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1、外文翻译之一Determining the External Social Costs of Public Space CrowdingAuthor(s): Roberts, Russell DNationality: USSource: Political Economy Working Papers, no. 137Abstract：This paper uses simple models of private and public behavior to model the relationship between public and private spending on publ
2、ic goods. The standard discussion of the relationship between public and private spending assumes that public spending is exogenous. When public spending is exogenous, each dollar of public spending reduces private spending by a dollar, unless public spending is large enough to drive donors to a cor
3、ner solution. When government decision-making is endogenous, responding to the preferences of citizens, the observed relationship between public and private spending is never dollar-for-dollar, nor does government have to push citizens to a corner solution in order to have real effects. The relation
4、ship between public and private spending depends in predictable ways on the structure of preferences, the degree of heterogeneity among citizens, the flexibility of taxation, and the motivation for the increase in government spending.I. INTRODUCTIONThe effect of an increase in government spending on
5、 private spending is a central theoretical and empirical question in macroeconomics and public finance. What is the effect of public borrowing on private investment? What is the effect of government housing on private housing ?What is the effect of food stamp expenditure on private food consumption?
6、 What is the effect of social security spending on private saving? What is the effect of government welfare programs on private charity?The standard theoretical answer to these questions is that government will either reduce private spending or leave it unchangedthe case of neutrality. These analyse
7、s almost always assume the increase in government spending is random or exogenous.This paper studies the interaction between public and private spending on public goods when government is endogenous, responding to the preferences of citizens. The paper begins with what I call the simple model of the
8、 private provision of public goods followed by a brief literature review. The succeeding sections look at the relationship between public and private spending on the poor and the elderly, under different assumptions about how government responds to the preferences of citizens. The main results of th
9、e analysis are:1. Public spending is never neutral in equilibrium.2. When public spending is exogenous, an increase in public spending must drive some donors to a comer solution in order to be non-neutral. But when public spending is endogenous, corner solutions are no longer necessary for non-neutr
10、ality. The relationship between public and private spending can be positive in equilibrium.3. When public spending is endogenous, the relationship between public and private spending depends on the source of the change in public spending as well as the structure of preferences, the heterogeneity of
11、citizens, the flexibility of taxation and the distribution of benefits.4. Efficiency considerations push public spending towards a level large enough to crowd out all private spending. Whether public and private spending coexist depends on the structure of preferences, the heterogeneity of citizens,
12、 the flexibility of taxation and the distribution of benefits. 决定公共空间拥挤的外部社会成本作者：罗伯特.罗素.D国籍：美国来源：政治经济学文稿第137页一、引言政府开支的增加对私人投资的影响是关于宏观经济和公共财政的理论和实践问题。公共借贷对私人投资有什么影响吗？政府投资房地产对私人住房有什么影响？食物券支出对私人餐饮消费有什么影响吗？社会保障支出在私人储蓄有什么的影响吗？政府福利计划对私人慈善机构捐款有什么影响吗？标准的理论对这些问题的回答是，政府将要么减少私人开支的情况下或者离开并保持中立。这些分析几乎总是承担增加政府支出的
13、随机性或外源性。本文研究了公共支出和私人支出之间的交互作用当把政府支出作为内生变量时，满足公民的特殊偏好。本文构建了所谓的“简单的模型”，私人提供公共物品，紧随其后的是一个简短的文献回顾。接下来的部分之间的关系看起来是在公共和私人消费，穷人和老年人的不同假设条件下，政府如何回应有特殊偏好的公民。主要分析的结果是：1、公共支出从来就不是中性的平衡。2、当公共开支是外生的，增加公共支出必须促使一些捐助者采取能够提出解决的方法为了使其不保持中立的情况。但当公共开支是内生对的,转角的解决方案将不在是中性的，也没有存在的必要了。公共和私人之间的关系平衡的支出可以是积极的。3、当公共开支是内生的关系，公共
14、和私人消费取决于变化的公共支出的结构参数，对公民的税收的灵活性和税收利益分配。4、考虑到效率推动公共支出在水平方向足够大时排挤了所有私人消费。公共和私人支出是否共存的结构取决于偏好、公民的异质性、灵活性和税收利益分配。外文翻译之二Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-OutAuthor(s): Juan Camilo Cardenas, John Stranlund, Cleve WillisNationality: USASouth: University of Virginia Library Research lit
15、erature pp.1-5Abstract: Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Therefore, in a situation in which private and social interests diverge, it should be possible to bring about a welfare improvement by imposin
16、g rules that provide the necessary incentives for more socially efficient choices. However, experimental evidence shows that individuals do not typically behave as if they are purely self-interested; they tend to make choices that strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments p
17、erformed in several villages in Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This surprising result occurred because individuals confronted with an external regulation began to exhibit less othe
18、r-regarding behavior and, instead, made choices that were more consistent with pure self interests; that is, the regulation itself appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior. The implication is that a policy design aimed simply at establishing incentives that move purely self-interested individu
19、als toward more efficient choices will not necessarily improve social efficiency if the institution itself lessens civic-mindedness and encourages more selfish behavior. Keywords: Institutional Crowding-Out, External Regulation, Local Environmental Quality, Experiments, South America, Colombia1. Int
20、roduction Economic institutions are designed to alter behavior, to stimulate actions intended to produce outcomes that are socially superior to those expected to flow from self-regarding individual choices. However, a small empirical literature suggests that institutions designed to induce Pareto-su
21、perior outcomes may affect individual choices in surprised sing and contrary ways. In this paper we present results from a series of experiments designed to study the effects of external regulatory control of local environmental quality. We find that subjects made themselves worse-off when they face
22、d a modestly enforced government-imposed regulation that standard theory would predict to be welfare-improving. The reason for this mystifying result appears to be that when subjects were confronted with a regulatory constraint on their behavior, they tended, on average, toward purely self-intereste
23、d behavior (that is, toward pure Nash strategies), while in the absence of regulatory control their choices were significantly more group-orientedWe are by no means the first to suggest that institutions designed and expected to do good might actually engender contrary behavior. A number of authors
24、have suggested that paying a monetary reward to motivate socially desirable behavior may actually do the opposite because it may crowd out an individuals sense of public-spiritedness. Tim (1971) suggested that individuals donate blood more willingly when they do so purely voluntarily than when they
25、are offered money for their donations. In the environmental arena, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) found that Swiss residents were willing to accept nuclear waste disposal in their community purely out of a sense of public spiritedness about twice as frequently as when they were offered compensation
26、for accepting the negative externality. Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) found a similar phenomenon in Nevada; raising tax rebates failed to engender support for sitting a nuclear waste facility at Yucca Mountain near Las Vegas.Evidence that regulatory institutions may crowd out public motivations i
27、n favor of greater self-interest is not limited to the effects of monetary incentives. Ostman (1998) suggests that external control of common pool resources may have a negative effect by shifting responsibility to the regulatory agency and essentially absolving individuals from other-regarding moral
28、 obligations. Frolich and Oppenheimer (1998) designed a series of experiments to operationalize John Rawls (1971) “veil of ignorance” in the context of private contributions to a pure public good. In addition to a standard contribution game, subjects played a game in which their payoffs resulted fro
29、m a random reassignment of individual payoffs. This veil over the link between individual choices and payoffs forced subjects to consider the consequences of their choices on the payoffs of the rest of their group. Indeed, the game was designed so that randomizing the assignment of payoffs generated
30、 a dominant strategy to contribute the efficient amount to the public good. As predicted, subjects did contribute significantly more to the public good than under the standard treatment. However, and this seems to us to be their most important finding, they also found strong evidence that the instit
31、ution of random payoffs shifted individual motivations toward greater self-interest despite the fact that the institution was designed to force a stronger group-orientation. Put simply, the institution served its intended purpose, but it seemed to crowd out other-regarding preferences.We are interes
32、ted in examining the effects of external institutions (rules and regulations imposed from outside a community) on behavior in an experimental setting, in particular the effects of external control of environmental quality in rural settings of the developing world. Our design has a number of features
33、, which combine to make it rather unique. (The details of our experimental design are provided in section 2). First, rather than conducting experiments in a laboratory setting, our experiments are conducted in the field; in three rural villages of Colombia, South America. Second, we consciously desi
34、gned our experiments to approximate an environmental quality problem that rural villagers in developing countries are likely to face. Specifically, subjects were asked to decide how much time they would spend collecting firewood from a surrounding forest, while realizing that this activity has an ad
35、verse effect on local water quality because of soil erosion. Third, we confront a subset of subjects with a government-imposed quota on the amount of time that can be spent collecting firewood. The quota is only modestly enforced, which is typical of command-and-control environmental policies that r
36、ural villagers in the developing world actually face .Despite the weak enforcement of the quota, standard economic theory predicts that the external control will produce more efficient choices. We consider two treatments to examine whether external control of local environmental quality may crowd ou
37、t group-oriented behavior. Each group of subjects plays a number of initial rounds of the game without regulation and without being able to communicate with each other .A subset of groups go on to play additional rounds in which they are confronted with the government-imposed regulation. The other g
38、roups also play additional rounds, but instead of facing an external regulation, individuals are allowed to communicate with others in their group between rounds. Allowing some groups to communicate was motivated by the fact that local cooperative efforts are frequently the alternative to external r
39、egulation in developing countries. And by the fact that relatively more is known about the role of face-to-face communication in enhancing levels of cooperation in experiments of this general type. Much of the literature on this subject is summarized by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994), and Ledyard
40、 (1995). In brief, the findings show that communication enhances the likelihood of individuals shifting from relatively self-interested decisions to more group-oriented ones. In section 3 we report our results. Consistent with findings of the experimental literature on contributions to public goods
41、and exploitation of common properties Ledyard (1995), Ostrom (1997, p. 7), we find that when subjects do not face external restrictions and cannot communicate with each other, their decisions tend to be neither pure Nash strategies nor efficient choices, but somewhere between these extremes. Absent
42、regulation, the simple ability to communicate allows individuals to make more efficient choices. However, our results about the effects of external regulation are new-surprisingly, regulatory control caused subjects to tend, on average, to make choices that were closer to their pure Nash strategies.
43、 Consequently, average individual payoffs were lower than in the absence of regulation, and much lower than the payoffs of those subjects who were simply allowed to communicate with each other, in spite of the fact that the regulatory institution was designed to induce more efficient choices. Instit
44、utional crowding-out suggests that well-intentioned but modestly enforced government controls of local environmental quality and natural resource use may perform rather poorly, especially as compared to informal local management. In section 4 we discuss this and other implications of the crowding-ou
45、t effect, as well as suggest ways in which this line of research should be extended.当地环境的控制与公共机构的挤出效应作者：朱.卡梅隆，克罗诺斯, 约翰.斯路德，克利.威尔国籍：美国出处：维吉尼亚大学图书馆研究文献第1-5页摘要:规则的设定是为了提高社会福利，但通常个人是纯粹的利己主义作为前提。因此,在这样的情况即私人和社会利益的无法达成一致,它应该有可能带来一个福利政策的改进制,提供必要的诱因,社会才能更加有效的选择。然而,实验证据表明个人通常都不会表现得好像他们是纯粹的利己主义,他们更倾向于做出选择,在自我
46、和团体之间找到利益平衡点。我们在哥伦比亚的几个村庄试验,发现有监督管理的解决方案。这个令人惊讶的结果是因为个体在面临外部性时,所做的选择尽可能的符合自身的最大化利益；那就是,该制度本身似乎排挤自身的选择行为。其中含义就是，一个政策的设计是建立在激励个人朝更有效率的利己行为的方向出发，减少外部性，尽量的降低外部性，提高社会效率。关键词:制度 挤出效应 外部监管 当地的环境质量 实验 南美 哥伦比亚1、引言经济制度的设立是为了改变个人行为,以刺激计划产生的效率的结果,是社会优于个人预期的选择。然而,实证文献表明,机构的成立诱使帕累托最优的结果。影响个人的选择并出现相反的选择结果。本文中我们提出结果
47、从一系列的实验设计,研究了外部监管的影响对当地的环境的挤出效应。我们发现,他们的情况会很糟糕当他们面临了一个宽松的政府规定，但理论标准却表明其福利会上升。这样做的原因似乎是不可思议的结果,当实验的对象面临一个监管约束对他们的行为的情况时,他们往往更倾向于纯粹的平均主义,利己主义行为(也就是说,向纯纳什策略),而在缺乏监管他们的选择会更加的明显。我们并非首次表明制度的设计和行为的预期在实际上可能会产生相反的行为。许多学者建议支付高额报酬激励社会所期望的行为，但实际上相反,因为它有可能排挤了个人的在某种意义上的公德心。提姆(1971)认为个人在捐血时更心甘情愿当他们作为志愿者时，而不是纯粹的自愿出
48、钱为他们的捐赠。在环境方面,弗雷和奥博(1997)发现瑞士居民愿意在他们的社区接受核废物处理,只是出于一种道德上的良心,他们通常会接受这个提议赔偿的负外部性。坤仁素和埃斯特拉达(1990)在内华达州发现有类似的现象; 在拉斯维加斯山脉核废物设施附近提高出口退税未必能得到民众的支持。证据显示,监管机构可能会出现公众支持排挤了更大的利益，但其动机却不受限于货币报酬激励的效果。奥斯曼(1998)表明,外部控制的公共资源可能会有产生负面的影响,通过转变管理机构的责任,而且并非单单从个人道德上的义务说明。弗拉罗奇和奥本海默(1998)设计了一系列的实验来实现约翰罗尔斯正义(1971)“无知之幕”语境中的
49、所谓私人贡献比公共投资要好的多。除了这样一个结果外,实验对象在赌一场比赛中,他们利益的起因出自于一个随机个人偿付的调动。这两方面之间的联系并不是个人的选择和强迫主体偿付的选择考虑的后果。事实上,设计这款游戏是在处理转让中夹杂生成的一个优势战略，它十分有效率的满足了公众的利益。正如所预测的,实验对象所做的贡献也会跟着其大幅增加的公众利益而增加。然而,这似乎对我们而言是最重要的发现,但同时也发现证据表明,制度的个人动机转移了随机利润,走向更大的利益,即使事实是这个机构是一个强大的有方向的团体。简言之,政府完成了它的目的,但是这似乎排挤了其他人的偏好。我们对在考察外部机构的影响(法规强加诶一个团体)以及实验设置对行为的影响有兴趣,特别是发展中国家中农村环境质量的外部控制。我们的设计有一定数量的特点,这二者相结合,使它相