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1、Dire Strait?Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S.PolicyNational Security Research Division David A.ShlapakDavid T.OrletskyBarry A.WilsonSupported by the Smith Richardson FoundationRThe research described in this report was sponsored by the SmithRichardson Foundation
2、.The research was conducted within theInternational Security and Defense Policy Center of RANDs NationalSecurity Research Division.RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy anddecisionmaking through research and analysis.RANDis aregistered trademark.RANDs publications do not necessar
3、ily reflectthe opinions or policies of its research sponsors.Copyright 2000 RANDAll rights reserved.No part of this book may be reproduced in anyform by any electronic or mechanical means(includingphotocopying,recording,or information storage and retrieval)without permission in writing from RAND.Pub
4、lished 2000 by RAND1700 Main Street,P.O.Box 2138,Santa Monica,CA 90407-21381200 South Hayes Street,Arlington,VA 22202-5050RAND URL:http:/www.rand.org/To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information,contact Distribution Services:Telephone:(310)451-7002;Fax:(310)451-6915;Internet:orderrand
5、.orgLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataShlapak,David A.Dire strait?;military aspects of the ChinaTaiwan confrontation and options for U.S.policy/David A.Shlapak,David T.Orletsky,Barry Wilson.p.cm.“MR-1217-SRF.”Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 0-8330-2897-91.TaiwanMilitary poli
6、cy.2.ChinaMilitary policy.3.United StatesMilitary policy.I.Orletsky,David T.,1963 II.Wilson,Barry,1959 III.Title.UA853.T28 S55 2000355.033551249dc2100-062657iiiPREFACEEven a half century after the birth of the Peoples Republic of China(PRC),the Taiwan Strait remains the locus of one of the most dan-
7、gerous military confrontations in the world.In recent years,a seriesof Chinese military exercises coupled with the ongoing modern-ization of the Peoples Liberation Army(PLA)have seemed to raisethe stakes in this long-standing staredown and likewise increased itsvisibility,especially in the United St
8、ates.Until 1979,the United States was Taiwans primary security partner.Today,it remains linked to the island by both force of law and a nat-ural affinity toward a rapidly democratizing polity embedded in avibrant market economy.But Washington at the same time is pursu-ing improved relations with Bei
9、jing as well as encouraging the PRCsdeeper integration with the international system at large.Becausethe status of Taiwan may be Chinas single most neuralgic point,theUnited States is compelled to perform a delicate balancing actattempting to fulfill its obligations and inclinations toward ensuringt
10、he Republic of Chinas(ROC)survival without making an enemy ofthe mainland.This report looks at the near-term military balance between Chinaand Taiwan.Mixing quantitative and qualitative analysis,it exploresa range of key factors that affect the ROCs self-defense capabilitiesand suggests ways that th
11、e United States can effectively contribute toimproving the odds in Taipeis favor.This report was written as part of a project on assessing Taiwanesedefense needs,sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation.Research for the report was conducted within the InternationalivDire Strait?Security and Defe
12、nse Policy Center of RANDs National SecurityResearch Division(NSRD),which conducts research for the U.S.Department of Defense,for other U.S.government agencies,and forother institutions.Publication of this report was supported in partby the Strategy and Doctrine program of Project AIR FORCE.vCONTENT
13、SPreface.iiiFigures.viiTables.ixSummary.xiAcknowledgments.xxiAbbreviations.xxiiiChapter OneINTRODUCTION.1Confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.1The U.S.Role.2The Purpose of This Study.3Structure of This Report.4Chapter TwoSCENARIO AND APPROACH.7A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.7Analytic Structure and Metho
14、dology.9Scoping the Problem.9Air War Methodology.12Naval War Methodology.18Caveats.18Orders of Battle.19Air,Air Defense,and Missile Forces.19Naval Forces.20Command and Control.23viReport TitlePlaying Out the Scenario.24Overview.24The War in the Air.24The War at Sea.30Chapter ThreeISSUES AND IMPLICAT
15、IONS.31Air Superiority.31Base Operability.31Advanced Air Weapons.34Training Quality.36The Value of U.S.Involvement.38Maritime Superiority.40The ASW Dilemma.40Maintaining a Credible Antisurface WarfareCapability.42The U.S.Role.43Summing Up.45Chapter FourRECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDINGREMARKS.47U.S.Sup
16、port Is Vital to Taiwans Security.47Small Increments of U.S.Assistance Could Turn theTide.48Supporting Taiwanese Modernization:The IsraelModel.49Air Defense C2.51Information and Intelligence Sharing.51Interoperability:The Critical Link.52China as a Sanctuary?.54Looking Beyond 2005.55Final Thoughts.5
17、6AppendixA.Some Thoughts on the PRC Missile Threat to Taiwan.59B.Overview of the JICM.63References.85viiFIGURES2.1Overall Outcomes.263.1Effects of Reductions in ROCAF Sortie Rates.323.2Effects of BVR Capabilities on Case Outcome.353.3Effects of ROC Training on Case Outcome.373.4Overall Effect of U.S
18、.Involvement.393.5Effect of U.S.Involvement on Air Outcomes,Advanced Threat.40B.1Fraction of Package with First Shot.69B.2D-Day Sorties.76B.3D-Day Sortie Losses.77B.4D-Day Aircraft Losses and Sorties.77ixTABLES2.1PLAAF Forces Committed to Taiwan Contingency.142.2Chinese Missile Forces.152.3Cases for
19、 Exploratory Analysis.182.4ROCAF Composition.192.5Taiwan Surface-to-Air Order of Battle.202.6Taiwanese Naval Order of Battle.212.7Chinese Naval Order of Battle.212.8Impact of Parameters on“Red”Outcomes.27B.1Mission Packages.74B.2Package Timing.75B.3Aircraft Data.79B.4Engagement Rates and First Shots
20、.80B.5Air-to-Air Weapon Data.80B.6Training Factors.81B.7Air-to-Air Weapon Loads.81B.8Air-to-Air Exchange Rates.82B.9Air-to-Ground Weapon Data.83B.10Air-to-Ground Weapon Loads.83B.11Ground-to-Air Weapon Data.83xiSUMMARYOVERVIEWAs the new century dawns,the Taiwan Strait is the locus of one of theworld
21、s most dangerous flashpoints.Two entities share the name of“China”:one,the most populous country in the world,is a gargan-tuan and unique hybrid of Communist ideology and capitalistappetite,while the other is a tiny island republic of great wealth anduncertain international status.And across the nar
22、row barrier of theTaiwan Strait,these two powersthe Peoples Republic of China(PRC)and the Republic of China(ROC)stare at each other.The United States plays an interesting role in this pas de deux,partobserver and part participant.For 30 years after 1949,it was Tai-wans principal patron,maintaining a
23、 mutual defense treaty with theROC.When the 1970s brought a“normalization”of relationsbetween Washington and Beijing,this era of close cooperationended.Since 1979,the U.S.government has maintained a calculatedambiguity in its policy toward the deadlock over Taiwans status.This balancing act has been
24、 complicated recently by such events asChinas 1995 and 1996 missile tests,in the wake of which Taiwanssecurity situation has gained new visibility in Washington,whereconcerns have been raised about whether the United States is doingenough to ensure the islands self-defense capabilities.This monograp
25、h reports the results of a project that examined themilitary dimensions of the confrontation between China and Tai-xiiDire Strait?wan.1 Using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis,wehave done two things:Identified a handful of issues that appear crucial in helping Tai-wan maintain an ad
26、equate defensive posture vis vis the PRC,andDeveloped a set of recommendations for steps the United Statesmight take to assist Taipei in dealing with those issues.SCENARIO AND APPROACHAlthough coercive scenarios(e.g.,limited missile strikes)are usuallyregarded as the more likely form of Chinese use
27、of force against Tai-wan,we assessed the more extreme case of an outright air andamphibious invasion of the island.We chose to focus on this chal-lenging contingency for six reasons.Some analysts arguein contrast to the conventional wisdomthat“immediate and full-scale invasion”is the most likely for
28、mof conflict between the two sides.As the“worst-case”scenario,it is of interest to military plannerswhose responsibility it is to deter potential adversaries from dan-gerous courses of action.The possibility of a direct Chinese invasion of Taiwanandexpectations regarding the outcome of such an attac
29、kis impor-tant in shaping overall perceptions of the balance between thetwo sides.The seizure and holding of the island is the only alternative thatguarantees Beijings control when hostilities end.So,in some_1That this report focuses on military issues should not be interpreted assuggesting that the
30、 crux of the China-Taiwan issue is military;neither dothe authors believe that military means are the only or even the mostlikely way of resolving the dispute.Our given task has been to examinethe balance of power across the strait,not to document,explicate,orpredict the complex political dynamics a
31、t the heart of the differencesbetween Taipei and Beijing.We recognize that a strongly deterrentTaiwanese posture is only one partalbeit a vital oneof the equation formaintaining peace and stability on the strait and in East Asia.Summaryxiiisense,the credibility of the invasion threat underwrites the
32、 other,lower-level options,such as limited missile strikes or maritimeharassment.While it seems unlikely that China would undertake such a des-perate gamble,it is important to think through the manner inwhich the Peoples Liberation Army(PLA)might essay the oper-ation and what steps would be needed t
33、o defeat it.After all,itwas always terribly unlikely that the Soviet Union would launch amassive nuclear attack on the United States.Still,hundreds ifnot thousands of war games,exercises,and analyses wereinvested in exploring the“what-ifs”of that contingency.An invasion scenario incorporates a numbe
34、r of elements thatcould be components of other coercive strategies directedagainst Taiwan.Perhaps most significant is the employment ofconventionally armed surface-to-surface missiles(SSMs)againsttargets in Taiwan.Analytically,an invasion campaign can be divided into four seg-ments:In the first phas
35、e,the two sides would fight for air superiority.The second phase,which could begin simultaneously with thefirst,would be a struggle for maritime control of the strait.Followup air strikes would focus on“softening up”the islandsdefenses.The fourth phase would involve actual landing operations andcoul
36、d include amphibious landings,paratroop assaults,andheliborne attacks.Our attention is focused mainly on the battle for air superiority and,secondarily,on the contest for control of the seas.Control of the airand control of the sea are absolute prerequisites for a successfulamphibious and/or airborn
37、e assault.This may be particularly true inthe context of a PRC attack on Taiwan.The Peoples Liberation ArmyNavy(PLAN)owns enough amphibious lift to move about a divisionof troops at a time,hardly enough to establish and sustain a firmfoothold in the face of determined Taiwanese resistance.Therefore,
38、many analyses picture a kind of“Dunkirk in reverse,”with ChinaxivDire Strait?employing numerous commercial vessels to transport troops,equipment,and supplies across the strait.Such an operation,involv-ing unarmed merchant shipping,would be sheer folly unless Chinahad secured almost uncontested domin
39、ance of the air and sea.Simi-larly,the kind of large-scale airborne and air assault operations oftensuggested as part of a PRC attack would be virtually suicidal unlessthe ROCs air defenses had been thoroughly suppressed.Finally,thesurface forces of the two navies consist of warships with very limit
40、edair defense capabilities.In the absence of air superiority,the PLANswarships would be very vulnerable to air attack in the confinedwaters of the strait.We therefore conclude that the battle for air su-periority in particular is the linchpin of the campaign.We chose RANDs Joint Integrated Contingen
41、cy Model(JICM)as theprimary modeling tool for this study;developed for the U.S.Depart-ment of Defense,JICM is a theater combat model designed to sup-port the kind of exploratory analysis that we emphasized in thisproject.After preparing a database from open-source materials andmaking an initial set
42、of runs to identify the factors that seemed likelyto play a determining role in the outcome of the war over the strait,we conducted more than 1,700 model runs to examine the impact ofseven key variables:The size and composition of the air forces committed to theattack by the PRC.Each sides possessio
43、n of beyond-visual-range(BVR),“fire-and-forget”medium-range air-to-air missiles(AAMs).The number and quality of short-and medium-range ballisticmissiles(SRBMs and MRBMs)used by the Chinese.The number of advanced precision-guided munitions(PGMs),such as laser-guided bombs(LGBs)and Global Positioning
44、Sys-tem(GPS)-guided weapons,in the Chinese inventory.The ability of the Republic of China Air Force(ROCAF)to gener-ate combat sorties.The quality of the ROCAFs aircrew.The extent,if any,of U.S.air forces,both land and sea based,committed to Taiwans defense.SummaryxvOur more-limited analysis of the n
45、aval war was undertaken using theJICM and Harpoon,a computer-based simulation of maritime war-fare.Harpoon is widely considered the best commercially availabledepiction of modern maritime combat.It includes representationsof submarine,surface,and air warfare.This work explores only a very limited re
46、gion of what is often referredto as the“scenario space.”We concentrated on one specific scenarioinvolving one particular Chinese offensive strategy,and we selectedthe factors to vary based on our reading of the extant literature on theChina-Taiwan balance as well as discussions with experts in theUn
47、ited States and elsewhere.We also focused our attention on whatmight be thought of as“reasonable”cases:those reflecting currentcapabilities,linear projections of current capabilities,and capabil-ities conceivably attainable within our limited time frame.As such,we present these results as illustrati
48、ve and indicative,meant to high-light and illuminate certain key points that emerged from our overallanalysis.Because our notional war is set in 2005,the two sides orders of battleconsist largely of systems already present in their arsenals.We variedthe size and composition of the PRC air and missil
49、e forces commit-ted to the campaign to reflect uncertainties regarding the pace andscale of Chinas military modernization programs.The analysis required many assumptions,and the problem fre-quently arose as to how much credit to give the protagonists for vari-ous capabilities.We decided to credit bo
50、th sides with takingmeasures to increase their competence in critical areas.In particu-lar,we credited the Chinese with more capability than they haveactually demonstrated in conducting complex offensive operations.And we assumed that Taiwan would be able to maintain the basicfunctionality of its co