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1、ContentsSummary201Introduction302The context in Venezuela703The experience in other countries1404A comparative assessment of Venezuelansreforms2605The case for a comprehensive energy policy3206Challenges for implementing reforms3507Conclusion38About the authors40AcknowledgmentsReforming Venezuelas o
2、il and gas sectorAn analysis of competing fiscal, contractual and institutional regimessector, with significant barriers to investments from overseas. This paper focuses on three basic areas that contribute to these investment barriers: institutional frameworks, legal and contractual arrangements, a
3、nd fiscal regimes.Institutional frameworksPoor sector governance and concentration of decisions in PDVSA:The 2001 Hydrocarbons Law kept the policymaking and regulation functions under the Ministry of Petroleum. The 1999 Gaseous Hydrocarbons Law created a natural gas regulator, but one with little au
4、thority in exploration and production projects. From 2004, the minister of petroleum and the president of PDVSA have often been the same person, and in practice the three governance roles - policymaking, regulation and operation - have been merged. This concentrated most operating decisions across t
5、he sector in PDVSA, leading to inefficiency, delays in payments to contractors, overspending, corruption allegations and cash flow management issues as PDVSA handled the sales proceeds for most of the joint ventures in the sector.一Loss of PDVSAs autonomy: PDVSA deviated from its core business operat
6、ions and focused resources and investments on the political objectives of the government and the ruling party, including national debt commitments and foreign energy agreements. Political influence in PDVSA led to a purge of technical staff that the company needed to manage the complex and mature oi
7、l fields. New non-commercial subsidiaries frequently participated in the implementation of government social policies, which stretched resources. PDVSA created multiple subsidiaries with activities that have little connection to its oil and gas business: housing developments, television, industrial
8、services and agricultural activities. For further discussion on these topics, see Corrales and Penfold (2011), DrAGon in the Tropics: Hugo Chavez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela； Gallegos (2016), Crude Nation： Ho%。Oil Riches Ruined Venezuela； Hernandez and Monaldi (2016), WEAThe
9、ring COLLAPSE: An Assessment of the FINANCIAL AND OperATlOlAL SITUATION of the VENEZUELAN Oil Industry.Legal and contractual arrangementsRigid contractual regime: Investors in oil projects are currently required by law to form joint ventures with PDVSA as the majority shareholder, which increases th
10、e states fiscal burden to fund investments and the risks it assumes. This requirement contrasts with the different types of oil fields in the country. Venezuelas oil reserves include mature fields that have been in operation for several decades, new and massive fields with heavy oil that is harder t
11、o process, and potential new fields that need further exploration.- Rigid contractual regime: Investors in oil projects are currently required by law to form joint ventures with PDVSA as the majority shareholder, which increases the states fiscal burden to fund investments and the risks it assumes.
12、This requirement contrasts with the different types of oil fields in the country. Venezuelas oil reserves include mature fields that have been in operation for several decades, new and massive fields with heavy oil that is harder to process, and potential new fields that need further exploration. Th
13、e Gaseous Hydrocarbons Law allows non-associated natural gas projects to use more traditional licences in which private companies can have full ownership and directly manage operations. But only four of the 19 licences awarded since 1999 reached the commercial production stage.- Discretionary alloca
14、tion of production rights: The government has the legal authority to assign oil and gas fields to investors without any competitive process. Almost all existing oil projects were awarded throughReforming Venezuelas oil and gas sectorAn analysis of competing fiscal, contractual and institutional regi
15、mesdirect negotiation between the government and international investors. From the 15 oil joint ventures formed since the 2006 migration, only two extra-heavy oil projects went through a bidding process with each area receiving just one bid. For more details on foreign investors1 participation in Ve
16、nezuelas oil industry, see Monaldi, F., Hernandez, I. and La Rosa, J. (2020), The COLLAPSE of the VENEZUELAN Oil Industry: The Role of Above-Ground Risks Limiting FDI, February 2020, Center for Energy Studies, Rice Universitys Baker Institute for Public Policy, .direct negotiation between the govern
17、ment and international investors. From the 15 oil joint ventures formed since the 2006 migration, only two extra-heavy oil projects went through a bidding process with each area receiving just one bid. For more details on foreign investors1 participation in Venezuelas oil industry, see Monaldi, F.,
18、Hernandez, I. and La Rosa, J. (2020), The COLLAPSE of the VENEZUELAN Oil Industry: The Role of Above-Ground Risks Limiting FDI, February 2020, Center for Energy Studies, Rice Universitys Baker Institute for Public Policy, . The government awarded most natural gas licences through competitive bidding
19、, but it has not auctioned new areas since 2005.- Lack of investor protection mechanisms during disputes: The current Hydrocarbons Law forbids international arbitration to resolve investment disputes, which was a key enabler for investors during the 1990s. The government also denounced and left the
20、World Bank International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) convention in 2012 and it has removed the investor protection mechanisms from several bilateral investment treaties. Gordon, K. and Pohl, J. 2015), Investment TrEATlES over Time - TrEATY PrACTlCE AND InterpretATiON in A CH
21、ANGING World, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2015/02, 16 January 2015, s:/doi.org/10.1787/ 18151957.Fiscal regimeThe substantial increase in government proceeds due to rising taxes:The fiscal terms for oil include a 30 per cent royalty, an additional 3.33 per cent extraction tax and
22、 a 50 per cent corporate tax. Oil producers must also pay a windfall profits tax based on the difference between the budgeted annual oil price and observed market prices, along with additional tax contributions. There is also a further alternative minimum tax (or rshadow tax) that guarantees that th
23、e government will receive at least 50 per cent of the value of the oil extracted - even if investors are losing money. The high amount owed to the government for any project constrains the cash flow available. While non-associated natural gas projects have a much more benign fiscal regime with a low
24、er royalty (20 per cent) and corporate income tax (34 per cent, they have struggled to collect enough revenues due to subsidized gas prices and delays in payments from PDVSA.- Fiscal distortions and disincentives to invest and produce: A recent study found that Venezuelas high royalty rates and taxe
25、s generated distortions reducing incentives to invest in upstream activities, raise output and explore for new reserves. Davis, G. and Smith, J. (2020), Design AD PerforMANCE of MiningPetroleum FISCAL Regimes in LATIN AmerlCAAND the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, August 2020, . As a who
26、le, the oil fiscal regime seriously discourages investments in the country.Venezuelas policymakers understand that reversing the recent damage to the oil and gas sector requires massive investments and reforms capable of boosting the countrys reputation for contractual reliability. The PDVSAs Ad Hoc
27、 BoardReforming Venezuelas oil and gas sectorAn analysis of competing fiscal, contractual and institutional regimes(appointed by the National Assembly in 2019) aims to mobilize between $78 billion and $120 billion in capital investments to increase oil output by 2.2-2.5 million b/d within eight year
28、s. Precise estimates of output goals and investment requirements have varied over time. More recently, there have been reports of a PDVSA document identifying projects along the value chain, requiring $77,6 billion, with the majority aimed at increasing oil production to 1998 levels, see Cohen, L. (
29、2021), Venezuela needs $58 bln to restore crude output to 1998 levels -document, Reuters, . See, for example, Garip, P. (2020), Venezuela foes intersect on strategic oil plans, Argus Media, 29 April 2020, news/2101066-venezuela-foes-intersect-on-strategic-oil-plans.(appointed by the National Assembl
30、y in 2019) aims to mobilize between $78 billion and $120 billion in capital investments to increase oil output by 2.2-2.5 million b/d within eight years. Precise estimates of output goals and investment requirements have varied over time. More recently, there have been reports of a PDVSA document id
31、entifying projects along the value chain, requiring $77,6 billion, with the majority aimed at increasing oil production to 1998 levels, see Cohen, L. (2021), Venezuela needs $58 bln to restore crude output to 1998 levels -document, Reuters, . See, for example, Garip, P. (2020), Venezuela foes inters
32、ect on strategic oil plans, Argus Media, 29 April 2020, news/2101066-venezuela-foes-intersect-on-strategic-oil-plans. Rodriguez, F. and Guerrero, G. (2020), TowARd SustAiNABLE Human Development in Venezuela： DiAGnosis, CHALLENGes AND Economic StrATegy, Revista Tempo Do Mundo, no. 23, December 2020,
33、revistas/index.php/rtm/article/download/270/239.Beyond technical and operational plans, there is significant uncertainty on the path to reform. Venezuela is going through a deep political crisis in which Nicolas Maduro still controls the government even if most countries in the continent do not reco
34、gnize him as the rightful president. Successful reforms can only succeed with a political consensus that brings credibility and stability. While this is still a major impediment, an oil and gas reform agenda must also address the following factors:- The massive investments needed contrast with Venez
35、uelas financial difficulties. The country is already in financial default and has few external assets to repay its colossal debts - which last year reached 278 per cent of its GDP.2s Most available fiscal resources are needed to stem the impact of the severe humanitarian crisis in the country and to
36、 support future economic recovery programmes. Further deterioration of fields and physical infrastructure may raise the investments that are required to recover activities across the oil and gas industry.- Venezuela has an existing base of international investors. Incumbent companies - with a footho
37、ld in the country and knowledge of their asset potential and of the current operational risks - focus on reducing costs and optimizing current operations. They may be open to possible expansions under improved fiscal and operational conditions, along with sound economic policies like flexible exchan
38、ge rates.- New international investors may require more detailed assessments of risks. New entrants may look for flexible contracts with attractive fiscal terms, the ability to lock in reserves and transparent infrastructure and oil well information. Clear governance rules and provisions for accessi
39、ng infrastructure would also support the interest of investors. Venezuelas very negative history of expropriation and weak institutions will augment the need for protection of investors* rights, including access to international arbitration, fiscal stability clauses and dispute settlement mechanisms
40、. Overall, the oil and gas sector needs strong independent institutions that can administer different geographical areas and negotiate operating conditions, while being flexible regarding contractual terms for the different types of projects and risk profiles. Viscidi, L. and Graham, N. (2020), Revi
41、ving VENEZUELA Oil Sector: The Role ofWestern Oil Majors, InterAmerican Dialogue, January 2020, .- Venezuela competes with other oil and gas producers. This is especially true in an energy sector in transition where reaching peak oil demand is a very real possibility and existing suppliers compete f
42、or market share. Countries likeReforming Venezuelas oil and gas sectorAn analysis of competing fiscal, contractual and institutional regimesBrazil, Colombia and Mexico - among others in the region - have already built a legal and institutional framework that attracts FDI in oil and gas projects. The
43、 economic impact of COVID-19 has increased calls for governments in the region to improve the fiscal and contractual terms for investors in order to boost economic growth. Monge, C. (2020), CorONAViRus, Oil and Latin AtneriCA： The Urgency of Economic Diversification and Energy Transition, Natural Re
44、source Governance Institute, 3 August 2020, s:/resourcegovernance.org/analysis- tools/publications/coronavirus-oil-latin-america-economic-diversification-energy-transition.Brazil, Colombia and Mexico - among others in the region - have already built a legal and institutional framework that attracts
45、FDI in oil and gas projects. The economic impact of COVID-19 has increased calls for governments in the region to improve the fiscal and contractual terms for investors in order to boost economic growth. Monge, C. (2020), CorONAViRus, Oil and Latin AtneriCA： The Urgency of Economic Diversification a
46、nd Energy Transition, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 3 August 2020, s:/resourcegovernance.org/analysis- tools/publications/coronavirus-oil-latin-america-economic-diversification-energy-transition.- The presence of political allies of Nicolas Maduro could affect the scope of reforms needed. B
47、oth civilian and military groups supporting the Maduro government have acquired oil and gas assets in the country but do not necessarily have the required technology or resources to develop some of these fields. For example, the Military Company for Mining, Oil and Gas industries (CAMIMPEG) is a par
48、tner in one oil joint venture (Petrourdaneta), and it is involved also in providing services for different extractive industries. They may be concerned about potential losses as their participation in the oil and gas industry was not approved by the National Assembly and they cannot compete with tec
49、hnically sound firms in a competitive process. International political allies of the Maduro regime, such as China and Russia, may also act to protect their oil and gas projects in the country, whether legally or illegally acquired.Overall, policymakers face a significant challenge aligning the interests of all these groups towards a long-term and sustainable reform process - in reality, the need for political compromise may trump the need for major ch