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1、ContentsList of AbbreviationsviiiPreface and AcknowledgmentsxOverviewxiiPart I. Recent Developments and Outlook1Part II. Policy33Part III. Deploying the COVID-19 Vaccine in EAP33Part II.B. The Fiscal Policy Response to the COVID-19 Shock51Part II.C. Building Back Bettertoward a Low Carbon Future75Ov
2、erviewUneven containment: Like Hydra, the many-headed monster of Greek myth, COVID-19 is proving hard to suppress even a year after the first case was confirmed in Wuhan. China and Vietnam, which had largely contained the disease, saw occasional local outbreaks. Malaysia witnessed a significant resu
3、rgence, while Cambodia, Myanmar, Mongolia, and Thailand have seen more limited spurts in infections. Of the countries in which the virus raged a few months ago, the situation has improved in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, but the number of cases remains high. The emergence of more transmi
4、ssible variants of the variants of COVID-19, however, poses new challenges to the containment of the disease globally.Three-speed recovery: Many of the economies in the region began to bounce back in the second half of 2020 after an initial slump. However, among major economies of the region, only C
5、hina and Vietnam have followed a V-shape recovery path with output surpassing pre-COVID-19 levels in 2020 (Figure 0.1). Most of the other countries have not seen a full-fledged recovery in terms of either output or growth momentum. By the end of 2020, output in the four other major economies had reb
6、ounded but remained on average around 5 percent below pre-pandemic levels, with the smallest gap in Indonesia (2.2 percent) and the largest gap in the Philippines (8.4 percent). Economic contraction has been particularly severe and persistent in some of the small island economies with output in 2020
7、, remaining more than 10 percent below pre-pandemic levels in Fiji, Palau, and Vanuatu. Due to the economic distress, poverty in the region stopped declining for the first time in 20 years and 32 million people were prevented from escaping poverty.Figure 0.1. China and Vietnam are leading the recove
8、ry in the EAP regionA. GDP growth, WorldB. GDP growth, selected economiesChinaEast Asia excluding ChinaWorld excluding EAPIndonesiaMalaysiaVietnamPhilippinesThailandSources: Haver Analytics; World Bank.Notes: Dashed line refers to 2019-Q4 = 100 index line. XIIDeterminants of growth performance: Econ
9、omic performance across countries continues to depend primarily on (i) the efficiency with which the virus is contained; (ii) the ability to take advantage of the revival in international goods trade; and (iii) the capacity of governments to provide fiscal and monetary support. The countries with th
10、e weakest performance were the ones that suffered high rates of COVID-19 infections and mortality; that relied more on prolonged restrictions on mobility rather an effective test-based strategy; that depend on earnings from tourism rather than exports of manufactured goods, especially electronics; a
11、nd whose governments had limited fiscal space. The rollout of the vaccine has not so farOVERVIEWFigure II.C.4. East Asias growth paths has traditionally been carbon-intensiveoutput vs. emissions growth across countries 2000-20202di(1U8 d) mo6 UOSSE uoqpoTimor-Leste4 MyanmarVietnaalaysialChina Cambod
12、ia . Mongolia匚 PNG Fiji . Vanuatu Kiribati .Micronesia Tuvalu Marshall Is. Samoa58GDP growth (percent) Philippines Thailand Solomon Is.11 EAP countriesLinear (Non-EAP countries) Non-EAP countriesSource: World Bank staff based on Carbon Project and WDI. Note: Bubble size denotes share in global emiss
13、ions.At the same time, thanks to technological progress, developing EAP has immense potential to capture economic opportunities that may arise from a greener and climate smart development path. Like previous economic transformations on the scale and pace envisaged, a decisive move toward decarboniza
14、tion in the region and the rest of world is likely to unlock new sources of economic growth and job creation as well as growing markets for first movers. Developing EAP is well positioned to benefit from these shifts. Core parts of the regions urban, transportation and energy systems are still being
15、 built out, and the creation of large new capacity creates an opportunity to invest in more resilient, low carbon infrastructure from the outset rather than locking in carbon-dependent technologies and assets. As a global manufacturing hub, the region is also well placed to convert this investment p
16、ush into long-term competitive advantages in emerging and fast-growing green technologies. Already today the region is, for example, the largest market for investment in green technologies from electric vehicles to renewable energy, and more than half of the worlds direct and indirect jobs in the re
17、newable energy sector are in China (Figure II.C.5). Conversely, if East Asias low carbon transition lags the rest of the world, there is a serious risk of declining market access with carbon border adjustments becoming an integral part of trade policy in key export markets, such as the EU and US.Fig
18、ure II.C.5. Green investment and job creation as future sources of growthInvestment, US$billion2018-19Direct and indirect renewable energy jobs2020-sa:c-csB-ssrlH Bpn_ox wssrl 山 B-ssnHs 8_PPGEwnos Bu-pnox 3BJJV 号 OSs 6u - prlox dorg sgsEv PUB -B-c O 一一ZB 缶Sfl wpnox cow EV q-cON Sflpu-6wpnox qjopd B_
19、s . . Thailand *Timor-Lest ； & .： yietnam Indonesia Malaysia20申冬!嘿* S?om吗咤吟Papua 吃个 GBinea-gemoa* :/larshall IslandsTonga 一_ Micronesia, Fed. Sts.60,000010,00020,00030,00040,00050,000GDP per capita, PPP (thousand, constant 2017 international dollars) EAP countries, 2017 Non-EAP countries, 2017.-x-Ch
20、ina (19902017)* EAP average excluding China (1990-2017)Source: World Bank staff estimate based on WDI data.Box II.C.1. Why is climate action not happening faster? Market failures, uncertainty, trade-offs and policy choicesWhile there is a growing consensus that the collective cost of delayed climate
21、 action could be enormous, choices by individual governments, firms and consumers will not appropriately account for the potentially devastating effects and catastrophic risks caused by unmitigated climate change. Climate choices are further complicated by intertemporal trade-offs because climate ri
22、sks will accumulate beyond current generations, exceeding the time horizons of typical individual behavior (Carney 2015). This problem is compounded by uncertainty involved in predicting climate impacts and their complex and two-directional interactions with the economy.Unless addressed, these marke
23、t and related policy failures may lead to an undersupply of global climate change mitigation efforts and imply greater climate risks than would be socially optimal and intergenerationally fair. At the same time, there are real policy concerns about the present economic costs, the distributional impl
24、ications, and global burden-sharing in addressing climate change. Policy frameworks need to be designed to correct for these market imperfections while addressing potential trade-offs and maximizing synergies between climate goals and other social and economic objectives and do all that under the fo
25、llowing high levels of uncertainty:A. Aggregate economic impacts: Policy makers are concerned whether it is possible to decarbonize their economies while maintaining robust economic growth. While early economic models indeed framed the optimal emissions path as a trade-off between the short-term cos
26、t of mitigation and expected benefits in terms of reduced climate-related losses for future generations (Nordhaus 2014), more recent research suggests that the trade-offs may be less sharp. One reason is that evidence suggests that technology adoption(continued)(Box II.C.1, continued)and relative pr
27、ice developments are endogenous, nonlinear and subject to economies of scale, implying lower mitigation costs (Aghion et al. 2016; Stern 2015). For example, over the past decade the price of solar and wind technologies has fallen dramatically, electric lighting has become far more efficient and batt
28、ery technology has enabled the emergence and rapid expansion electric vehicles. At the same time, traditional models have tended to underestimate present and future benefits of climate action. This is partly because of incomplete accounting of co-benefits in terms air quality, public health, and bio
29、diversity benefits as well as growth-enhancing innovation and economic dynamism (Arezki et al. 2016; Coste et al. 2019; Heine and Black 2019). In addition, negative feedback loops and fat tail risks could cause severe economic damage, including through wealth destruction, reduction and volatility of
30、 income and growth, further bolstering the economic case for climate action (Stern 2015).B. Distributional impacts: While there is growing evidence suggesting that there may be economic co-benefits to climate change mitigation and adaptation (Stern 2015), the costs and benefits of climate action wil
31、l not be evenly distributed. The accelerated exit of polluting industries will inevitably lead to labor dislocation. At the same time, the more rapid depreciation of carbon related infrastructure implies stranded assets and financial losses for individual corporates and investors. In a similar vein,
32、 the burden of climate change impacts is varied geographically (Tol 2019) and across the income distribution and some of the populations most at risk may lack political agency and voice, especially in comparison to well organized vested interest that would stand to lose from a more rapid decarboniza
33、tion path. Policies to engender the needed economic transformation, will therefore need to be accompanied by steps to ensure its costs and benefits are distributed fairly, not the least to ensure the necessary broad-based political support and to overcome resistance from vested interests.C. Global a
34、nd regional spillovers: Similar to the uneven domestic distribution of costs and benefits discussed above, individual countries may lack incentives for climate action, if they bear disproportionate costs but benefits accrue predominantly to other countries (IMF 2019). The cumulative nature of atmosp
35、heric greenhouse gases also implies that historical emissions as well as the level of income of individual countries should be factored into international burden sharing. These global spillovers and interdependence of policy choices across counties gives rise to international coordination problems b
36、ut also create ample room for mutually beneficial global and regional collective action.As the region recovers from COVID-19, there is an opportunity to recalibrate policy frameworks toward low carbon and resilient development. Policy makers in the region face complex policy challenges. Most economi
37、es remain well below full employment and potential growth, but fiscal space is increasingly constrained by rising public debt burdens in many countries, especially those with high levels of external debt denominated in foreign currency. Further fiscal support to secure the recovery will therefore ne
38、ed to be calibrated carefully, as discussed in the previous section of this report. Where fiscal space permits, additional fiscal stimulus measures could be aligned with medium-term policy objectives of low carbon development. This could be achieved by prioritizing measures that combine benefits for
39、 jobs and short-term recovery with longer-term impacts on resilience while avoiding investment in carbon-intensive infrastructure. While such alignment is desirable, it is important to recognize that cyclical policies in response to the current crisis can contribute to but will not be enough to achi
40、eve long-term decarbonization. It is therefore important to complement the greening of short-term measures with consistent medium-term policy shifts.There is no uniform policy approach to drive low carbon and resilient development across the region, but a broad menu of policy options from which poli
41、cy makers can choose. D印ending on country circumstances, the policy agenda will need to balance policy efforts to reduce climate risks (mitigation) with efforts to increase resilience to them when theydo materialize (adaptation). The individual policy m枚 will also vary across countries. In smaller, low-income countries with relatively low levels of emissions but high exposure to disaster risks, for example small island states in the Pacific, marginal investment is needed to enhance adaptation and resilience. In larger, fast industria