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1、Finding a Path to Peace in Ethiopias Tigray RegionCrisis Group Africa Briefing N0167Nairobi/Brussels, 11 February 2021Whats new? After weeks of fighting in Ethiopias Tigray region, federal troops removed the regional government and declared victory. Yet thousands have died, hundreds of thousands are
2、 at risk of starvation and the conflict continues. Addis Ababa has established an interim administration, but ousted Tigrayan politicians say they will fight back.Why did it happen? Relations between Addis Ababa and Mekelle tanked after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018 and Tigrays leade
3、rs lost federal power. Tensions spiked when Tigray defied central authority by holding regional elections in September, culminating when Tigrayan forces captured the national military command in the region, triggering federal intervention.Why does it matter? The conflict has poisoned relations betwe
4、en Tigrayan and other Ethiopian elites and inflamed public opinion in Tigray against the federal authorities, who may well struggle to administer a restive region. If Addis Ababas energies are drained by enforcing its rule on Tigray, other Ethiopian ethno-nationalist forces may be emboldened.What sh
5、ould be done? To get Tigrays public on side, Ababa Ababa should ensure that Eritrean and Amhara regional forces that participated in the intervention withdraw. It also should urgently allow aid to reach all Tigrayans who need it. Ultimately, inclusive dialogue is needed to address federal-Tigray dis
6、agreements and wider disputes over regional autonomy.L OverviewFollowing weeks of conflict, Ethiopian federal forces declared victory over the northern Tigray regions leadership after taking the capital Mekelle on 28 November 2020. The army says it is mopping up, although ousted Tigrayan leaders and
7、 the UN say fighting is still widespread. The war has killed thousands and displaced maybe a third of Tigra/s population amid reports of atrocities by all sides. More than 4.5 million people in Tigray reportedly require emergency food aid and hundreds of thousands could starve. Federal troops are ba
8、cked by Amhara factions claiming areas they say Tigray annexed in the early 1990s. It is now apparent that Eritrean troops intervened to support Ethiopias army, though both Asmara and Addis Ababa deny it. Whether or not the federal government achieves all its military goals, it will need to work wit
9、h on making good his promise that the 2018 changes in Ethiopia were “game over” for the TPLF 45With no resolution of the underlying tensions in sight, the prime ministers decision in 2019 to merge regional ruling parties into a single, unitary one further strained his relations with the TPLF. Eight
10、of the countrys governing parties - that is, all except the TPLF - joined to establish the Prosperity Party. The TPLFs refusal to sign up grew partly out of fears that the merger would dilute Tigrays autonomy, but it cost the party its share of federal power. After TPLF representatives became the so
11、le opposition bloc in the national parliament, federal authorities moved to rid the central government of remaining officials nominated by the party.The National Electoral Boards March decision to delay polls due to COVID-19, followed by the House of Federations extension, in June 2020, of all gover
12、nments5 terms until elections, was another step on the escalatory path. The TPLF saw those decisions as further provocation, arguing (like some other Abiy opponents) that the premiers mandate was limited to shepherding the country to elections and that he should have included the opposition formally
13、 in decisions related to elections once the original terms expired.46 They said the delay beyond legal term limits was unconstitutional, complaining that the Prosperity Party was increasingly monopolising a transition the prime minister had promised would lead to multiparty democracy.47 Addis Ababa
14、argued, with some justification, that the process to extend all govern- ments, terms was constitutional.48 The idea of Tigray holding its own regional election, however, then became a totemic issue of self-rule for the TPLF and, apparently, many Tigrayans. The party, already omnipresent in Tigra/s i
15、nstitutions, easily won polls held on 9 September in defiance of federal orders.49At stake in Tigrays election was not so much who would wield political power; that the TPLF would win an overwhelming majority was never in doubt. Rather, the issue was whether the electorate backed the partys decision
16、 to defy federal authorities. As it happened, the TPLF won the backing of 98 per cent of the 2.6 million Tigrayans who voted - almost half the regions whole population, so the vast majority of voting-age Tigrayans. Competing opposition parties adopted even harder-line Tigrayan nationalist positions,
17、 including advocating secession0 Critics say the result was undermined by TPLF repression, boycotts by other opposition parties, and the lack of federal and international oversightsThe poll set the stage for the subsequent hostilities. The House of Federation declared the ballot unconstitutional and
18、 thus the federal authorities considered Tigrays4 “PM Abiy, President Isaias visit Ethio-Engineering Group”, Ethiopian News Agency, 16 December 2020; “Game over for ethnic federalism: Isaias”, Ethiopia Insight, 12 February 2020.46 See Crisis Group Commentary, Managing the Politics of Ethiopias COVID
19、-19 Crisis”, 15 April 2020.47 See Crisis Group Briefing, Toward an End to Ethiopias Federal-Tigray Feud, op. cit.48 Ethiopias Tigray region vote unconstitutional, lawmakers say”, Bloomberg, 5 September 2020.49 The TPLF won 98.2 per cent of the vote and all 152 seats. 6Tigray elections: it has been a
20、nnounced that TPLF has won the regional elections in Tigray”，BBC Amharic, 11 September 2020.50 Crisis Group telephone interview, journalist based in Mekelle, November 2020.51 Gizachew Abebe, uThe election has indeed become a referendum”, Addis Maleda, 21 September 2020. In January, the electoral boa
21、rd cancelled the TPLF*s registration for participating in rebellion and asked three regional opposition parties that have applied for registration for an explanation of their participation in the “iUegaT Tigray election. UNEBE cancels registration of TPLF”, Fana Broadcasting Corporation, 18 January
22、2021.new cabinet and legislature illegitimate. In turn, Mekelle rejected the Abiy administration authority, saying its original term had expired in early October.2 That month, Addis Ababa moved ahead with a plan to redirect budget transfers away from Tigrays executive, which the regional government
23、claimed would be a fundamental breach of the federal arrangement. 53 Unless Tigrays leadership took the unlikely step of disavowing the election it had just made a major political statement by holding, federal authorities appeared bound to act.Before the outbreak of conflict, federal officials told
24、Crisis Group that their plan was to weaken Tigray through economic measures in order to force compliance.54 One said the TPLFs downfall was at hand, as was restoration of Amhara land. In Mekelle, the mood was defiant: Tigray leaders said they would not sit idly by while federal action continued to u
25、ndermine the region.ss Tigray rejected Abiy?s attempt to change the leadership of the militarys Northern Command, based in Tigray, arguing that the federal government no longer had legal authority. Amid Tigrayan claims of a military build-up, on 3 November, regional authorities seized control of as
26、much of the military stationed in Tigray as they could, working in tandem with Tigrayan officers within the national army, killing those who resisted and detaining those who remained loyal to Addis Ababa.56 Late on 3 November, Abiy announced the intervention. On 5 November, parliament voted for a si
27、x-month state of emergency in Tigray and two days later to dissolve the regional government and replace it with an interim administration.57 The war was under way.IV. An Uneasy and Unstable FutureFor now, Addis Ababa is intent on securing an outright military victory. It rejects negotiations with Ti
28、grays ousted leaders and has issued arrest warrants for at least 349 Tigrayan government and military elites, 124 of whom it says it has detained and some of whom it has killed, including former Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin.s8 Federal authorities have established a new interim administration in Ti
29、gray, led by Mulu Nega, a Tigrayan federal education junior minister. The administration is supposed to stay in place until elections are held. Authorities have also replaced regional and zonal leaders with newly appointed non-TPLF Tigrayan officials, a mix of academics, opposition party representat
30、ives and bureaucrats, to work directly with existing52 See Crisis Group Briefing, Steering Ethiopias Tigray Crisis away from Conflict, op. cit.53 Tigrays leaders told Crisis Group in October that, as regional states formed the federation, the central government could not bypass Tigrays executive to
31、deliver funding directly to district administrations. Crisis Group interviews, Mekelle, October 2020.54 Crisis Group interview, federal officials, Addis Ababa, October 2020.55 Crisis Group interviews, Tigrayan officials, Mekelle, October 2020.56 Crisis Group interview, senior federal official, Addis
32、 Ababa, November 2020. On 30 November, Tigray authorities released 4,000 of those soldiers. Ethiopia crisis: Tigray force still fighting5 despite army Mekelle push，BBC, 2 December 2020.57 Ethiopia parliament dissolves Tigray leadership”, BBC, 7 November 2020.58 Arrest warrants issued for 76 generals
33、, high-ranking military officers, subordinates over treason, Fana Broadcasting Corporation, 18 November 2020； “Arrest warrant issued for TPLF junta mem- bers”, Fana Broadcasting Corporation, 13 November 2020; Alex de Waal, “In Memoriam: Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopian Peacemaker and Patriot”, African Argum
34、ents, 14 January 2021.district and village-level administrators - although there are indications that, at least in Mekelle and Shire cities, the local TPLF councillors have left their posts, as have the police in the regional capital.59Addis Ababa contends that its measures enjoy popular backing in
35、Tigray and signal the end of the TPLF as a political force. Tigray interim government plans regional, zonal overhaul”, The Reporter, 21 November 2020. “About 84 per cent of civil servants in Mekelle reported so far to return to work: interim admin”, Fana Broadcasting Corporation, 19 December 2020; “
36、Tigray Interim Administrations discussions with elders and residents of Shire town”, video, YouTube, 4 December 2020. Crisis Group telephone intendews, Mekelle and Shire residents, December 2020. The People of Tigray Have Proven in Practice That They Are Not with the Greedy Junta，statement, Prime Mi
37、nister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 28 November 2020. “The reality is the criminal clique is thoroughly defeated and in disarray, with insignificant capacity to mount a protracted insurgency”，the Prime Ministers Office said on 7 December. Current phase of rule of law operations in
38、 Tigray region”, Office of the Prime Minister, 7 December 2020. The TPLF, its supporters and many other Tigrayans see things differently and profess their commitment to fighting on. Tigray regional government statement”, 25 December 2020. Brief from the Tigray National Regional Government on the Cur
39、rent Conflict in Ethiopia”, Tigray Friendship Liaison Office, 2 December 2020; Ethiopian military says it killed 15 members of rebellious Tigray forces, captured 8 others”, Reuters, 10 January 2021. The Tigray Defence Forces is the name Tigrays ousted leadership gave to Tigrays security forces when
40、the war broke out. Crisis Group telephone interviews, Tigrayan opposition leader and Tigrayan activists, December 2020-JAnuary 2021. For example, before the TPLF rebellion from 1975, Tigrayans had also risen up against Emperor Haile Selassies government in 1943. Most of the wanted Tigrayan leadershi
41、p remains at large, although a former president, an ousted deputy president and TPLF founders are among those captured and killed. TPLF leaders continued issuing (unsubstantiated) claims of battlefield victories by the Tigray Defence Forces weeks after their loss of control of the regional governmen
42、t.Even if Tigrayan forces are fully defeated, it will be an uphill battle to persuade former officials and the bulk of Tigrays population to support the federally imposed interim government. Although realities on the ground are difficult to assess given lack of access, many Tigrayans believe that Et
43、hiopian and, particularly, Eritrean forces have committed atrocities, which is intensifying opposition to the intervention.64 Moreover, the region has a long history of resistance and the TPLF has an extensive grassroots network, having built political and governance structures down to the village l
44、evel during its decades of rebellion and rule.65 The federal government may count on its ability to restore stability and rebuild Tigray, as well as on the TPLFs failure to live up to its vows of resistance, and so turn Tigrayan public opinion in Addis Ababas favour. Yet continued elite and popular
45、resistance to the provisional administration, coupled with growing backing for secession fuelled by sustained federal military rule, are at least as likely outcomes. Indeed, many Tigrayans express newfound support for independence. Crisis Group telephone interviews, Tigrayan activists, November and
46、December 2020. See Crisis Group Briefing, Bridging the Divide in Ethiopias North, op. cit.Tigrayan anti-federal sentiment has been further exacerbated byAmhara control of parts of west and south Tigray。As manyAmhara see it, when the federation took shape in the early 1990s, the TPLF annexed the Welk
47、ait area in what is now West Tigray Zone and the Raya area in South Tigray Zone. Regardless of the legitimacy of both sides5 claims, plenty ofTigrayans resent the new reality. West Tigray, which has already seen extreme intercommunal violence at Maykadra and elsewhere, is an ethnic tinderbox. Unless
48、 the federal government rolls back Amhara control there and in South Tigray Zone - as requested by Tigrays interim leader appointed by Addis Ababa - the situation is likely to complicate any settlement.r o.The de facto alteration of inter-regional boundaries in the wake of the intervention could tri
49、gger other land grabs elsewhere in a federation that has numerous territorial disputes. The Amhara moves were criticised by some political leaders from the Oromo, the other major bloc in the ruling Prosperity Party. Prosperity Party Oromia branch spokesman Taye Dendea, uRaya and Wollo，9 December 2020. Abiy said territorial disputes should be decided in consultation with the people and based on the findings of the Administra