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1、一个投资者的成长读巴菲特的信（1）分类：投资阅读数：6860评论数：21推荐数：156 最近正在读巴菲特给股东的信，从1957开始。当时巴菲特还只是一个27岁的青年投资者，仅有两年正式的职业投资经验。1954-1956年，巴菲特曾经在格雷厄姆的投资公司工作。在那之前，巴菲特提出免费给格雷厄姆工作，但遭到了拒绝。他给股东的信忠实的记录了一个投资者成长的历程。 在1957-1961年的信中，有几段话吸引了我的注意： 基金的目标 “My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve along-term perform
2、ance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more orless parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.” “我管理合伙基金的一贯目标是取得优于道琼斯工业
3、平均指数的长期业绩。我坚信这一平均指数在长期将与领先的投资公司的业绩相类似。除非我们取得这样优异的业绩，否则我们的合伙基金没有理由存在下去。” （1960年给合伙人的信） 巴菲特最初的目标是长期业绩超越指数。这个目标至今没有改变。 如何获得超越市场的业绩 “However,I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance comp
4、ared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.”“但是，我曾经指出，即使我们可能取得优秀的业绩，这也不能证明我们能保持相对稳定的对道琼斯工业平均指数的优势。如果我
5、们获得优势，也是通过在平稳或下跌市场中超出平均的业绩，在上涨的市场中获得平均业绩，甚至有可能是逊于平均的业绩而达到。”（1960年给合伙人的信）巴菲特告诉自己的合伙人，自己超越市场不是持续稳定的超越，具有稳定的优势，而是在市场不好时超越，在市场狂热时表现一般，甚至逊色。换句话说，战胜市场不是多赢，而是少输。 衡量业绩的标准 “I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to somethin
6、g or other. I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level
7、. While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market.” “我坚信在行动前制定标准。因为事后再看，几乎任何事情，相对于某些其他事物，都能显得很好。 我
8、一直用道琼斯工业平均指数作为我们衡量的基准。我感觉三年是检验业绩的最短时间。最佳的检验至少要包括三年的时间，而道琼斯指数的终值与初始值相当接近。 虽然道琼斯指数并不是衡量业绩的完美指标（任何事物都不是），但这个指数有着广为人知，长期的连续性，以及相当准确的反映了市场投资者情况的优势。” （1961年给合伙人的信） 巴菲特选取指数是为了有一个公平的标准。而且，他认为要评价投资业绩最少要三年的时间，而且最好是在这段时间里市场持平。这样才能体现出投资的真实业绩，而不是短期运气，或者随着市场水涨船高。 保守的投资“Many people some years back thought they wer
9、e behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power. Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflati
10、on, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at
11、all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.” “True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.” “多年前很多人认为购买中期或者长期政府债券是最保守的做法。这种方式造成了大量的损失，而且肯定无法保持或者增加真实购买力。 由于意识到通胀，甚至过于担心通胀，很多人认为他们不顾市盈率、股息率等
12、指标购买大型蓝筹股是保守的做法。即使不考虑过去债券的例子，我也认为这种做法充满危险。在我看来，投机毫无保守可言，投机只不过是猜想贪婪而变化无常的公众能给盈利多高的倍数。” “真正的保守惟有通过知识和理性才有可能。” （1961年给合伙人的信） 50年前的忠告同样适合今天的人们。不顾租售比，不考虑价格买房的人并不是在通胀条件下进行保守的保值投资。预期房价不断上涨，其实就是预期贪婪而变化无常的公众将给房子支付更高的价格。一个投资者的成长读巴菲特的信（2）分类：投资阅读数：2741评论数：17推荐数：58 内在价值的回归与卖出时机 被低估股票的价格何时能回归内在价值？如何才能回归内在价值？在什么情况
13、下要卖出所投资的股票？巴菲特的回答如下： “Some times these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market a
14、ction, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package
15、of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase pri
16、ce and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.” “有时候很快就能实现。更多的时候，需要几年。在买入的时候很难知道有哪一个具体的原因让股票价格应该上涨。但是，正是由于这种缺乏魅力或者没有期待，才有可能创造出当前有利的市场机会。这些股票可以用非常便宜的价格获得。通过支付低价，我们能获得很多价值。这种大量的超额价值在每个交易中创造出一个相当大的安全边际。这种个股的安全边际加上投资的分散性，创造出了一个最有吸引力的组合，具有安全性和升值潜力。在过去几年，我们买入的时间点一直远好于卖出的时机。我们买入这些股票时并没有想获得最后一分钱的利润
17、。我们往往满足于在买入价和合理价位中间卖掉。我们认为的合理价位是对私人业主来说公平的价格。” (1961年给合伙人的信) 价值投资的安全性 价值投资的安全性不是来自于高超的卖点选择，而是来自于买入的低价。 By buying assets at a bargain price, we dont need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on maki
18、ng a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.” 通过低价买入资产，我们无需施展魔术才能得到非常好的百分比回报。我们投资哲学的基石是：“绝不指望好的卖出。而是让购买价格如此之诱人，即使一个平庸的卖出也能带来良好的回报。更好的卖出将会是锦上添花。” (1962年给合伙人的信) 股市下跌的情况 价值投资，安全边际，购买便宜的股票也不能避免下跌
19、。市场涨跌左右短期表现。 The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period
20、 of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market. 我们的股票倾向与市场表现一致。便宜并不意味着不会进一步下跌。在市场突然下跌的时候，这些股票完全可能与道琼斯指数一样，下降
21、同样的百分比。从长期看，我相信这些股票将超过道琼斯指数的表现。在1961年那样猛烈上涨的市场，这部分股票在我们的投资组合中表现是最佳的。当然，在一个下跌的市场，这部分也是最容易受到损失的。 (1961年给合伙人的信) 对投资人的承诺 结果无法保证，目标可以承诺，投入全部身家，与合伙人利益保持高度一致。 I can not promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that: a.Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity; b.
22、That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity ofcommitments;and c.My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnersh
23、ip. 我无法对合伙人承诺结果。我能够承诺而且确定承诺的是： a.我们投资的选择是基于价值，而不是流行。 b.我们会试图把资本永久损失（而不是短期账面损失）的风险降到绝对最低。而这是通过每个投资的大的安全边际和投资的分散性达到的。 c.我的妻子，孩子和我将把我们几乎全部的净值都投资在合伙基金中。 (1962年给合伙人的信) 对投资业绩的检验 市场下跌是对投资是否保守的客观考验。无需患得患失，少输胜过多赢。 I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises th
24、rough evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. 我认为通过评估在下跌市场中的业绩，我们可以得到最客观的关于投资方式有多保守的检验。最好是道琼斯指数下跌很多的时候。 (1962年给合伙人的信) Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether t
25、he absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. 我们的任务是积累年复一年超越道琼斯指数的业绩，而不是过度担心某一年的绝对结果是正还是负。我认为道指下跌25%而我们只下跌15%的一年要远好于道指和我们都上涨20%的一年
26、。 (1962年给合伙人的信) 一个投资者的成长读巴菲特的信（3）分类：投资阅读数：2273评论数：17推荐数：52 复利的威力 在投资中，巴菲特逐渐体会到了复利的威力。实际上，巴菲特最终成为首富就是靠长期高速的复利增长。关于复利的威力这一点，巴菲特在32岁的时候就非常清楚。 I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at
27、least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatters rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invest
28、ed at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (thats $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions il
29、lustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point. 我从不太可靠的消息来源得知，当年西班牙女王伊萨贝拉资助哥伦布远航的成本大约是3万美金。这被认为至少是一个相当成功的运用风险资本的例子。不考虑发现一个新半球的精神上的收获，即使算上强占的土地的权利，这个投资也比不上IBM的例子。简单估算，3万美金投入4%复利增长，到了1962年将会是2万
30、亿美元。同情曼哈顿岛的印第安人的人们也会找到类似的计算。这种奇异的几何级数增长揭示了两种事物的价值：长寿或者让你的金钱以相当好的速度复利增长。我对前一个事情没什么可讲的。 The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums ove
31、r a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over adecade or two. 下面的表格显示的是10万美元以5%，10%和15%的速度复利增长10，20和30年。让人吃惊的是，相对较小的速度差别，经过多年的积累，逐渐变为巨大的数字差异。这就是为什
32、么虽然我们的目标是更高的增长，但我们感觉，对于道指的几个点的优势是非常有价值的成就。假以时日，10年或20年，这意味着很多钱。 （1962年给合伙人的信） Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da V
33、incis Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000. 由于复利这个话题牵扯的范围很广，我就试着把这个讨论转向艺术世界，来引入一门小课程。1540年，法国的弗兰西斯一世花了4000克朗把达芬奇的蒙娜丽莎买下。你们可能没关注克朗的波动，这4000克朗相当于今天的2万美金。 If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he
34、(and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. Thats $1 quadrillionor over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase of pain
35、tings qualifying as an investment. 如果弗兰西斯还活着，他（和他的受托人）当时能够找到一个税后6%的投资，这笔财产现在会价值超过1000万亿。这是目前国债的3000倍，都是从这6%而来。我相信这将结束所有家庭中关于购买画作算不算投资的讨论。 （1963年给合伙人的信） 基金无法战胜市场 巴菲特发现即使是领先的大基金也无法战胜市场指数。他认为这源于这些投资机构的机制。 The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficu
36、lty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to million
37、s of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality,etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that ach
38、ieved by the general market. 这些结果继续显示，那些获得最高额收入和最受尊敬的投资建议也很难比得上一个无人管理的蓝筹股指数的业绩。这并不是指责这些机构或投资顾问，以及与这些投资公司有着大体上类似的方法、推理，和结果的信托部门。这些机构给成百万的投资者起到了重要的服务作用，以获得足够的分散投资，提供便利，让人感到踏实，避免质量低下的问题等。但是，他们的服务不包括（在大部分情况下也不声称包括）以高于市场的速度复利增长金钱。 Our partnerships fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at
39、a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly can not represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we dont achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will c
40、ease operation. 我们的合伙基金存在的根本原因就是要以高于平均水平的速度复利增长基金，而且与上面所说的投资公司相比，我们要有更少的长期资本损失的风险。我们当然无法声称会达到这一目标。我们能说的而且是确实说的是，除了在长时间的投机性牛市中，如果我们在相当长的一段时期内，达不到这一目标，我们将停止运营。 （1963年上半年给合伙人的信） The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements
41、working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4)literally centuries of aggregate investment experience? (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of exp
42、erience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one years experience -twenty times.”) 这些重复出现的表格让一些合伙人不禁问道：“这些聪明的投资经理究竟怎么了？他们有（1）聪明而精力充沛的手下（2）几乎无限的资源（3）最广泛的商业联系（4）加在一起几个世纪的投资经验。”（这最后一点让我想起一个家伙在求职时声称有20年的经验。后来前任雇主纠正说是“1年的经验，20次”。） This question is of enormous importance, and you would ex
43、pect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attacking this problem, and discussion of it is
44、virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate en
45、tities of the United States. 这个问题极其重要。你可能会认为投资经理和大投资者们对这个议题有着很多的研究。毕竟300亿美元的百分之一就是一年3亿美元。令人好奇的是，实际上在华尔街没有任何文章探讨这个问题。在证券分析师会议和讲座等活动中也几乎没有讨论。我的想法是，任何一个投资管理机构的首要任务都是分析自己的技术和结果，而不是判断整个美国的主要投资机构的管理能力和业绩。 In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index
46、in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating
47、 in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations;(3) an institutional framework whereby average is safe and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational;and finally and importantly, (5) inertia. 在大多数情况下，投资机构缺乏超越无人管理的指数的业绩，甚至连与指数一致的业绩都少见。这绝不是由于缺少智慧或者诚信。我认为这主要是以下几个原因的结果：（1）集体决策-我的可能有些偏颇的看法是：如果所有成员都真正参与决策，出色的投资管理几乎不可能