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1、ContentsForewordVI1 |The Budget andStrategy Overview:Four Challenges and a Wild Card1|Army192 |Navy31|Marine Corps623 |Air Force75|Space, SOF, Civilians, and Contractors95116About the Author The wild card is the long-term effect of the pandemic, and whether this would change the nature or size of th
2、e defense effort. The public will be the ultimate arbiter. Polling indicates public support for a U.S. role in the world but not increased spending.What is force structure? The Department of Defense (DOD) defines force structure as “the number, size, and structure of units. Force structure is one of
3、 four elements of military capability, the others being readiness (the ability of units and equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed), modernization (the technical sophistication of weapon systems and equipment), and sustainment (the ability to maintain the necessary level of mi
4、litary activity).缪The Trump Administrations StrategyAnalysis of force structure must begin with strategy, since that, at least in theory, drives all elements of military capability as well as national security policy and budgets.The administration NATIONAL Security StrATEGY (NSS), issued in December
5、 2017, and NATIONAL Defense StrATEGY (NDS), published in January 2018, describe the national security environment the administration sees.3* The NDS bluntly depicted a U.S. military that is losing its edge over potential competitors and urges increased and sustained investment for long-term strategi
6、c competitions with China and Russia.”There is no need to reiterate the strategy at length here. The key points are as follows Five threats: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and global terrorism. These are the same threats that Secretary Ash Carter described at the end of the Obama administration,
7、but the order has changed. Joint Staff, DOD DlCTIONARy of MlLlTARy AND ASSOCIATED Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DOD), updated June 2020), . White House, A New NATIONAL Security StrATEGY for A New ErA (NSS) (Washington, DC: December 2017), . whitehouse.gov/articles/new-national-securi
8、ty-strategT-new-era/; and DOD, A SlJMMARy of the 2018 NATIONAL Defense StrATEGY： Sharpening the American MiLiTARys Competitive Edge (NDS) (Washington, DC： January 2018), s：/dod.defense. gov/Portals/1 /Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy7-Summary.pdf. For example, Secretary of Defense Ash C
9、arter, U.S. National Security Challenges and Ongoing Military Operations,5 Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 2nd scss., September 22, 2016, media/doc/ Carter_09-22-l 6.pdf. Whereas Carter had put Russia first, the Trump administration puts China first. Further, the administrations strate
10、gy places greater emphasis on China and Russia than the other three threats. The importance of allies: The NDS extolls their value, the long-standing relationships, and the need for these connections in the future. This contrasts with the presidents often critical comments. The need for management r
11、eform: The NDS notes the importance of being good stewards of the publics money. This is particularly important during a defense buildup when DOD asks the taxpayers for an increased financial commitment.A big change is the force sizing constructthe way the strategy calculates how many forces are nee
12、ded and of what kind. A “1+” construct-defeating aggression by a major power . and deterring aggression by another major powcrreplaced the two major conflict construct, which had been a constant in various configurations since the end of the Cold War. This change reflects that conflictGuam is 1,400
13、miles from the South China Sea and 1,700 miles from Taiwan.U.S. bases in Europe, even forward bases in Eastern Europe, are still far from potential battlefields. RAF Lakenheath, for example, is nearly 1,000 miles from the Baltic states, and Spangdahlem AFB in Germany is 850 miles. Further, airbases
14、are again vulnerable, so U.S. aircraft may need to be based further away from their targets, and adversary air defenses may make aerial tanking risky.As a result, many analyses recommend actions to increase standoff range and reduce vulnerability, including an emphasis on bombers because of their lo
15、ng range; the curtailment of F-35 procurements because of their short range; the dispersion of basing; and the development of long-range strike, especially unmanned systems. For example, in a congressionally-directed study, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) recommended, the A
16、ir Force should rebalance its combat forces in favor of long-range, penetrating bombers. CSBA also recommended developing a new, long-range fighter/attack aircraft (penetrating counter-air) to substitute for some F-35 inventory. Gunzinger et al., An Air Force for An ErA of GrEAT Power Competition (W
17、ashington, DC： CSBA, March 2019), xi, s:/ csbaonline.org/research/publications/an-air-fbrce-fbr-an-era-of-great-power-competition. Similarly, in another congressionally-directed study, the MITRE Corporation recommended: an increase in available long-range aircraft and bases to strengthen the convent
18、ional deterrence postxire of U.S. forces? MITRE Corporation, US Air Force AircrAFT Inventory Study: UNCLASSIFIED Report (NfcTan, VA： 2019), : airfbrcemag. com/E)ocumcntFile/Documents/2019/MITRE-USAF-Aircraft-lnventory-Study.pdf; This is the unclassified version of a longer classified report on the A
19、ir Force aircraft force structure, directed by Congress; see also Rebecca Grant, “Air Force, Dont Cut a Single Bomber,Breaking Defense, April 3(), 2020, s:/breakingdefense /author/rebeccagrant/.The Navy suffers from the same range limitation but has the advantage of being able to move its airfields
20、(aircraft carriers) around, so this affects the Air Force more intensely. See Jcny Hendricks, RetrEAT from RANGE: The Rise AND FALL of CARRIER AVIATION (XKashingion, DC： Center for a New American Security, October 2015), s:/as.org/publications/reports/retreat-from-range-the-rise-and-fidl-of-carrier-
21、aviation.Nuclear EnterpriseAfter decades of stability and low visibility, the nuclear force is getting attention again as the cost of modernization programs makes them more visible, and controversial.The ICBM force has leveled off at the New START limit of 400. The nuclear bomber force (B-2s and B-5
22、2s) holds steady at 96 (total active inventory, or TAI). DODs NUCLEAR Posture Review (NPR), published in February 2018, laid out the direction of the nuclear enterprise. The NPR affirmed the need for the nuclear triad to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression and assure allies and partners.After d
23、ecades of stability and low visibility, the nuclear force is getting attention again as the cost of modernization programs makes them more visible, and controversial.Further, the NPR highlighted “the increasing need for this diversity and flexibility as “one of the primary reasons why sustaining and
24、 replacing the nuclear triad and non-strategic nuclear capabilities, and modernizing NC3, is necessary now.21sHowever, after nearly three decades of low public visibility and relatively low cost, the nuclear enterprise is getting more attention because the systems acquired during the Reagan buildup
25、of the 1980s arc now reaching the end of their service lives and must be replaced. That brings opposition from arms-control advocates. Further, a Democratic administration will certainly revise nuclear weapons policy. It will want to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the cost of modernization
26、 programs. For example, the Biden campaign website endorses arms-control and “the need to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.”Table 5 shows the most controversial nuclear modernization programs.Table 5: Nuclear Modernization Programs ($ millions)ProgramProgramGround-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
27、Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon414.4664.9B61 tail kit233.8program570.4712.5108.4GBSD has been controversial among arms- control advocates and some budget hawks who see it as unnecessary and would reduce the nuclear forces to a dyad or even a monad.” LRSO, a nuclear-armed cruise missile, has been c
28、ontroversial because bombers already have one nuclear munition, the B61 bomb.Designed to increase the accuracy of the B61 nuclear bomb, the program faces some opposition because of concerns that it makes nuclear warfighting more viable.FY 2020 enacted FY 2021 proposed CommentNote: The DOE NNSA budge
29、t provides funding for an Analysis of Alternatives to develop a low yield SLCM called for in the 2018 NPR.Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2020), .These programswith the B-21 bom
30、ber and the Columbia-class submarinecontribute to the nuclear modernization bow wave that the DOD faces in the 2020s and 2030s and which will require the DOD to either trim programs or increase the proportion of the budget allocated to nuclear forces. DOD, NUCLEAR Posture Review (Washington, DC: Feb
31、ruary 2018), s:/media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-l/- 1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAIREPQRT.PDE Todd Harrison and Evan Montgomery, The Cost of U.S. NUCLEAR Forces: From BCA to Bow WAVE AND Beyond (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015), :/csbaonline.org/s
32、earch/?x=0&y=0&q=harrison.One piece of good news: in response to scandals several years back and several outside reviews, the Air Force (and the Navy) implemented a wide variety of actions to improve the standards and quality of their nuclear enterprise, both personnel and operations. The absence of
33、 any recent incidents indicates success. Here, no news is good news.Creation of the Space ForceThe Space Force is now a reality as the fifth DOD military service (the sixth U.S. military service, including the Coast Guard). Over the course of the year, the Air Force and DOD published a series of doc
34、uments developing the organization and structure of the Space Force. About 6,000 personnel have been transferred to this new service, all from the Air Force. A later chapter on the Space Force will describe these actions in more detail.So far, the split has been amicable. The Air Force has supported
35、 the establishment of the new service and facilitated its stand up. There has been none of the acrimony that is seen in most divorces. Nevertheless, major elements of the division of personnel, facilities, and organizations are still unresolved. Particularly sensitive will be the requirement that th
36、e creation of the Space Force entail no increase in the number of DOD personnel; every Space Force billet created will come out of the Air Force total.Munitions as an Element of Strategy: Volume for a Long WarAll the services arc buying more munitions because many analyses show that U.S. forces woul
37、d expend large amounts of munitions in a great power conflict. Thus, the Air Force budget procures a lot of munitions. This year the Air Forces strategy seems to have changed, maintaining production of long- range and air-to-air munitions but cutting air-to-ground munitions. This likely reflects the
38、 winding down of the air war in the Middle East and a judgment that great power conflict, particularly in the X estern Pacific, would be less about ground operations and more about air and maritime operations.Table 6: Major Munitions Procurement QuantitiesSource: John Pletcher, Air Force FY 2021 Bud
39、get Briefing/ (presentation, Air Force, Washington, DC, slide 13).ProgramFY 2020 EnactedFY 2021 Presidenfs BudgetJ DAM25,00010,000Short-range air-to-groundSmall Diameter Bombs (SDB-I and II)8,2533,600Hellfire Missile3,8592, 497 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)390400Air-to-air and long-r
40、ange air-to-groundAIM-9X Sidewinder355331AIM120D Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM).220414Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)05Procurement of munitions may not hold up if budgets decline. The downside of munitions acquisition is that they are sterile; once procured, they go on the s
41、helf to be used in case of conflict. If no conflict requires their use, then the services must pay to dispose of the munitions at the end of their useful life. Because munitions are not visible, they may not contribute significandy to deterrence. For this reason, many U.S. allies and partners do not
42、 have large munitions stocks despite the wartime requirement.By contrast, aircraft, ships, and vehicles get used every day; their visibility creates a perception of U.S. capability in potential adversaries and thus adds to deterrence. As a result, there is always pressure to buy platforms rather tha
43、n munitions.Space, SOE Civilians, and ContractorsBeyond the traditional military services, military forces include the new Space Force as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF, which functions as a quasi-service), Department of Defense (DOD) civilians (which perform many functions that military per
44、sonnel perform in other countries), and contractors (which fbrm a permanent element of the national security establishment, not only in the United States proper but also on overseas battlefields).KEY TAKEAWAYSSpace Force It exists! Major elements such as a headquarters, appropriations accounts, and
45、capstone doctrine have been established. Major elements of structure are in place, but decisions are still pending about transfer of most personnel. Its small size will require heavy reliance on other services, particularly the Air Force, for support functions and a different approach to personnel m
46、anagement.Special Operations Forces (SOF)SOF continues its gradual expansion and heavy dependence on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. A broad set of actions to counter recent instances of ethical misconduct by its personnel seems to be having an effect.DOD Civilians, Despite administra
47、tion skepticism about the federal bureaucracy, the number of DOD civilians stays at about the same level in FY 2021, retaining the growth of recent years., This strength reflects the civilian workforce contribution to readiness and lethality. Former secretary of defense Mark Espers review of the “fo
48、urth estate“ cut defense-wide civilians by about 7,000, but increases in the Military Departments offset this decrease.ContractorsContractors have become a permanent part of the federal workforce but remain controversial due to enduring questions about cost and what contractors should or should not do. Operational contractors continue to play a vital role in CENTCOM, holding a 2.8 to 1 ratio of contractors to military (up from 1.7 to 1 last year) as military forces exit Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan while contractors stay behind.Space ForceThe Space Force, officially