新兴市场-宏观策略-数说新兴市场:这些数据是否支持从疲弱的企稳转向增长提速.docx

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1、Global ResearchEM Economic PerspectivesEM by the Numbers: Does the data supportmoving from weak stabilisation to a growth pick-up?A reasonable rebound after a growth slump; but do not draw straight linesThe improvement in China survey data was large even after accounting for seasonality. That this i

2、s less true for the rest of EM, however, with export orders prints for most still stuck below 50. In terms of the direction of travel from here, we will likely get synchronous improvement in most regions globally. However, given the degree of the slump in Asia and Europe in the prior six months, tha

3、t should not be a big statement. In terms of the magnitude of the improvement, we would caution that the markets seem to be using a historical template to global growths beta to China, which may not apply this time. We view this China stimulus as being both smaller and more oriented to domestic sect

4、ors than the previous stimuli.Mixed signs of tech demand; little doubt in the markets mind, howeverAmong the big divergences in the market is the gap between IT sector stock prices and underlying fundamental data and guidance from the companies. A significant bounce in Taiwan electronics new orders

5、PMI and a likely bottoming of the semiconductor exports from Korea are positives in this regard, but the market valuations seem well ahead of these numbers. The Taiwan new orders numbers also have a strong element of seasonality in March. While waiting for more data from North Asia, we maintain our

6、cautious view on the EM Tech sector.Inflation is yesterdays problem even in EM; the demand for coupon will persist The decline in inflation is very much a global phenomenon, including in EM. 80% of the 30 main EM economies are showing higher y/y inflation than (smoothed) m/m numbers, pointing to dow

7、nside risk in the former. The median inflation print for EM has now shifted below just below 2%, while that of Asia is now just under 1%. most other countries which have experienced high inflation historically - Russia, India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and the Philippines - to name a few, are

8、consistently posting weak and declining inflation prints.Factory owner confidence much lower than investor confidenceThe secular terms of trade shift away from goods towards services is being manifested also in stronger company earnings in the services sectors, and a continued divergence of Services

9、 PMIsfrom Manufacturing. EM Industrial Production growth, which is highly correlated with global trade growth, is within the bottom decile of its long-term distribution. Stronger commodity prices this year mean that the deflators should stop falling in y/y terms soon and global trade should look bet

10、ter in the months ahead. The degree of volume improvement will depend on global factory owner confidence, which presently is much weaker than that of investors.9 April 2019EconomicsEmerging MarketsBhanu Ba we j aStrategist +44-20-7568 6833Arend KapteynEconomist +44-20-7567 0531Rohit AroraStrategist

11、+65-6495 5232Alexey OstapchukStrategist +44-20-7567 0239This report has been prepared by UBS AG London Branch. ANALYST CERTIFICATION AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BEGIN ON PAGE 25.InflationWhat the eumbers sa”: It has been the case for many months now, but both CPI and core CPI prints in EM continue to s

12、urprise to the downside even now. GBI-weighted EM inflation is at 4.3%, 25th percentile of its 20-year distribution, while MSCI-weighted headline inflation is at 2.1%, 1st percentile of a similar distribution. Sequential momentum is even weaker, with 80% of the 30 main EM economies we track showing

13、higher y/y than (smoothed) m/m numbers, pointing to a downside risk in the former. The median inflation print for EM has now shifted just below 2%, while that of Asia is just under 1%. With the exception of Venezuela, Argentina and Turkey, most other countries which have experienced high inflation h

14、istorically - Russia, India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, and the Philippines - to name a few are consistently seeing inflation prints between 2.5% and 5%. What they mea/?: Low inflation seems to be very much a global phenomenon with little evidence of a Philips curve relationship in evidence ev

15、en for economies where output gaps had shut a few years back. While in the developed markets closed output gaps (Japan, US, Sweden, Germany, for example) have led to a clear rise in wages, companies have not felt confident about being able to raise prices, very likely taking a hit on their margins.

16、This is particularly true for manufacturing companies. In this situation, the global inflation cycle has really been driven by the commodity cycle. Driven by higher oil and metals prices this year, these should emerge from deflation on a y/y basis in Q2, but this will be more clearly visible in PPI

17、measures, ratherthan CPI measures where low food prices, once again a global phenomenon, are having a major impact. 12month outlook: Weak growth and an early flattening out of the nascent credit impulse mean that higher EM inflation will likely only come through FX weakness and higher energy prices,

18、 neither of which have been an issue over the last three months. Median inflation is likely to remain within 2.0-2.5% range over the next 12-24 months, while weighted average inflation (including Turkey) looks set to decline to 3.5% in 2020 after coming in at 4.3% in 2019. Overall, similar to develo

19、ped markets, inflation is not a problem in EM, but growth is.Figure 3: EM headline and core inflation (% y/y)20%Figure 2: CPI inflation by regionSource: Haver, UBS15%10%5%0%Source: Haver, UBSFigure 4: EM headline and core inflation (sequential*)Figure 6: Headline CPI EM vs DM (MSCI-weighted)Figure 5

20、: EM CPI headline y/y and EM CPI sequential (ann)Source: Haver, UBS. * Represents a 6-month trimmed mean saar.SpreadE MD MJan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09 Jan-12 Jan-15 Jan-18Source: Haver, UBSFigure 7: PPI inflation in EM countriesSource: Haver, UBSSource: Haver, UBSSource: Haver, UBS *AII series

21、 are GBI-weighted.Industrial ProductionW/?af theumbers sa”: The continued terms of trade shift away from goods & commodities towards services is apparent in PMIs, GDP deflators and companies earnings. This is being reflected in real IP variables across the world as well, and EM is particularly hard

22、hit. As of February, EMs GDP-weighted manufacturing IP slowed down to 1.8% (y/y, 3mma), just 10th percentile of its post-crisis distribution. Y/y global IP has dropped three percentage points over the 12 months to February, with the drop for EM being 3.8 percentage points compared to 2.6 percentage

23、points for DM. Within DM, however, Eurozone IP has slipped by 5.5 percentage points (data as of January). Amongst the EM manufacturing* countries, big drops were seen in Korea, Taiwan and India. Chinese production did not drop sharply but remains in the midst of a long-term structural decline, with

24、y/y growth now close to the 5th percentile of its 20-year distribution. CEE economies (Hungary and Poland more than the Czech Republic) managed to buck the trend and post gains on already decent IP growth. What thev meac: Across countries, machinery and equipment or (where released separately) capit

25、al goods production was particularly hard hit. In Koreas case, the y/y declines in capital goods production are now similar to those seen during the global financial crisis. Seen in a positive perspective, this would suggest capital discipline from firms, making for higher free cash flow even when r

26、evenues are not strong. More realistically, this makes a statement on factory owners lack of confidence in the future, not just regarding demand, but also of the disruptive effect of technology. Trade in services, although just a third of the global trade in goods, is growing at a much faster pace t

27、han that in goods. The problems being experienced by Germany are country-specific (emission regulations, Rhine river levels) only to a limited degree; the truth is that manufacturing has been weak globally and in many parts of EM (especially in EM ex-China) it is now close to recession levels. 12mon

28、th outlook: The deterioration in EM production broadly mirrors the slowdown in global trade. Volatility in global import volume demand tends to be closely correlated with changes in IP growth (correlation of 0.82 over the last two decades) - as demand falls, EM producers reduce production/capacity/b

29、orrowing. The weakness in the trade cycle itself is something we have attributed largely to the fading commodity cycle (three quarters of the nominal trade deterioration comes from weakening deflators, which are largely a function of FX movements and commodity prices). We expect the trade cycle (and

30、 with it EM production) to bottom shortly on the recovery in metal and oil prices and relatively benign currency dynamics. Whether that is a hard or a soft bottom will likely depend on (i) the progress in US/China trade talks (needed to improve sentiment), (ii) what action the US decides to take und

31、er its Section 232 investigation into the auto industry (a potential source of further disruption to global trade/IP), (iii) and how quickly we see a turnaround in Turkey, Argentina and China (which have together accounted over half the EM slowdown), where we expect stimulus to start to gain tractio

32、n soon.Figure 1: EM, US and ELI industrial production ex construction-2504 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19Figure 2: Industrial production ex construction by regionSource: CPB, Haver, UBSSource: CPB, Haver, UBSFigure 3: Industrial Production (BRIC) (%y/y, 3mma)Figure 4: Industrial produc

33、tion: EM ex-China vs DM ex-US (% y/y, 3mma)Figure 5: EM IP growth: (3mma % y/y, latest vs 6m ago)Source: Haver, UBSTradeWhat the numbers sap: Global trade declined sharply between Nov-18 to Jan-19, falling from +5.3%y/y in October to 0%y/y January, with December recording largest y/y contraction sin

34、ce the GFC. EM accounted for 80% of the Q4 slowdown. Only six countries explain 88% of the net weakness in global trade over the above mentioned period, with China (36%), India (15%) and the US (11 %) accounting for 62% alone; Hong Kong, Ireland and Thailand are the other three. By region, Asia had

35、an outsized role in the global trade slowdown (accounting for 67% of the weakness). Nonetheless, the slowdown has been synchronized - at the time of writing exports in 71% of our coverage are contracting (y/y) vis-a-vis 0% 6m ago. Tariffs in the US and China appear to have had an impact, with bilate

36、ral trade in both countries slowing more rapidly than trade with the rest of the world. Moreover, the weakness in tech exacerbated an already fragile trade environment. As demand declined, prices fell much more sharply and accordingly, MSCI weighted EM nominal exports growth fell 14.8%y/y 6m ago to

37、-11.2% as of February, and is sequentially contracting at-24% (annualized rate) as of February. The global manufacturing survey, in particular new export orders, remains close to the 5y lows, while most export order sub print of PMIs in Asia/Europe stayed well below 50 in March. What thev mea/7: Giv

38、en the sharp contraction in the trade until January, a modest rebound into Q2 is not a big ask. Indeed, there are signs of stabilization in the income March data. Korea and Taiwan exports ticked-up by 2% and 7.7% m/m (sa); similarly exports in these two countries to China appear to be normalizing af

39、ter their worst contraction since the global financial crisis (in Dec). However, the UBS EM Cycle Index suggests that hopes of a growth rebound are running ahead of reality. We have argued that this China stimulus will be smaller, and, importantly, less EPS accretive for the rest of EM than the prio

40、r housing led stimulus from Beijing. Our model now points to -1 to 3% growth in EM earnings in USD terms through 2019, against a consensus of 7.0%. In short, if the growth rebound falls short of market expectations, EM currencies are likely to see another round of depreciation; this time focused on

41、growth sensitive currencies in Asia (CNY, KRW, MYR and INR) and low(er)-carry commodity-driven currencies (COP and ZAR). 12-month out/ook: Given the sharp rise in commodity prices YTD (20% on a basket basis), the negative drag on y/y exports from deflators would stop declining from April onwards, al

42、though it may remain negative through Q2 and Q3. This exports recession is happening in the context of narrower EM trade surpluses vis-a-vis 2015/16; balances have shrunk since as North Asia, India and ASEAN have seen their balances worsen amidst weakening semi-conductors and stable commodity prices

43、. This puts Asian earnings and currencies at risk of further depreciation into 2019. A resolution of the trade war between the US and China should be positive for sentiment in the near term, but its importance should not be exaggerated. The fact that US import volumes have remained robust while Chin

44、a and European imports have collapsed suggests to us that the trade slowdown has much more to do with the slowdown in China than with protectionism alone. The market is optimistic on a trade rebound based on Chinas improved TSF numbers, but the big surprise here came in short-term credit, which may

45、have smaller multipliers for global growth or trade patterns. At the same time, with Chinas credit impulse still negative and a smaller intention (and ability) of Chinese authorities to ease like in 2015/16 (or 11-12), we think EM exports growth may not be able to avoid a contraction through the yea

46、r.Source: Haver, CEIC, IMF, UBS estimatesSource: Haver, CEIC, IMF, UBS estimatesFigure 3: EM exports to DM and EM (%, y/y)Source: Haver, UBSFigure 4: EM exports to DM and EM (USD, bn)Source: Haver, UBSFigure 5: Trade balance as % of GDP*Figure 6: Export growth in nominal USD terms (3mma, % y/y)Sourc

47、e: Haver, UBSFigure 7: Import growth in nominal USD terms (3mma, %y/y)Source: Haver, UBSFigure 8: EM trade balance (USD bn 3mma)Nettradebalance(US$bilNSA3mma)003 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19Source: Haver, CEIC, UBSFigure 9: Trade balance by regionFigure 10: EM export volume growth

48、Source: Haver, UBSFigure 11: EM export volumes to DM import volumesSource: Haver, UBSBalance of paymentsWhat theumbers say: Given the countrys importance, we will focus on Chinas BoP trends this month. The 12-month portfolio inflows into China rose to USD 110bn in 2018, even if the pace dropped off sharply in Q4. Direct investment into China is of a similar amount and similar to portfolio flows, it has shown a

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