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1、EMBARGOThe contents of this report must not be quoted orsummarized in print, broadcast, electronicor social media beforeMonday, 3 October at 15:00 GMT(11:00 New York, 17:00 Geneva)Development prospects in a fractured world :Global disorder and regional responsesADVANCE COPYCHAPTERS I and II每日免费获取报告1
2、、每日微信群内分享7+最新重磅报告；2、每日分享当日华尔街日报、金融时报；3、每周分享经济学人4、行研报告均为公开版，权利归原作者所有，起点财经仅分发做内部学习。扫一扫二维码关注公号回复：研究报告加入“起点财经”微信群。Chapter IGlobal Trends and ProspectsITRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2022Development prospects in a fractured world: Global disorder and regional responsesA. TOO CLOSE TO THE EDGE1. A year of s
3、erial crisesAfter a rapid but uneven recovery in 2021, the world economy is in the midst of cascading and multiplying crises. With incomes still below 2019 levels in many major economies, growth is slowing everywhere. The cost-of-living crisis is hurting the majority of households in advanced and de
4、veloping countries. Damaged supply chains remain fragile in key sectors. Government budgets are under pressure from fiscal rules and highly volatile bond markets. Debt-distressed countries, including over half of low-income countries and about a third of middle-income countries, are edging ever clos
5、er to default. Financial markets are jittery, as questions mount about the reliability of some asset classes. The vaccine roll-out has stalled, leaving vulnerable countries and communities exposed to new outbreaks of the pandemic. Against this troubling backdrop, climate stress is intensifying, with
6、 mounting loss and damage in vulnerable countries who lack the fiscal space to deal with disasters, let alone invest in their own long-term development. In some countries, the economic hardship resulting from these compounding crises is already triggering social unrest that can quickly escalate into
7、 political instability and conflict.The resulting policy challenges are daunting, especially in an international system marked by rising distrust. At the same time, the institutions of global economic governance, tasked since 1945 with mitigating global shocks, delivering international public goods
8、and providing a global financial safety net, have been hampered by insufficient resources and policy tools and options that are “rigid and old fashioned” (Syed, 2022; Yellen, 2022). Even as growth in advanced economies slows down more sharply than anticipated in last years Report, the attention of p
9、olicymakers has become much too focused on dampening inflationary pressures through restrictive monetary policies, with the hope that central banks can pilot the economy to a soft landing, avoiding a full-blown recession. Not only is there a real danger that the policy remedy could prove worse than
10、the economic disease, in terms of declining wages, employment and government revenues, but the road taken would reverse the pandemic pledges to build a more sustainable, resilient and inclusive world (chapter III).As noted in last years Report, the pandemic caused greater economic damage in the deve
11、loping world than the global financial crisis. Moreover, with their fiscal space squeezed and inadequate multilateral financial support, these countries bounce back in 2021 proved uneven and fragile, dependent in many cases on a further build-up in external debt. The immediate prospects for many dev
12、eloping and emerging economies will depend, to a large extent, on the policy responses adopted in advanced economies. The rising cost of borrowing and a reversal of capital flows, combined with a sharper than expected slowing of Chinas growth engine and the economic repercussions from the war in Ukr
13、aine, are already dampening the pace of recovery in many developing countries, with the number of those in debt distress rising, and some in default. With 46 developing countries already severely exposed to financial pressure from the high cost of food, fuel and borrowing, and more than double that
14、number exposed to at least one of those threats, the possibility of a widespread developing country debt crisis is a very real one, evoking painful memories of the 1980s and ending any hope of meeting the sustainable development goals (SDGs) by the end of the decade.The acceleration of inflation beg
15、inning in the second half of 2021 (figure 1.1) and continuing even as economic growth began to slow down in the final quarter of the year has led many to draw parallels with the stagflationary conditions of the 1970s. Despite the absence of the wage-price spirals that characterized that decade, poli
16、cymakers appear to be hoping that a short sharp monetary shock along the lines, if not of the same magnitude, as that pursued by the United States Federal Reserve (the Fed) under Paul Volker will be sufficient to anchor inflationary expectations without triggering recession. Sifting through the econ
17、omic entrails of a bygone era is unlikely, however, to provide the forward guidance needed for a softer landing given the deep structural and behavioural changes that have taken place in many economies, particularly those related to financialization, market concentration and labours bargaining power
18、.4Global Trends and ProspectsFigure 1.1 Countries with double-digit inflation rates, June 2022 vs June 202169 Economies with confirmed double-digit inflation, representing more than 2.1 billion of world population, June 2022 (Consumer Price Index, change over respective period of previous year)10% -
19、 15%15% - 20%20% - 60%60% - 100%more than 100%10% - 15%15% - 20%20% - 60%60% - 100%more than 100%23 Economies with confirmed double-digit inflation, representing less than 0.9 billion of world population, June 2021 (Consumer Price Index, change over respective period of previous year)10% - 15%15% -
20、20%20% - 60%60% - 100%more than 100%10% - 15%15% - 20%20% - 60%60% - 100%more than 100%Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on Internati al Monetary Fund (IMF) data, Refinitiv, and various national sources.1Note: For 2022 (top figure), the latest monthly data are available for 164 of 182 e
21、conomies; for 9 of them, figures are for one of the last months in 2021; another 10 are estimations for 2022 from various sources. Out of 69 economies with double-digit inflation, 18 show double-digit inflation rate (at least) since the end of 2019. For 2021 (bottom figure), out of 23 economies with
22、 double-digit inflation, 16 show double-digit inflation rate (at least) since the end of 2019.1 The designations employed and the presentation of material on any map in this work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of an
23、y country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.I5TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2022Development prospects in a fractured world: Global disorder and regional responsesThe origins of this latest wave of inflation are, in fact, uniq
24、ue. The successful roll-out of the vaccine in advanced and some developing countries and the easing of Covid restrictions, combined with continued government support for households and firms, saw demand pressures running ahead of supply responses during the first half of 2021, creating bottlenecks,
25、including in some key markets, such as automobiles. The surge in inflation from the end of last year belied hopes that this would be a short-lived inconvenience. However, the evidence does not suggest this surge has come from a further loosening of fiscal policy or wage pressure, but instead derives
26、 largely from cost increases, particularly for energy, and sluggish supply response due to a prolonged history of weak investment growth (chapter III). These have been amplified by price-setting firms in highly concentrated markets raising their mark-ups to profit from two rare opportunities in 2021
27、, the surge in demand due to the global recovery, and in 2022, the surge in speculative trades related to a wave of global concern over the availability of particular sources of energy, with no substantial changes in overall demand or supply.Under these circumstances, continued monetary tightening t
28、hrough rising central bank rates and the normalization of their balance sheets will have little direct impact on the supply sources of inflation and will instead work indirectly to re-anchor inflationary expectations by further reducing investment demand and pre-empting any incipient labour market p
29、ressures. A more immediate impact could be a sharp correction in asset and commodity prices, from crypto currencies to housing and metals.With financial entanglements since the global financial crisis (GFC) becoming increasingly global, complex unanticipated shocks, including outbreaks of financial
30、panic or extreme price volatility, or a combination of external triggers, are a present danger. Monetary tightening poses additional risk to the real economy and the financial sector: given the high leverage of non-financial businesses, rising borrowing costs could cause a steep increase in non-perf
31、orming loans (NPLs) and trigger a cascade of bankruptcies. With direct price and markup controls ruled out as politically unacceptable, and if monetary authorities are unable to stabilize inflation quickly, governments might resort to additional fiscal tightening. This would only help precipitate a
32、sharper global recession.Finally, what does seem likely is that the impact of Fed tightening will be more severe for vulnerable emerging economies with high public and private debt, substantial foreign exchange exposure, a high dependence on food and fuel imports and higher current-account deficits
33、(chapter II).According to one recent estimate, an increase in United States interest rates of 1 percentage point reduces real gross domestic product (GDP) by 0.5 per cent in advanced economies and by 0.8 per cent in emerging economies, after three years (Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019).2 These effects
34、 are comparable to the domestic effects of a one-percentage-point increase in the United States interest rate, which lowers the United States GDP by almost 1 per cent after 11 quarters (Fair, 2021). More drastic increases by 2 to 3 percentage points would therefore depress the already stalling econo
35、mic recovery in the emerging economies by another 1.6 to 2.4 percentage points.2. Global stagflation: spinning back down the yearsDisruptions to global supply chains, armed conflicts in key commodity-producing regions, slowing economic growth, turbulence in stock markets and accelerating inflation s
36、uggest a resemblance to the stagflation of the 1970s (BIS, 2022; World Bank, 2022; Wolf, 2022). Accordingly, the recommended policy action is aggressive monetary tightening, which is supposed to pre-emptively anchor inflationary expectations and avoid the steep economic costs associated with a prolo
37、nged period of interest rate increases, such as the world painfully experienced between 1979 and 1981 when the Fed introduced a series of rate increases amounting to almost 9 percentage points.2 Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, Fed economists Akinci and Queralto (2021) obtained
38、 broadly similar results: an increase in United States interest rates by 1 percentage point is found to lower the United States real GDP by 0.5 percentage points and the real GDP of emerging economies by 0.45 percentage points. The new inflationary environment has changed the balance of risks. Gradu
39、ally raising policy rates at a pace that falls short of inflation increases means falling real interest rates. This is hard to reconcile with the need to keep inflation risks in check. Given the extent of the inflationary pressure unleashed over the past year, real policy rates will need to increase
40、 significantly in order to moderate demand. Delaying the necessary adjustment heightens the likelihood that even larger and more costly future policy rate increases will be required, particularly if inflation becomes entrenched in household and firm behaviour and inflation expectations.6Global Trend
41、s and ProspectsFrom this perspective, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2022: 26) has clearly defined the task facing central bankers:“The new inflationary environment has changed the balance of risks. Gradually raising policy rates at a pace that falls short of inflation increases means
42、falling real interest rates. This is hard to reconcile with the need to keep inflation risks in check. Given the extent of the inflationary pressure unleashed over the past year, real policy rates will need to increase significantly in order to moderate demand. Delaying the necessary adjustment heig
43、htens the likelihood that even larger and more costly future policy rate increases will be required, particularly if inflation becomes entrenched in household and firm behaviour and inflation expectations.”These policy recommendations, along with calls for fiscal policy to address investor concerns
44、by cleaning up public finances (World Bank, 2022: 69), closely resemble the dominant policy recommendations of the early 1980s, and these proved disastrous, particularly for developing countries, in terms of economic growth, inequality and poverty (TDR, 2021).The primary cognitive blinder hindering
45、adequate understanding of the key lessons from past crises is still the widely shared belief and confidence in monetary policys singular ability to reduce output volatility and ensure stable and lasting growth in market economies in a neutral manner, without affecting potential output growth of the
46、economy under consideration (Goodfriend, 2007; Blanchard, 2018). In fact, the aggressive monetary tightening of the early 1980s provoked deep distributional shifts within and across countries, and repeating that approach today could be equally damaging.Moreover, while echoes of the 1970s are audible
47、 in current conditions, there are important differences between then and now and these should caution us to avoid drawing direct policy lessons. First, the recent commodity price increases, when measured in real terms, have so far been smaller than in the 1970s. Figure 1.2 shows this for the real increase in global oil prices. Second, the energy intensity of GDP has declined considerably since the 1970s (figure 1.3), reducing the inflationary impact of higher energy prices.Figure 1.2 Real oil price, January 1970 April 2022 (adjusted dollars pe