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1、TABLE OF CONTENTSFOREWORD 1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY2U.S. ASSESSMENT OF CHINAS WTO MEMBERSHIP 4Chinas WTO Accession 4Expectations of WTO Membership 5Chinas Record in Terms of Complying With WTO Rules 6Chinas Record in Terms of Transitioning toa Market Economy 8U.S. STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING TRADE DISTORTIONS
2、CAUSED BY CHINA 13REVIEW OF TRADE MECHANISMS USED TO ENGAGE CHINA21Bilateral Dialogues 21Multilateral Fora 22Enforcement 24U.S. Laws24WTO Litigation 24KEY U.S. CONCERNS 27Non-tariff Measures27Industrial Plans 27State-Owned Enterprises29Industrial Subsidies 30Fisheries Subsidies 31Excess Capacity31In
3、digenous Innovation 32Technology Transfer 33Investment Restrictions 34Administrative Licensing34Standards35Secure and Controllable Policies36Encryption37Competition Policy37Pharmaceuticals38Medical Devices40Cosmetics40Export Restraints 42Value-added Tax Rebates and RelatedPolicies42Import Ban on Rem
4、anufactured Products 42Import Ban on Recyclable Materials 43trading system and institutions. Through Chinas commitments and representations, WTO members understood that China intended to dismantle existing state-led, mercantilist policies and practices, and they expected China to continue on its the
5、n- existing path of economic reform and successfully complete a transformation to a market-oriented economy and trade regime.Chinas protocol of accession to the WTO sets out Chinas obligations under the WTO agreements as well as numerous additional China-specific commitments made necessary because o
6、f the need for China to transform its approach to the economy and trade. China itself acknowledged the evolving nature of its economy/, and it confirmed that socialist market economy system was applied” in China. Similarly, WTO members highlighted that “China was continuing the process of transition
7、 towards a full market economy. WTO members noted, for example, that “the special features of Chinas economy, in its present state of reform, still created the potential for a certain level of tradedistorting subsidization/For these reasons, it was agreed that special safeguard-like provisions would
8、 be included among the terms of Chinas protocol of accession as protective measures while China completed its transformation into a market economy. For example, Chinas protocol of accession included a China-specific safeguard mechanism, special antidumping rules, and special methodologies for identi
9、fying and measuring subsidy benefits. It also created a unique, 10-year review mechanism designed to monitor Chinas progress in implementing its many WTO commitments and to secure updated information on the use of industrial plans by China.Unfortunately, as discussed below, China has a poor record w
10、hen it comes to complying with WTO rules and observing the fundamental principles on which the WTO agreements are based. Too often, China flouts the rules to achieve industrial policy objectives. In addition, and of more serious concern to the United States and other WTO members, China has not made
11、sufficient progress in transitioning toward a market economy. China continues to embrace a state-led, non-market and mercantilist approach to the economy and trade. This approach results in sophisticated and expansive policies and practices that often evade WTO disciplines and cause serious harm to
12、markets, industries and workers in the United States and other WTO Members. At the same time, China has used the benefits of WTO membership - including its guarantee of open, non-discriminatory access to the markets of other WTO Members - to become the WTOs largest trader, while resisting calls for
13、further liberalization of its trade regime by claiming to be a “developing country.CHINAS RECORD IN TERMS OF COMPLYING WITH WTO RULESSince last years report, our assessment of Chinas record in terms of complying with WTO rules and observing the fundamental principles on which the WTO agreements are
14、based has not changed. Chinas record remains poor.As we detailed in prior reports, Chinas trade regime has generated many WTO compliance concerns. Too often, WTO members have had to resort to the WTOs dispute settlement mechanism to change problematic Chinese policies and practices. The United State
15、s, for example, has brought nearly two dozen cases against China at the WTO covering a wide range of important policies and practices, such as: (1) local content requirements in the automobile sector; (2) discriminatory taxes in the integrated circuit sector; (3) hundreds of prohibited subsidies in
16、a wide range of manufacturing sectors; (4) inadequate intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement in the copyright area; (5) significant market access barriers in copyright-intensive industries; (6) severe restrictions on foreign suppliers of financial information services; (7) export restraints
17、on numerous raw materials; (8) a denial of market access for foreign suppliers of electronic payment services; (9) repeated abusive use of traderemedies; (10) excessive domestic support for key agricultural commodities; (11) the opaque and protectionist administration of tariff-rate quotas for key a
18、gricultural commodities; and (12) discriminatory regulations on technology licensing. Even though the United States has routinely prevailed in these WTO disputes, as have other WTO members in their disputes against China, they take years to litigate, consume significant resources, and often require
19、further efforts when China fails to comply with WTO rules.China has been a particularly bad actor when it comes to trade remedies. While the use of trade remedies in a manner consistent with WTO rules is an important tool for protecting domestic industries from unfair and injurious trade practices,
20、China has made a practice of launching antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations that appear designed to discourage its trading partners from the legitimate exercise of their rights under WTO rules. This type of retaliatory conduct is not typical of WTO members, nor is it a legit
21、imate basis for seeking AD and CVD relief. Moreover, when China has pursued AD and CVD investigations under these circumstances, it appears that its regulatory authorities have tended to move forward with the imposition of duties regardless of the strength of the underlying legal claims and evidence
22、. The United States three successful WTO cases challenging the duties imposed by China on imports of U.S. grain- oriented electrical steel (GOES), U.S. chicken broiler products, and U.S. automobiles offer telling examples of this problem. Indeed, Chinas poor behavior does not always stop after an ad
23、verse WTO ruling. In two of the three WTO cases brought by the United States on trade remedies, China did not implement the WTOs recommendations, and the United States was forced to bring Article 21.5 compliance proceedings to secure Chinas compliance.Chinas retaliatory use of trade remedies highlig
24、hts another unique issue that WTO members face when dealing with China - the threat of reprisal. It is no secret that foreign companies are hesitant to speak publicly, or to be perceived as working with their governments to challenge Chinas trade policies or practices, because they fear retaliation
25、from the Chinese state. A study by one U.S. industry association noted that foreign companies confidentially have reported receiving explicit or implicit threats from Chinese government officials - typically made orally rather than in writing - about possible retaliatory actions that could have seve
26、re repercussions for a companys business prospects in China. At the same time, it is also no secret that China threatens more vulnerable WTO members to dissuade them from speaking publicly against China.A further persistent problem is Chinas inadequate transparency. China disregards many of its WTO
27、transparency obligations, which places its trading partners at a disadvantage and often serves as a cloak for China to conceal unfair trade policies and practices from scrutiny. For example, for the first 15 years of its WTO membership, China failed to notify any sub-central government subsidies to
28、the WTO, despite the fact that most subsidies in China emanate from provincial and local governments. The magnitude and significance of this problem is illustrated by the five WTO cases that the United States has brought challenging prohibited subsidies maintained by China. While those cases involve
29、d hundreds of subsidies, most of the subsidies were provided by sub-central governments. The United States was able to bring those cases only because of its own extensive investigatory efforts to uncover Chinas opaque subsidization practices. Most other WTO members lack the resources to conduct the
30、same types of investigations. Today, China continues to shield massive sub-central government subsidies from the scrutiny of WTO members. Together with other non-market practices, these subsidies contribute to the serious excess capacity problems that plague industries like steel, aluminum, solar pa
31、nels, and fishing and devastate global markets and foreign competitors. Industrial plans such as Made in China 2025, which reportedly targets 10 sectors in China with hundreds of billionsof dollars in subsidies, inevitably will create a new wave of industries with severe excess capacity to the detri
32、ment of Chinas trading partners.For years, the United States has urged China to change the behaviors described above and become a responsible member of the WTO. In the future, the United States will continue this effort. The United States also will continue to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanis
33、m as an enforcement tool as appropriate and will continue working through WTO committees and councils and other WTO bodies to seek effective actions to curb problematic Chinese policies and practices.CHINAS RECORD IN TERMS OF TRANSITIONING TO A MARKET ECONOMYSince last years report, our assessment o
34、f Chinas record in terms of transitioning to a market economy has not changed. Nearly two decades after its accession to the WTO, China has still not embraced open, market-oriented policies. The state remains in control of Chinas economy, and it heavily intervenes in the market to achieve industrial
35、 policy objectives.As we detailed in prior reports, China pursues a wide array of continually evolving interventionist policies and practices aimed at limiting market access for imported goods and services and restricting the ability of foreign manufacturers and services suppliers to do business in
36、China. At the same time, it offers substantial government guidance, resources, and regulatory support to Chinese industries. The principal beneficiaries of Chinas policies and practices are Chinas state-owned enterprises and numerous other significant domestic companies, sometimes referred to as nat
37、ional champions/ that are attempting to move up the economic value chain.The benefits that Chinese industry realizes largely come at the expense of Chinas trading partners and their companies and workers. As a result of Chinas industrial policies, markets all over the world are less efficient than t
38、hey should be, and the playing field is heavily skewed against foreign companies that seek to compete against Chinese companies, whether in Chinas market or markets outside of China.This situation has worsened in recent years. Since new leaders assumed power in China in 2013, the states role in the
39、economy - effectuated by the Chinese government and, increasingly, the Chinese Communist Party - has grown. While China has repeatedly signaled in recent years that it is pursuing economic reform/ Chinas concept of economic reform differs from the type of change that a country would be pursuing if i
40、t were embracing open, market-oriented principles. For China, economic reform appears to mean perfecting the management of the economy by the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party and strengthening the state sector, particularly state- owned enterprises. Meanwhile, as the states role in
41、 the economy has increased in recent years, the depth and breadth of concerns facing U.S. and other foreign companies doing business in China - or competing with favored Chinese companies in markets outside of China - have similarly increased.To fully appreciate the challenges presented by Chinas no
42、n-market economy, it is vital to understand the extent to which the state still maintains control over economic decision-making in China. As we catalogued in prior reports, a thorough examination of Chinas Constitution, relevant directives and pronouncements by Chinas leadership, legislative and reg
43、ulatory measures issued by the Chinese government, Chinas industrial plans and the actions of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party leaves no doubt that the Chinese state maintains a tight grip on virtually all economic activity. Indeed, the government and the Party have constitutio
44、nal mandates to develop a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. To fulfill these mandates, the framework of Chinas economy is set by the government and the Party, which exercise control directly and indirectly over the allocation of resources through instruments such as government o
45、wnership and control of key economic actors andinnumerable government directives. The government and the Party also direct and channel economic actors to meet the states planning targets. The government and the Party permit market forces to operate only to the extent that they accord with the object
46、ives of national economic and industrial policies. When there is conflict between market outcomes and state objectives, the government and the Party intervene to ensure that the states objectives prevail.Aside from the role of the government and the Party in managing the economy, there are also seri
47、ous concerns over how the government and the Party exercise influence over the operations and investment decisions of both state-owned enterprises and private companies, including foreign-invested enterprises. This influence appears to be growing, as the Party is increasing its control over key acto
48、rs in Chinas economy and not, as had been hoped, enabling China/s transition to a market economy.China claims that its state-owned enterprises make business decisions independently of the state and based on market principles. However, the government and the Party continue to exercise control over st
49、ate-owned enterprises. Among other things, they appoint and control key executives through the Chinese Communist Party Organization Department. They also provide state-owned enterprises with preferential access to important inputs (such as land and capital) and other competitive advantages unavailable to private Chinese companies. State-owned enterprises, in turn, play an outsized role in Chinas economy. For example, state-owned