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1、THE CRISIS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND ITS IMPACT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY士UKASZ KULESAI. INTRODUCTIONThe system of nuclear arms control, which originated during the cold war as a United States-Soviet endeavour, is in crisis. The European Union (EU) member states and the EU itself have already been nega
2、tively affected, but thus far European actors have remained observers rather than active players. The EU has not prioritized nuclear arms control as part of its agenda and remains ill-suited as an institutional actor to engage on this topic.Instead of focusing on praising the past achievements of nu
3、clear arms control and lamenting its demise, the EU and its member states should review the situation and analyse the options. Must they continue to play second fiddle to the two nuclear superpowers? Or are there ways in which the EU can take a more proactive stance in addressing the major nuclear s
4、ecurity threats and challenges facing Europe and influencing the nuclear arms control agenda?This paper examines the legacy of nuclear arms control, recent developments and the causes of the crisis; and analyses their impact on European security. Finally, it presents options on how the EU and its me
5、mber states can become engaged in rethinking the nuclear arms control architecture.II. NUCLEAR ARMSCONTROLAND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITYEven though various forms of arms control can be traced through the ages, such as the establishment of restraints on the development of armaments by a de
6、feated party following a conflict, its conceptual development in the 20th century was closely connected with the advent of nuclear weapons and the subsequent cold war confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union. Faced with the threat of a devastatingSUMMARYThe collapse of the 1987 Intermediat
7、e-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 was the most recent chapter in the process of the erosion of the cold war- originated system of nuclear arms control. This paper argues that the European Union (EU) member states and the EU itself have already been negatively affected. Thus far, how
8、ever, European states have remained observers rather than active players. Instead of focusing only on praising the past achievements of nuclear arms control and lamenting its demise, a new European approach is needed - one that identifies how best to address the major nuclear security threats and ch
9、allenges facing Europe through arms control instruments.This paper examines the legacy of nuclear arms control, recent developments and the causes of the current crisis; and analyses the impact on European security. Finally, it presents options on how the EU and its member states might become better
10、 engaged in rethinking the nuclear arms control architecture.ABOUT THE AUTHORLukasz Kulesa (Poland) is currently Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International A仔airs (PISM). His research interests include nuclear and conventional deterrence and arms control, NATO and Russian secur
11、ity policy, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In 2014-19 he was Research Director at the European Leadership Network in London. its nuclear sharing arrangements. As part of this arrangement, some European NATO member states host US nuclear weapons on their territories.Lukasz
12、Kulesa (Poland) is currently Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International A仔airs (PISM). His research interests include nuclear and conventional deterrence and arms control, NATO and Russian security policy, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In 2014-19 he
13、was Research Director at the European Leadership Network in London. its nuclear sharing arrangements. As part of this arrangement, some European NATO member states host US nuclear weapons on their territories. European states can give or deny permission to: deploy US nuclear weapons on their territo
14、ry (subject to the limitations that stem from the NPT); (b) host nuclear-capable systems such as US strategic bombers or submarines; and (c) host conventional systems relevant to nuclear arms control, such as strategic missile defence installations or, potentially, intermediate-range conventional mi
15、ssiles. Beyond the hardware； the EU and the European states bring to the table their ability to influence the agenda of international organizations and regimes, such as the United Nations Security Council, the Conference on Disarmament, the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Compreh
16、ensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and provide considerable funding in their support.One crucial factor that could have a major impact on European capacity to influence the future of nuclear arms control is the post-Brexit status of the UK. While the UK will remain a member of NATO and an
17、important partner of the EU, it is not clear how European5 its policy on arms control will remain or whether suitable mechanisms for coordination of its positions with the EU can be developed on the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation agendas. Given the links between the British and US nuclea
18、r establishments and the US role in the maintenance of the British nuclear deterrent, the UK would probably be inclined to align itself more closely with the US position. It is also likely to remain cautious about any proposals that could be seen as adversarial by the USA.In recent decades, there ha
19、s been a high degree of convergence between the US and European agendas on nuclear arms control: preventing nuclear war, maintaining stable US-Russian relations and reducing the size of nuclear arsenals, while assuring the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees within NATO. In some
20、 cases, both sides cooperated on applying pressure on the Soviet Union, later Russia, to push it to adopt arms control solutions. The European states have not always fully supported, but thus far have always adapted to, changes in the US nuclear posture and its approach to arms control, including th
21、e withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The issue now is whether the aim of European states remains to support (or at least not challenge) US arms control policy, or to develop a European policy vis-a-vis both the USA and Russia. If it is the latter, the question arises how to ensure the credibility and e
22、ffectiveness of such a policy.With regard to the policy choices ahead, European member states of NATO and the EU could continue the present course, acknowledging their own weak position and the lead roles of the USA and Russia in the nuclear domain. The European states would thus continue their chee
23、rleading role as supporters and promoters of nuclear arms control, and facilitators and potential hosts of bilateral or multilateral arms reduction talks. The aim would be to persuade the USA and Russiaand potentially also China-to engage with the existing agenda. Prolongation of New START, constrai
24、nts on nuclear modernization and deployments, and a relaunch of strategic stability talks would be the goals most likely to be supported by all European states and the EU. Such a position would be consistent with the sentiments of the majority of the European populations and the views of the Europea
25、n strategic community. At the same time, it would allow the EU itself to continue to maintain some distance from nuclear arms control issues and to pursue its current agenda.Maintaining the current course would not mean remaining passive. The European states could pursue additional initiatives regar
26、ding the non-nuclear elements of the arms control agenda, for example moving forward with the rethinking arms controF initiative. Developing viable arms control approaches to new and emerging technologies could become a major EU contribution to the global debate. The European states could also push
27、ahead with initiatives to strengthen existing non-proliferation regimes and continue nuclear diplomacy with Iran. The interested European NATO member states could influence the organizations arms control agenda in line with their preferences for further nuclear reductions. France and the UK could wo
28、rk towards the same goal in their contacts with other nuclear weapon states, for example, through the P5 process.Continuation of the current course would be a productive, and relatively uncontroversial, policy. Fixing nuclear arms control may simply be beyond the reach of European states and the EU,
29、 since the practical challenges of developing a European or EU approach to nuclear arms control would be huge.First, any move towards taking an independent European5 course would be seen externally as a major weakening of the transatlantic link, and a signal of the limited confidence placed in the U
30、SA and NATO.Second, it would amount to a marginalization of NATO as a forum of transatlantic coordination on arms control issues. Given the importance that a number of EU member states attach to their membership of NATO and their links with the USA, they would be unlikely to support such a course of
31、 action. Third, it would require a consensus to be reached within the EU on the goals of and strategy for nuclear arms control. Finally, in institutional terms, it would necessitate a major development of the capabilities and expertise of the European External Action Service in the area of arms cont
32、rol negotiations, and potentially also arms control verification. It is also debatable whether the USA or Russia would see the EUs expectation to be treated as a partner in nuclear arms control as either serious or credible.Nonetheless, it is possible to identify two hypothetical scenarios for a mor
33、e ambitious European approach to nuclear arms control. The first would see the European states and the EU seek to apply a combination of pressure and incentives to persuade the USA and Russiaand potentially other nucleararmed statesto make progress on arms control. Meier, 0.,Europeans to the rescue?
34、5, Bulletin of the Atomic With respect to the incentives, in the relationship with the USA, European states could for example pledge to increase their defence budgets or support for US policy in specific regions and areas, such as regarding relations with China, as a quid pro quo for the extension o
35、f New START. On Russia, its agreement not to pursue specific nuclear-related armament programmes, such as strategic or intermediate-range missile development, could potentially be linked to a review of the EU sanctions. Another incentive, for both sides, might be a pledge by France and the UK that t
36、hey would participate in the negotiations on the next nuclear arms control treaty if there was a US-Russian agreement on a New START extension.With regard to the coercive angle, pressure could hypothetically be applied on Russia and the USA by threatening retaliatory measures or a reduction of coope
37、ration in case of continued paralysis in arms control negotiations. European states could for example signal to the US leadership that in the case of a US withdrawal from New START, or a refusal to extend it, they might review their security cooperation with the USA or request the removal of US nucl
38、ear weapons or specific strategic installations, such as early warning or missile defence facilities, from their soil.Scientists, 24 Oct. 2018. With regard to Russia, European states could declare that they would be willing to host US intermediate-range missiles on their soil or purchase them indivi
39、dually in the case of continued Russian deployment of intermediate-range land-based systems, whereas they would refrain from such moves if Russia were to reverse its course. Use of the threat of economic sanctions or a withdrawal from existing projects, such as the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, has al
40、so been suggested as a potential way to apply coercion on Russia on arms control issues.41Such a policy of positive and negative linkages, similar to the one pursued by the EU with regard to Iran in the lead-up to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, would however be quite difficult to implement
41、in practice. Given the centrality of the USA to the security policies of a number of European states, it is hard to imagine them agreeing to put pressure on the USA or threaten to review their non-nuclear bilateral security cooperation for the sake of nuclear arms control. The policy of linkages cou
42、ld gain more internal support if applied to Russia, but even there it would be effective only if the European states were able to agree on a particular policy course and maintain cohesion- being prepared to deliver on both the promises to Russia and the punitive measures.The second option, and the m
43、ost radical break from the current approach, would see European states, acting through the EU or in smaller groupings, agreeing to develop and implement a fully independent approach to nuclear arms control. This would constitute a break with the tradition of close consultations and coordination on s
44、uch issues with the USA.The proposals to initiate outreach to Russia to achieve some degree of restraint in the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe could be seen as an example of how a European initiative in an arms control area previously managed by the USA and Russia might look. Ac
45、cording to one such proposal, Russia would refrain from deploying additional missiles in, and move its existing stockpile of SSC-8/9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles out of, the European part of its territory, and in exchange receive assurances40 A major question would of course be whether such m
46、oves would encourage the USA to change course on arms control, or rather trigger US strategic disengagement from Europe.41 Kuehn, U./Between a rock and a hard place: Europe in a post-INF world； Nonproliferation Review, vol. 26, nos 1-2 (2019), pp. 164-65.from European NATO member states that NATO wo
47、uld not deploy US intermediate-range missiles in Europe. See e.g. van der Meer, S. and Onderco, M./An EU-Russia deal to replace the INF Treaty?5, European Leadership Network, Commentary, 8 Mar. 2019; and Kuehn (note 41). In November 2019 the president of France, Emmanuel Macron, suggested that Europ
48、e should be involved in any negotiations of an agreement prohibiting or restraining nuclear-capable missiles as a follow-up to the INF Treaty, and that it should be one of the topics of dialogue with Russia. RFI,Macron says EU must be part of any future US-Russia nuclear missile treaty5,28 Nov. 2019
49、.Similar nuclear-related arms control initiatives may be pursued by individual European states, especially those that are particularly critical of the Trump administrations arms control policy. In the current security circumstances, however, it is highly unlikely that the EU would decide to pursue an independent course on arms control that would situate it between Russia and the USA. Despite their policy disagreements with the USA, most European states would be reluctant to put the transatlantic relationship