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1、JANUARY 2022 2022 年 1 月Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic Competition战略竞争时代的综合军备控制AUTHORSRebecca K.C. Hersman Heather Williams Suzanne Claeys作者丽贝卡KC赫斯曼希瑟威廉姆斯苏珊娜克莱斯A Report of the CSIS Project on Nuclear IssuesCSIS核问题项目报告CSIS核问题项目报告JANUARY 2022Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategi
2、c CompetitionAUTHORSRebecca K.C. Hersman Heather Williams Suzanne ClaeysA Report of the CSIS Project on Nuclear IssuesLanham Boulder New York LondonAbout CSIS关于CSI 战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）是一个跨党派、非营利的政策研究组织，致力于推动实践想法，以应对世界上最大的挑战。Thomas J.Pritzker于2015年被任命为CSIS董事会主席，接替前美国参议员萨姆纳恩（D-GA）。CSIS成立于1962年，由约翰J哈姆雷领导，自2
3、000年起担任总裁兼首席执行官。CSIS的目的是定义国家安全的未来。我们遵循一套独特的价值观无党派、独立思考、创新思维、跨学科学术、正直和专业精神，以及人才培养。CSIS的价值观与创造真实世界影响的目标一致。CSIS学者将他们的政策专业知识、判断力和强大的网络带入他们的研究、分析和建议中。我们组织会议、出版、讲座和媒体露面，旨在提高相关利益相关者和感兴趣公众对政策问题的认识、意识和重要性。当我们的研究有助于告知关键决策者的决策和关键影响者的想法时，CSIS会产生影响。我们努力实现一个更安全、更繁荣的世界。CSI不采取具体的政策立场；因此，本文中表达的所有观点均应理解为作者的观点。2022年，战
4、略与国际研究中心出版。版权所有。ISBN:978-1-5381-4051-2（pb）；978-1-5381-4052-9（电子书）华盛顿特区西北罗德岛大道1616号战略与国际研究中心，20036202-887-0200 | www.csis.org罗曼和利特尔菲尔德福布斯大道4501号马里兰州兰厄姆20706301-459-3366 | The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to adv
5、ancing practical ideas to address the worlds greatest challenges.Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2
6、000.CSISs purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross-disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSISs values work in concert toward the goal of
7、making real-world impact.CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with
8、 relevant stakeholders and the interested public.CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world.CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all v
9、iews expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). 2022 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.ISBN: 978-1-5381-4051-2 (pb); 978-1-5381-4052-9 (eBook)III | Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionCenter for Strategic
10、& International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036202-887-0200 | www.csis.orgRowman & Littlefield 4501 Forbes BoulevardLanham, MD 20706301-459-3366 | AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank all of the workshop participants who offered valuable insights and sparked thoug
11、htful discussions. The authors would also like to thank David C. Logan, Dr. Justin Anderson, and Elaine Bunn, who reviewed earlier drafts of the report and provided valuable feedback. The authors would also like to thank Eric Brewer for his close readings and recommendations for later versions of th
12、e report. Finally, the authors appreciate the support of CSISs iLab team in the editing, formatting, and publishing of the report.This research was made possible through the support of the United States Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Threat Reduction and Arms Control (ODASD(TRAC
13、). The opinions, findings, views, conclusions, or recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of ODASD(TRAC) or the U.S. government.致谢作者要感谢所有提供了宝贵见解并引发了深思熟虑的讨论的
14、研讨会参与者。作者还要感谢David C.Logan、Justin Anderson博士和Elaine Bunn，他们审阅了报告的早期草稿，并提供了宝贵的反馈。作者还想感谢埃里克布鲁尔（Eric Brewer）对报告后续版本的仔细阅读和建议。最后，作者感谢CSIS的iLab团队在编辑、格式化和发布报告方面提供的支持。这项研究是在美国国防部减少威胁和军备控制副助理部长办公室（ODASD（TRAC）的支持下进行的。本文中包含的意见、调查结果、观点、结论或建议均为作者的意见、调查结果、观点、结论或建议，不应被解释为必然代表ODASD（TRAC）或美国政府的官方政策或明示或暗示的支持。IV | Reb
15、ecca K.C. Hersman, Heather Williams, and Suzanne ClaeysContentsExecutive Summary1Introduction71 | The Evolving Security Environment: Integrated Deterrence and Strategic Competition102 | The Evolving Technology Landscape: Challenges for Arms Control183 | The Evolving Information Ecosystem: Arms Contr
16、ol in the Digital Information Age224 | Evolving Concepts of Escalation and Stability: Integrated Arms Control and Risk Reduction275 | Integrated Arms Control: The Way Forward31Conclusions and Recommendations: Realizing an Integrated Arms Control Strategy42Appendix A: Canary in the Coal Mine: The Che
17、mical Weapons Case Study48Appendix B: Disinformation and Covid-19 Case Study52About the Authors54目录执行摘要1导言71 |不断变化的安全环境：综合威慑和战略竞争102 |不断发展的技术前景：军备控制的挑战183 |不断演变的信息生态系统：数字信息时代的军备控制224 |不断演变的升级和稳定概念：综合军备控制和减少风险275 |综合军备控制：前进之路31结论和建议：实现综合军备控制战略42附录A：煤矿中的金丝雀：化学武器案例研究48附录B：2019冠状病毒疾病和病例报告52关于作者54V | Int
18、egrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionExecutive SummaryCan contemporary arms control keep pace with the rapid rate of change in both geopolitics and technology? The increasingly competitive security environment has made near-term prospects for further reductions in nuclear arms and
19、delivery systems unlikely, yet fundamentalinterests in strategic stability, risk reduction, and the prevention of arms racing remain. Indeed, the challenges to future arms controlthe decline in trust between the United States and potentialarms control partners; the rise in complex, highly interrelat
20、ed, strategic technologies; the emergence of a highly digitized, privately controlled, and easily weaponized information environment; andthe presence of increasingly assertive regional stakeholdersall point to a rocky road ahead. Measures that build confidence, reduce miscalculation, enhance transpa
21、rency, and restrain costly and dangerous military competition may be of increasing value, particularly as states develop and employ a wider range of strategic technologies and rely on broader strategic concepts such asintegrated deterrence to reduce the risk of conflict between major nuclear-armed p
22、owers. Moreover, arms control institutions and mechanisms for dispute resolution and compliance enforcement can provide useful venues for addressing sources of conflict, reducing misperceptions, and restraining impulsive or risky actions.For arms control tools to succeed, however, they must be adapt
23、ed to the current security environment, account for rapidly evolving technological and informational factors, and consider alternative structures, modalities, and participation models. As deterrence becomes more integrated across an increasingly diverse range of technologies, domains, risks, and act
24、ors, so too must arms control. Indeed, now is the time for a recoupling of arms control with deterrence in a way that recognizes these new realities. Now is the time for integrated arms control.执行摘要当代军备控制能否跟上地缘政治和技术的快速变化？竞争日益激烈的安全环境使得进一步削减核武器和运载系统的短期前景变得不太可能，但却是根本性的战略稳定、降低风险和防止军备竞赛的利益依然存在。事实上，未来军备控制
25、面临的挑战是美国和潜在的军事力量之间信任的下降军备控制伙伴；复杂、高度相关的战略技术的崛起；高度数字化、私人控制和易于武器化的信息环境的出现；和越来越自信的地区利益相关者的存在都指向了一条崎岖的道路。建立信任、减少误判、提高透明度、抑制代价高昂和危险的军事竞争的措施可能会越来越有价值，尤其是在各国开发和使用更广泛的战略技术，并依赖更广泛的战略概念，如综合威慑，以降低主要核武装国家之间发生冲突的风险。此外，军备控制机构和争端解决及合规执法机制可以为解决冲突根源、减少误解、抑制冲动或危险行为提供有用的场所。然而，对于武器控制工具的成功，他们必须适应当前的安全环境，考虑到快速发展的技术和信息因素，并
26、考虑替代的结构，方式和参与模型。随着威慑在越来越多样化的技术、领域、风险和行为者之间变得更加一体化，军备控制也必须如此。事实上，现在是以承认这些新现实的方式，重新结合军备控制和威慑的时候了。现在是进行综合军备控制的时候了。1 | Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Heather Williams, and Suzanne ClaeysThe Evolving Technology LandscapeFor most emerging and potentially disruptive technologies, private actors, rather than governm
27、ents, are the primary developers and drivers of innovation. Also, the rapid way in which these technologies are being developed, fielded, and updated is straining the ability of existing legal mechanisms and arms control institutionsoften more rigid and slower to adaptto keep up.Finally, many of the
28、se technologies are still under development, and both states and private companies might be unwilling to subject them to limits that could curtail future economic or military advantage. This evolving technological landscape has three broad implications for arms control: (1) emerging technologies com
29、plicate strategic stability and risks of crisis escalation and arms racing; (2) many of these advanced technologies are used in both the civilian and military sectors, complicating the ways in which arms control agreements are negotiated and implemented, and (3) most of these technologies exist outs
30、ide of existing arms control regulations, meaning legal mechanisms will likely struggle to incorporate them.不断发展的技术前景对于大多数新兴的和潜在的颠覆性技术，创新的主要开发者和驱动者是私人参与者，而不是政府。此外，这些技术的快速开发、部署和更新正在使现有法律机制和军备控制机构的能力受到限制，它们往往更加僵化，适应的速度也更慢。最后，这些技术中有许多仍在开发中，国家和私营公司可能都不愿意对它们施加限制，这可能会削弱未来的经济或军事优势。这种不断发展的技术格局对军备控制有三个广泛的影响：
31、（1）新兴技术使战略稳定和危机升级及军备竞赛的风险变得复杂；（2） 这些先进技术中有许多被用于民用和军事部门，使军备控制协议的谈判和执行方式复杂化；（3）这些技术中的大多数不在现有军备控制条例的范围内，这意味着法律机制很可能难以将其纳入。The Evolving Information EcosystemTodays information ecosystem, specifically the potential benefits and challenges for accessing, processing, analyzing, altering, and disseminating
32、large volumes of information, is poised to change the nature of arms control.1 This complex and highly dynamic information environment will potentially transform how agreements are negotiated, monitored, verified, and enforced, not to mention altering roles and responsibilities along the way. First,
33、 the use of disinformation toundermine arms control structures, institutions, and mechanisms poses a large and growing challenge to future arms control. Manipulated information could be used to raise questions about a countrys compliance with an arms control agreement, forge or fake a treaty violati
34、on, cover up or hide a violation, or cause confusion about a states weapon development. Second, state actors are not the only players of note in the new information ecosystem. The explosion of international open-source investigation and analysis groups outside the government will potentially transfo
35、rm not only how verification is done but also who does it. In the future, open-source information may offer monitoring and verification alternatives when intrusive, state-sponsored approaches might not be agreeableor desirable. Ultimately, this emerging information ecosystem, particularly in the for
36、m of highly competitive open-source analysis and investigation, will impact the role of national technical means (NTM)nationally controlled ground, space, airborne, or even underwater sensorsin monitoring and verifying compliance with arms control agreements.2不断演变的信息生态系统今天的信息生态系统，特别是获取、处理、分析、更改和传播大量
37、信息的潜在好处和挑战，正准备改变军备控制的性质。1这种复杂且高度动态的信息环境将潜在地改变协议的谈判、监控、验证和执行方式，更不用说改变过程中的角色和责任了。首先，利用虚假信息破坏军控结构、机构和机制对未来的军控构成了巨大且日益严峻的挑战。被操纵的信息可能会被用来质疑一个国家遵守军备控制协议的情况，伪造或伪造违反条约的行为，掩盖或隐藏违反条约的行为，或对一个国家的武器发展造成混淆。其次，在新的信息生态系统中，国家行为者并不是唯一值得注意的参与者。政府之外的国际开源调查和分析组织的激增，可能不仅会改变核查的方式，还会改变谁来核查。在未来，当政府资助的侵入性方法可能不可取时，开源信息可能会提供监控
38、和验证替代方案或者说是可取的。最终，这一新兴的信息生态系统，尤其是以高度竞争的开源分析和调查的形式出现的信息生态系统，将影响国家技术手段（NTM）国家控制的地面、空间、机载甚至水下传感器在监测和核查军备控制协议遵守情况方面的作用。2.Evolving Concepts of Escalation and StabilityCold War stability concepts drew heavily on ladders and firebreaks to define nuclear crises and escalation, but contemporary deterrence fa
39、ilure may more closely resemble “wormholes” or sudden, possibly temporary openings in the fabric of deterrence that allow for accelerated and unpredictable escalation risks. Future conflicts are unlikely to unfold in a clear linear or stepwise fashion with a distinction between pre-conflict and conf
40、lict termination. Neither is a clear delineation between nuclear and non-nuclear crises sustainable when conventional and nuclear capabilities are highly co-mingled, capable of more diversified strategic effects, and increasingly vulnerable to detection, disruption, or disablement.3不断演变的升级和稳定概念冷战稳定概
41、念在很大程度上依赖梯子和防火带来定义核危机和升级，但当代威慑失败可能更像是“虫洞”，或威慑结构中的突然、可能是暂时的开口，允许加速和不可预测的升级风险。未来的冲突不太可能以明确的线性或逐步方式展开，区分冲突前和冲突结束。当常规能力和核能力高度混合，能够产生更加多样化的战略影响，并且越来越容易被发现、破坏或致残时，核危机和非核危机之间的明确划分也不可持续。3.2 | Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic CompetitionIntegrated deterrence strategies can only provide partial
42、answers to this complex and multidimensional strategic challenge. In fact, in a deterrence framework that is much larger and more comprehensive than traditional nuclear deterrence, gaps and weaknesses that create the potentialfor wormhole dynamics are more likely, not less. Moreover, the very nature
43、 of integrated deterrence erodes the utility of firebreaks in arresting stability risks as capabilities grow more entangled. In a security paradigm based on integrated deterrence, the imperative for arms control is more urgent than ever. By identifying and mitigating deterrence gaps and risks, futur
44、e arms control may prove most useful by focusing on preventing conflict as well as costly arms races that might incentivize nuclear first use or crises that can rapidly escalate. Rather than seeking to impose numerical constraints on specific technologies, states might prioritize arms control effort
45、s that target specific behaviors of concern, regardless of the technological capabilities involved, and explore a wide range of arms control modalities to reduce the risks of arms racing and improve crisis stability.综合威慑战略只能部分解决这一复杂而多层面的战略挑战。事实上，在一个比传统核威慑更大、更全面的威慑框架中，存在着一些差距和弱点，这些差距和弱点创造了潜在的威胁因为虫洞动力
46、学更可能，而不是更少。此外，随着能力变得更加复杂，综合威慑的本质削弱了防火带在遏制稳定风险方面的效用。在基于综合威慑的安全范式中，军备控制比以往任何时候都更加紧迫。通过确定和缓解威慑差距和风险，未来的军备控制可能最有用，因为它将重点放在预防冲突和代价高昂的军备竞赛上，这些军备竞赛可能会刺激首次使用核武器或可能迅速升级的危机。各国不必寻求对具体技术施加数量限制，而可以优先考虑针对具体关切行为的军备控制努力，而不管所涉及的技术能力如何，并探索广泛的军备控制模式，以降低军备竞赛的风险，改善危机稳定性。Conclusions and Recommendations: Realizing an Inte
47、grated Arms Control StrategyThis highly entangled, multidomain risk landscape suggests new approaches to strategic arms control will be needed to mitigate risks across both technical domains and levels of conflict. In addition,the status of China as a rising peer, accompanied by increasingly capable
48、 regional nuclear actors, suggests multi-actor and multifocal approaches will need to replace traditional bilateral ones. Going forward, while the broader goals of disarmament may be desirable, the most pressing objective for arms control in the current security environment must be the prevention of major war, especially war that wo