Whitesell Sector Study Workshop Nov 3.pdf

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1、 Sector Crediting OptionsPresentation to the Sectoral Study Side EventBarcelona,SpainNovember 3,2009William Whitesell,Director of Policy Research,Center for Clean Air Policy2Acknowledgment and DisclaimerThe analysis presented here arose from work on Sectoral ApproachesSupported by the European Commi

2、ssion and othersViews expressed do not represent those of the EC3Developing Country Sector Programs Differ WidelyMexico:cap-and-trade for two sectors,maybe more China:targets for neither absolute emissions nor intensity but for technology penetrationIndia:energy efficiency standards for 9 sectors(in

3、itially)with tradable“certificates”A flexible international framework is needed to accommodate such differences4NAMAs and Sector ProgramsNAMAs in part supported by public finance Simple if designed for one sector Could be many within one sector or one that crosses many sectorsCrediting baselines nee

4、d to take into account:Grouping individual NAMAs within a sector into one sector crediting baseline Possible multi-sector crediting baselines:NAMAs crossing parts of several sectors (e.g.,motor replacement)Comprehensive,multi-sector cap-and-trade5Possible Market Design OptionsLinked multi-sector cap

5、-and-trade programs Among Annex 1 countries Developing countries(DCs)as wellSector“trading”:emission cap on a sector No-lose sector crediting:implementation within DCs could vary widely 6Linked Cap-and-TradeIdeal of common global carbon price“Differentiated responsibilities”:DCs sell domestic allowa

6、nces to Annex 1These sales replace offset creditsCompetitive effects depend on free allowances given in different countriesMay be some time before DCs develop these programs and links can be formedEU sees sector trading or crediting as an interim step toward linked cap-and-trade7Sector TradingSimple

7、 version of cap-and-trade for one or a few sectors in a DCAllowances given to DC in advance by international bodyAllowance submission requirement for DC is an internationally enforceable capCompetitive effects depend on the DCs sector policies(i.e.,grants of free allowances or other subsidies)Not ma

8、ny DCs may be ready to make such international commitments as yet 8Sector Crediting Reflects EU idea of incentives for DCs to make transition from project creditsNo lose,ex post,based on:Absolute emissions Emission intensity Technology penetration level(translated into tons)Implementation options in

9、 DCs could include:Package of NAMAs and mandates in a sector Domestic cap-and-trade(prior to full linkage)Tradable intensity standard9Sector Crediting Issues Re:Pass-through to Private FirmsPro-rata sharing of credits among DC firms:Winning firms get less than one credit per ton Price signal below i

10、nternational carbon priceDifficult to get finance by selling future credits when results depends on performance of other firmsWould DC governments agree to pay for firms with excess emissions?Some suggest fines on failing firms;one version of this is a tradable intensity standard10Tradable Intensity

11、 Standard with International LinkDC sets intensity standard at baseline for international creditingInternational credits used as compliance instrument for firmsDC government gets credits from international body if sector beats baselineFirms with excess intensity buy credits to submit to governmentGo

12、vernment gives credits from both sources to firms that beat intensity baseline(one credit per ton)11Effects of Tradable Intensity StandardsNo lose for DC governmentFirms face the full international carbon price to motivate emission abatementFirms exceeding intensity baseline:pay only for emissions a

13、bove baseline Less effect on marginal cost of output than cap-and-trade without free allowancesFirms that beat the baseline:Earn a credit for each ton below Can finance projects with forward sales of creditsProduction incentive favors firms beating the baselineTo avoid any competitive effect(assumin

14、g no free allowances to industry by Annex 1),could discount credits,but then lose incentive of full carbon price signal12Questions for DiscussionHow soon could DCs be expected to implement broad cap-and-trade programs?How soon could such programs be linked with those in Annex 1 countries?Will sector

15、 programs be effective transitional vehicles?How can sector approaches:accommodate differences in program designs across DCs provide incentives and private financing for substantial emission reductions?Can tradable intensity standards play a role in some countries?13Thank you!For More Information:Visit:www.ccap.org

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