《Web20设计及商业模式.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《Web20设计及商业模式.pdf（21页珍藏版）》请在taowenge.com淘文阁网|工程机械CAD图纸|机械工程制图|CAD装配图下载|SolidWorks_CaTia_CAD_UG_PROE_设计图分享下载上搜索。
1、 What Is Web 2.0:Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software Tim OREILLY OReilly Media,Sebastopol(CA)USA Abstract:This paper was the first initiative to try to define Web2.0 and understand its implications for the next generation of software,looking at both design pattern
2、s and business modes.Web 2.0 is the network as platform,spanning all connected devices;Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that platform:delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more people use it,consuming and remixing da
3、ta from multiple sources,including individual users,while providing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others,creating network effects through an architecture of participation,and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich user experiences.Key words:collecti
4、ve intelligence,rich client,data,software as a service,long tail and beta.he bursting of the dot-com bubble in the autumn of 2001 marked a turning point for the web.Many people concluded that the web was overhyped,when in fact bubbles and consequent shakeouts appear to be a common feature of all tec
5、hnological revolutions.Shakeouts typically mark the point at which an ascendant technology is ready to take its place at center stage.The pretenders are given the bums rush,the real success stories show their strength,and there begins to be an understanding of what separates one from the other.TThe
6、concept of Web 2.0 began with a conference brainstorming session between OReilly and MediaLive International.Dale Dougherty,web pioneer and OReilly VP,noted that far from having crashed,the web was more important than ever,with exciting new applications and sites popping up with surprising regularit
7、y.Whats more,the companies that had survived the collapse seemed to have some things in common.Could it be that the dot-com collapse marked some kind of turning point for the web,such that a call to action such as Web 2.0 might make sense?We agreed that it did,and so the Web 2.0 Conference was born.
8、COMMUNICATIONS&STRATEGIES,no.65,1st quarter 2007,p.17.18 No.65,1st Q.2007 In the year and a half since,the term Web 2.0 has clearly taken hold,with more than 9.5 million citations in Google(defintion posted on the Web on September 2005;135 million citations af of February 2007).But theres still a hu
9、ge amount of disagreement about just what Web 2.0 means,with some people decrying it as a meaningless marketing buzzword,and others accepting it as the new conventional wisdom.This article is an attempt to clarify just what we mean by Web 2.0.In our initial brainstorming,we formulated our sense of W
10、eb 2.0 by example:Web 1.0 Web 2.0 DoubleClick-Google AdSense Ofoto-Flickr Akamai-BitTorrent -Napster Britannica Online-Wikipedia personal websites-blogging evite-upcoming.org and EVDB domain name speculation-search engine optimizationpage views-cost per click screen scraping-web services publishing-
11、participation content management systems-wikis directories(taxonomy)-tagging(folksonomy)stickiness-syndication The list went on and on.But what was it that made us identify one application or approach as Web 1.0 and another as Web 2.0?(The question is particularly urgent because the Web 2.0 meme has
12、 become so widespread that companies are now pasting it on as a marketing buzzword,with no real understanding of just what it means.The question is particularly difficult because many of those buzzword-addicted startups are definitely not Web 2.0,while some of the applications we identified as Web 2
13、.0,like Napster and BitTorrent,are not even properly web applications!)We began trying to tease out the principles that are demonstrated in one way or another by the success stories of web 1.0 and by the most interesting of the new applications.?The Web as platform Like many important concepts,Web 2
14、.0 doesnt have a hard boundary,but rather,a gravitational core.You can visualize Web 2.0 as a set of T.OREILLY 19 principles and practices that tie together a veritable solar system of sites that demonstrate some or all of those principles,at a varying distance from that core.At the first Web 2.0 co
15、nference,in October 2004,we listed a preliminary set of principles in our opening talk.The first of those principles was The web as platform.Yet that was also a rallying cry of Web 1.0 darling Netscape,which went down in flames after a heated battle with Microsoft.Whats more,two of our initial Web 1
16、.0 exemplars,DoubleClick and Akamai,were both pioneers in treating the web as a platform.People dont often think of it as web services,but in fact,ad serving was the first widely deployed web service,and the first widely deployed mashup(to use another term that has gained currency of late).Every ban
17、ner ad is served as a seamless cooperation between two websites,delivering an integrated page to a reader on yet another computer.Akamai also treats the network as the platform,and at a deeper level of the stack,building a transparent caching and content delivery network that eases bandwidth congest
18、ion.Nonetheless,these pioneers provided useful contrasts because later entrants have taken their solution to the same problem even further,understanding something deeper about the nature of the new platform.Both DoubleClick and Akamai were Web 2.0 pioneers,yet we can also see how its possible to rea
19、lize more of the possibilities by embracing additional Web 2.0 design patterns.Lets drill down for a moment into each of these three cases,teasing out some of the essential elements of difference.Netscape vs.Google If Netscape was the standard bearer for Web 1.0,Google is most certainly the standard
20、 bearer for Web 2.0,if only because their respective IPOs were defining events for each era.So lets start with a comparison of these two companies and their positioning.Netscape framed the web as platform in terms of the old software paradigm:their flagship product was the web browser,a desktop appl
21、ication,and their strategy was to use their dominance in the browser market to establish a market for high-priced server products.Control over standards for displaying content and applications in the browser would,in theory,give Netscape the kind of market power enjoyed by Microsoft in the PC market
22、.20 No.65,1st Q.2007 Much like the horseless carriage framed the automobile as an extension of the familiar,Netscape promoted a webtop to replace the desktop,and planned to populate that webtop with information updates and applets pushed to the webtop by information providers who would purchase Nets
23、cape servers.In the end,both web browsers and web servers turned out to be commodities,and value moved up the stack to services delivered over the web platform.Google,by contrast,began its life as a native web application,never sold or packaged,but delivered as a service,with customers paying,direct
24、ly or indirectly,for the use of that service.None of the trappings of the old software industry are present.No scheduled software releases,just continuous improvement.No licensing or sale,just usage.No porting to different platforms so that customers can run the software on their own equipment,just
25、a massively scalable collection of commodity PCs running open source operating systems plus homegrown applications and utilities that no one outside the company ever gets to see.At bottom,Google requires a competency that Netscape never needed:database management.Google isnt just a collection of sof
26、tware tools,its a specialized database.Without the data,the tools are useless;without the software,the data is unmanageable.Software licensing and control over APIs-the lever of power in the previous era-is irrelevant because the software never need be distributed but only performed,and also because
27、 without the ability to collect and manage the data,the software is of little use.In fact,the value of the software is proportional to the scale and dynamism of the data it helps to manage.Googles service is not a server-though it is delivered by a massive collection of internet servers-nor a browse
28、r-though it is experienced by the user within the browser.Nor does its flagship search service even host the content that it enables users to find.Much like a phone call,which happens not just on the phones at either end of the call,but on the network in between,Google happens in the space between b
29、rowser and search engine and destination content server,as an enabler or middleman between the user and his or her online experience.While both Netscape and Google could be described as software companies,its clear that Netscape belonged to the same software world as Lotus,Microsoft,Oracle,SAP,and o
30、ther companies that got their start in the T.OREILLY 21 1980s software revolution,while Googles fellows are other internet applications like eBay,Amazon,Napster,and yes,DoubleClick and Akamai.DoubleClick vs.Overture and AdSense Like Google,DoubleClick is a true child of the internet era.It harnesses
31、 software as a service,has a core competency in data management,and,as noted above,was a pioneer in web services long before web services even had a name.However,DoubleClick was ultimately limited by its business model.It bought into the 90s notion that the web was about publishing,not participation
32、;that advertisers,not consumers,ought to call the shots;that size mattered,and that the internet was increasingly being dominated by the top websites as measured by MediaMetrix and other web ad scoring companies.As a result,DoubleClick proudly cites on its website:over 2000 successful implementation
33、s of its software.Yahoo!Search Marketing(formerly Overture)and Google AdSense,by contrast,already serve hundreds of thousands of advertisers apiece.Overture and Googles success came from an understanding of what Chris Anderson refers to as the long tail,the collective power of the small sites that m
34、ake up the bulk of the webs content.DoubleClicks offerings require a formal sales contract,limiting their market to the few thousand largest websites.Overture and Google figured out how to enable ad placement on virtually any web page.Whats more,they eschewed publisher/ad-agency friendly advertising
35、 formats such as banner ads and popups in favor of minimally intrusive,context-sensitive,consumer-friendly text advertising.The Web 2.0 lesson:leverage customer-self service and algorithmic data management to reach out to the entire web,to the edges and not just the center,to the long tail and not j
36、ust the head.Not surprisingly,other web 2.0 success stories demonstrate this same behavioUr.eBay enables occasional transactions of only a few dollars between single individuals,acting as an automated intermediary.Napster(though shut down for legal reasons)built its network not by building a central
37、ized song database,but by architecting a system in such a way that every downloader also became a server,and thus grew the network.22 No.65,1st Q.2007 Akamai vs.BitTorrent Like DoubleClick,Akamai is optimized to do business with the head,not the tail,with the center,not the edges.While it serves the
38、 benefit of the individuals at the edge of the web by smoothing their access to the high-demand sites at the center,it collects its revenue from those central sites.BitTorrent,like other pioneers in the P2P movement,takes a radical approach to internet decentralization.Every client is also a server;
39、files are broken up into fragments that can be served from multiple locations,transparently harnessing the network of downloaders to provide both bandwidth and data to other users.The more popular the file,in fact,the faster it can be served,as there are more users providing bandwidth and fragments
40、of the complete file.BitTorrent thus demonstrates a key Web 2.0 principle:the service automatically gets better the more people use it.While Akamai must add servers to improve service,every BitTorrent consumer brings his own resources to the party.Theres an implicit architecture of participation,a b
41、uilt-in ethic of cooperation,in which the service acts primarily as an intelligent broker,connecting the edges to each other and harnessing the power of the users themselves.?Harnessing collective intelligence The central principle behind the success of the giants born in the Web 1.0 era who have su
42、rvived to lead the Web 2.0 era appears to be this,that they have embraced the power of the web to harness collective intelligence:Hyperlinking is the foundation of the web.As users add new content,and new sites,it is bound in to the structure of the web by other users discovering the content and lin
43、king to it.Much as synapses form in the brain,with associations becoming stronger through repetition or intensity,the web of connections grows organically as an output of the collective activity of all web users.Yahoo!,the first great internet success story,was born as a catalog,or directory of link
44、s,an aggregation of the best work of thousands,then millions of web users.While Yahoo!has since moved into the business of creating many types of content,its role as a portal to the collective work of the nets users remains the core of its value.T.OREILLY 23 Googles breakthrough in search,which quic
45、kly made it the undisputed search market leader,was PageRank,a method of using the link structure of the web,rather than just the characteristics of documents to provide better search results.eBays product is the collective activity of all its users;like the web itself,eBay grows organically in resp
46、onse to user activity,and the companys role is as an enabler of a context in which that user activity can happen.Whats more,eBays competitive advantage comes almost entirely from the critical mass of buyers and sellers,which makes any new entrant offering similar services significantly less attracti
47、ve.Amazon sells the same products as competitors such as B,and they receive the same product descriptions,cover images,and editorial content from their vendors.But Amazon has made a science of user engagement.They have an order of magnitude more user reviews,invitations to participate in varied ways
48、 on virtually every page-and even more importantly,they use user activity to produce better search results.While a B search is likely to lead with the companys own products,or sponsored results,Amazon always leads with most popular,a real-time computation based not only on sales but other factors th
49、at Amazon insiders call the flow around products.With an order of magnitude more user participation,its no surprise that Amazons sales also outpace competitors.Now,innovative companies that pick up on this insight and perhaps extend it even further,are making their mark on the web:Wikipedia,an onlin
50、e encyclopedia based on the unlikely notion that an entry can be added by any web user,and edited by any other,is a radical experiment in trust,applying Eric Raymonds dictum(originally coined in the context of open source software)that with enough eyeballs,all bugs are shallow,to content creation.Wi