，have researched the responsibilities of the government onhazard loss，whole the market economists innovate the hazard loss financing mechanismfrom the perspective of risk loss transfer loss and diversification. However, the modernsociety is characterized by risk society , with hazard risks accompan
10、ying with theindustrialization, globalization and technical reform have been more and more frequently,the economic, social and population losses brought by the hazard risk are also being magnified continuously. Risk society does not only change the morphology of risksfaced by people，but also changes
11、 the traditional rule on which the hazard losscompensation mechanism relies. This paper strives to discuss the new selection for thehazard loss compensation in the game relation of government and market around thesechanges of hazard risk, so as to construct a new system of hazard loss compensationsy
12、stem. Risk society changes the nature and state of hazard risks faced by people, makingthe hazard risks characterized by mutation, dispersivity，fussiness and massive loss, thecatastrophe risks of small probability have been occurring more and more, the naturalhazard and industrial hazard, environmen
13、tal hazard and social hazard like terrorist attackoccur alternately, with a fuzzier and fuzzier risk，hazards are also spreading regionallyand internationally. These highlighting new characteristics make the traditionalgovernment functions weak and also invalid the traditional risk transfer and shari
14、ngmechanism. We re-examine the risk nature and define hazard as a process ofphenomenon constituting serious deprival to a great portion of population (public bodies)by force majeure. When hazard cause the public bodies to face massive losses jointly, itis possible to use a completely private market
15、mechanism to share the risk loss，therefore,we propose to establish a hazard loss compensation model integrating public department(P)，market (M) and the public (P)，which is also a hazard loss financing mode to greatlyexpand the insurability of hazard risk. The basis to put forward this idea is a publ
16、ic risk，which does not only influence theprivate, but also influences the national security and government credibility. Hazard isserious deprival of public bodies、such deprival is not only limited to resources, butalso the resource allocation relation (mainly manifested in exchange entitlement relat
17、ion). Therefore, the nature of hazard is to destroy the resource and resource allocationmechanism. Then when deprival occurs, it is not only required to repair the resources ofthe public bodies borne by the hazard, but also reallocate the resource allocation relationof the public bodies，and this is
18、the task of hazard loss compensation that we willresearch. It is a broad concept，not only to measure the loss of and make compensationfor the public bodies destroyed, level the lowland after the original resources aredeprived, but more importantly, to implement a series of economic, political,enviro
19、nmental and humanistic measures, restore the market subject function of thegovernment and social organization, reconstruct the economic operation mechanism andrestructure the resource allocation mechanism. Hazard loss compensation is not only torealize the objective of efficiency and fairness, but a
20、lso the objective of systemcompensation, i.e. the compensation for the loss of resource environment system. Considered from the aspect of national security, change trend of hazard risk and thepublic risk nature of the hazard itself, it has been an important thing that must be solvedand should not de
21、layed in the economy and society of a nation to establish a new hazardrisk management system. We propose to re-recognize risk insurability and the traditionallaws of the hazard loss compensation like law of large numbers, expand the insurablerisks and the law of large numbers with the reform of mode
22、rn technology and modernthinking to realize the structural setting of hazard loss compensation. The governmentwill not only play the role of manager, but also the role of final insurer of hazard riskand participates in the insurance, reinsurance and the overall capital market with theexpmded law of
23、market to form a macro and open insurance public body. In this integrated public body，from the aspect of the public, public is the demanderof private products，but also the undertaker of private risk, the connection between thegovernment and public can be linked by the public participation, while the
24、 connectionbetween public and market is linked by the risk contract; from the aspect of market,market is a collective mechanism of public risk，and another public body gathered withinsurance contract as the link; from the aspect of government, government is anothergathering mechanism of the public, w
25、hich is a public body established with law andmorality (social deed). The government can and should provide public products for thepublic when dealing with the non-private risks like hazard risk, which is the demand ofpublic selection and also the source of formation of government system. The govern
26、mentcan interfere with the market in the form of insurance, reinsurance, hazard risk fund andcattrophe bonds to become the market subject or loss financing. A problem here is that the government plays double roles，i.e. the government is notonly the establisher of system, supervisor of market, a judg
27、e ，but also the provider ofsome insurance products，insured products, bond supplier, market subject and player . The government also plays the double roles of judge and player simultaneously with anunclear identity and responsibilities and will often not perform the due responsibilities,while interfe
28、re with those that should not be interfered with too much. However，this isthe inevitable contradiction occurring to tiie government as two subjects, but on thecontrary, it is the contradiction by the ambiguous of two subject roles of the government. The possible innovations and shortcomings in this
29、paper 1.In terms of research on disaster loss compensation, the general approach is tostudy the operation of loss financing mechanism in the market, and the science of publicmanagement also focuses on the research on the management and response from theperspective of government management. In this p
30、aper, we investigated the change ofdisasters with times from the perspective of risk society，and considered building thegovernment-market-integrated disaster loss compensation methods; 2.In insurance, the research on disaster loss compensation is focused on the naturaldisasters. In the paper, we mai
31、nly described the ambiguity of natural disasters and naturaldisasters, and proposed not to strictly distinguish the disasters in naturality and sociality,but defined the disaster loss compensation as a loss compensation for various moderndisaster hazards including industrial and environmental disast
32、ers. 3.The disaster loss compensation research in the conventional sense mainly focuseson the compensation for the direct economic loss caused by disasters. In this paper, wedefined the disaster loss compensation as a compensation for resources and resourcesallocation mechanism, hoping to establish
33、a systematic loss compensation modelstressing both efficiency and justice, to extend the innovation of disaster losscompensation from the level of economic loss to the level of systematic resilience . However, due to the limitations in my academic ability, knowledge and experience,the integrated dis
34、aster loss compensation model above was only defined and analyzedqualitatively from the framework，but not demonstrated fully and analyzed with aquantitative method. It needs a clear solution on how to make P=M-P model realizesystematic compensation in actual operation，and especially realize the quan
35、titativedesign of programs when it is applied in the frequent disasters like earthquake, typhoon,floor and drought in China. These problems need to be further researched. In my futurework and study, I will keep correcting and perfecting some ideas I proposed in this paper. Key words: risk society, d
36、isaster, public body, loss compensation, and macroinsurance 引 言 几年前，当我在武汉大学保险系办公室的小会议室里接受博士生入学的复试时，胡炳志教授问了一个问题： 保险不是从来就有的，那它会不会永远恒久存在？ 后来，在一次博士生毕业论文答辩时，胡炳志教授又提出了一个问题： 保险对于灾祸能够起到减轻的成效吗，假如不能那保险还有存在的必要吗？ 看似如此简单的两个问题，却是由保险学界的知名专家提出来，在很长一段时间，这两个问题一直让我深思：保险是干什么的？它为什么会存在？它们还给了我一个深入的启示： 在我们研究问题的时候，能否经常忽略了那些
37、看起来似乎显而易见、其实却值得深究的命题，实际上我们经常把这些问题当成了一个个隐含的假定。就像我们面对严重的自然灾祸时，我们总是会想到，在干什么？投入了多少财力、多少物力，甚至是出动了多少兵力投入抢险救灾？由于我们心目中都隐含了一个假定：抢险救灾就是的职责！ 但是，我们又经常被另一个问题所困烧：生活中人们总是面临各种各样的灾祸、各种各样的风险，这些风险有大有小，有骤发有常发，但是我们设问一下，每年因交通事故死亡的人数有多少？因火灾损失的财产是多少？这些数字无疑是特别庞大的，甚至要远远超过汉川大地震中的人员伤亡和财产损失状况，即便以全年的地震伤亡和损失总数来比拟，也并不比火灾、交通事故等风险事故
38、来得更为庞大，但令人惊奇的是，我们的会愈加关注于地震、风灾、水灾这些骤发的灾难事故，而对于交通事故、火灾这样的风险往往交由市场来处置。这是为什么呢？ 我一直努力想弄明白这些问题的答案:，这也让我重新认识灾祸风险与社会管理在人类历史长河中的关系，这是一个长久不断、甚至能够讲是主旋律的互相斗争，正是由于这样一种斗争，人类社会才在组织构造、政治架构、科学技术、社会文化等等方面获得不断的进步。因而，从这个意义上讲，风险与风险管理是人类社会进步的动因。 当代社会的灾祸风险形势又是如此严峻，我们天天打开电视、翻开报纸、登上网、拿出手机，看到的、听到的无不是地震、干旱、洪水、台风以及工厂爆炸、河流污染、流感肆虐、爱滋横行等各种各样的灾难在全球各个角落发生。面对这些触目惊心的灾祸风险，人类正在积极探求自我救赎的出路，那么今天的中国，正处于社会转型与风险叠加的关键时期，应该建立什么样的风险管理制度，应该做什么，市场应该做什么，保险是千什么的，我们需不需要保险？等等这些问题，亟需有一个确切的答案:。 这里我们希望通过对这些问题的研究，给出一个今天面对灾祸风险，能够釆取到的在与市场之间实现优化组织的风险管理方案。这是我的初衷，不过，由于自个学浅识漏，我的这些想法或许不成体系，但我仍然相信，这个问题的研究很有意义，毕竟我们已经进入了一个灾祸多发的时代，一个风险愈加突出的社会 风险社会。