毕业论文外文翻译-对群众的控制:多数主义法院和反映舆论的原则.doc

上传人:豆**** 文档编号:29914481 上传时间:2022-08-02 格式:DOC 页数:18 大小:81KB
返回 下载 相关 举报
毕业论文外文翻译-对群众的控制:多数主义法院和反映舆论的原则.doc_第1页
第1页 / 共18页
毕业论文外文翻译-对群众的控制:多数主义法院和反映舆论的原则.doc_第2页
第2页 / 共18页
点击查看更多>>
资源描述

《毕业论文外文翻译-对群众的控制:多数主义法院和反映舆论的原则.doc》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《毕业论文外文翻译-对群众的控制:多数主义法院和反映舆论的原则.doc(18页珍藏版)》请在taowenge.com淘文阁网|工程机械CAD图纸|机械工程制图|CAD装配图下载|SolidWorks_CaTia_CAD_UG_PROE_设计图分享下载上搜索。

1、外文文献翻译稿和原稿外文文献翻译稿对群众的控制:多数主义法院和反映舆论的原则作者:本杰明J罗斯切 Benjamin J. Roesch一、序言联邦国家机关的司法部门有史以来就与社会舆论有着令人不安的紧张关系。如同行政和立法部门,司法部门也有赖于从大众的支持中获得合法地位。但不同于政治部门的是司法部门并非通过被选举的方式来对支持他们的人负责。相反,它的固有职责之一就是阻止那些违宪的群众性的政治表达。然而,根据一些法学学者的说法,有人指出普通法系的上诉法院法官的观点有必要建立在社会对法外价值的共识上。换句话说,那些常常反对多数主义的法官也必须做出社会大众在长期内能接受的判决以维持其合法地位。凯姆林

2、斯基教授 Professor Chemerinsky提出假说:“司法的合理性取决于其判决的社会接受度和得出这个判决的程序的合法性。”传统上认为,学者和法官在舆论对联邦司法部门的影响上的分析主要走两个路径一些评论家和法学家认为司法独立要求舆论对司法判决的作出不应当产生任何影响,另一群学者则提倡舆论在例外情形下可以对司法判决的作出产生间接的影响。这些学者认为法官应该在某些情况下寻求公众舆论作为“客观”的指引,比如在作出法律解释时,在界定什么是第八修正案禁止的“残酷的非正常的待遇”时。根据最近一些实证研究的发现表明,上述观点过于限制舆论对司法判决产生的影响。这项研究表明“司法中立”模式可能与现实相悖

3、,社会舆论的影响不可避免。本文将考察这一认为法官或多或少都会受到舆论影响的论据。因为司法部门也是联邦机关的一个分支,所以也要付诸于透明的决策制定过程,本文将分析社会舆论在各种情形下如何影响司法判决的制定过程。舆论对司法的这一明显影响机制将会显著影响我们如何设想舆论和司法判决之间的关系以及这种影响是否构成对司法独立的威胁。有人可能认为民主制度会引导舆论通过司法和政治部门的互动来发挥它的影响,并且正是关注这种互动的本文首次开始调研舆论对司法判决影响的机制。但政治控制,例如国会对司法管辖权和财政的控制就是一把钝器。通过上述方式对法官的个人决策进行报复所产生的政治成本促使他们以“认定无效”作为一种手段

4、,逐案地影响司法的基础。总统拒绝执行司法机关的判决是一个更准确说明对司法机关制约的例子,虽然总统很少这么做。官方正式的政治制约最终未能解释舆论对个案的影响。本文于是转而更多地讨论那些以非正式的方式对司法判决产生的影响。这些产生影响的制约力量包括尊重先例原则 stare decisis、上诉的程序以及对法学家的个人威望和对司法整体的关注。舆论可能会加强上述几方面的约束力,但似乎在这些制约因素允许法学家自由裁量的时候其影响力是最为强大的。舆论于是在类似于法官个人政治理念的领域里发挥作用,而在这一领域中,根据司法决策的“态度”模式,法官可以在先例约束原则的范围内扩大自由裁量的空间。由于对正式和非正式

5、约束力量以及司法决策中的“态度”模式的考量会得出不能令人满意的答案,本文于是从外部影响转而讨论司法决策的内部框架并审查这个框架本身。为了更进一步理解舆论的显著作用,本文进而设想有原则地融入社会舆论后的各种分析会是什么样子。也就是说,本文首先以一个特别的判例为开头该案中法官视民意调查为司法决策的合法部分推演出当社会舆论作为一种切实的而不是神秘莫测的影响力量来影响司法判决的作出时,美国的判例法体系将会怎样。这种想法的实验最终得出另一种对司法结果和舆论之间关系的解释。最高法院在阿特金斯诉弗吉尼亚州 Atkins v. Virginia的案件中引用民意调查的事例表明如果舆论在法律推理中有合法地位的话,

6、民意测验将会是一项非常有用的证据。将民意调查作为证据使用的这一案例扩大了通过司法程序获知民意这一问题的研究领域,同时也代表着我们向着将民意有原则地融入司法决策的潜在可能迈出了极有意义的一步。虽然不幸的是在该案中民意测验不能在审判中受到专家证人的审查和评论,但是民意测验依然是一项潜在的反映社会舆论的重要而有力的证据。同时,针对该案中法院使用民意测验作为证据的评论认为,社会舆论足以精确地测量以支持法官将它作为证据采用。传统的“服从频谱” spectrum of deference表明,对在各种司法环境中产生影响的社会舆论的适当性进行合理评价是完全可能的。这个频谱基于对相对的体制优势进行现实的评估,

7、并允许国会根据不同决策环境下的各种职能表现出不同的服从度。虽然当问题集中在社会舆论而不是对政府机构的服从度的情况下时,这个频谱考虑的因素与之并不完全相同,但是对政府和司法机关基本价值的审查将启发司法机关何时以及如何反映舆论。比方说,艾斯克瑞吉教授就认为社会价值观应该而且确实影响着法律解释。阿特金斯提出,舆论的影响力虽然小于艾斯克瑞吉所说的社会价值,但是仍可能影响法律解释,取决于法官个人偏好的程度以及法定意义上的其他传统因素的力量。美国联邦的普通法是另一个对民意进行考量的潜在背景。虽然普通法并非经常直接反映社会的偏好,但是民主原则要求对普通法规则的制定必须考虑民意。普通法体系的背景表明了在若干情

8、况下不应当考虑舆论,包括影响公共税收负担的情况,公共舆论对少数派或者不受宪法权利保护的个体不利的情况。公共舆论理论上同样对宪法裁决产生影响。可能有点讽刺的是,决定是否立法在州际贸易条款下属于国会的权限在州际贸易条款中法院对国会给予实质上的服从被证明是不恰当地采纳民意的做法。原因是双重的,首先,没有理由相信公众相比于司法机关在确定一项活动是否实质上影响州际贸易上更具有固有的优势。其次,法院的贸易条款仅仅为宪法上适当的决策者作为引进民意的裁定依据,这一点似乎与立法行为要求的民意普遍性毫无关系。然而,社会舆论惊人地适用于其他的宪法原则。即使是在小选区里对全国流行的观点进行的辩驳也可以证明对法院第生死

9、修正案中对社会舆论的考虑是正当合理的。在劳伦斯诉德州案中的学理发展表明舆论可能在实质正义的领域内成为一个合法的和明确的考虑因素。在反对德克萨斯州禁止同性性行为的过程中,仅仅在支持德州阻止类似行为十七年之后,劳伦斯法院就得出了与第八修正案具有惊人相似性的分析。劳伦斯法院于是指出了在实质正义程序的判例中舆论的学理地位。因为类似的发展并未出现在法院的平等保护判例中,所以本文保留了关于平等保护学说契合民意的判断。对舆论可能如何契合各种司法原则的审查研究指出了舆论在哪里以及怎样影响着司法的判决结果。在大多数情况下,舆论的司法判决结果的相关性是体现在法官按照常规作出决定的过程而不是外部因素直接影响法官作出

10、决定的过程。因此,这种影响不需要被视为对司法独立的威胁。一刀切地说,目前的原则是为旨在反映民意。本文将如此展开:第部分首先提出一些不能让民意干预司法的特定情况并考察具有竞争性的司法传统在有关于民意影响宪法裁决时发挥的作用。第部分调查舆论影响司法判决的证据并得出舆论具有边际效应的结论。接着,本文笔者尝试着解释了这种效应如何发挥作用并发现了政治性的以及非正式的内部司法控制的不足导致舆论对司法产生的影响。最终,本文考察了对民意测验的在阿特金斯案中的采用来定义“残酷而非正常的惩罚”。第部分考察了司法判决这个工具本身来解释社会舆论对司法判决的明显影响。在这部分中,本文首先概述了什么是传统的“服从频谱”,

11、并将其作为一个例子来分析在形形色色的情形下是否可以在理论上把舆论列为作出司法判决的考量之一。本文接着分析在形形色色的情形下舆论是否可以作为合法的考虑因素,包括在立法解释、普通法的立法过程以及若干宪法性质的情况下。本文是通过考察各种反映民意的学说倾向和近期判例对社会舆论镜像反映 mirroring ability上述学说的能力的影响而得出最后结论的。二、讨论在司法判决作出过程中的舆论(一)司法独立绝对禁止舆论干扰的观点有一种广为人知的观点认为舆论绝对不可以对司法判决的作出产生任何干扰。比如,无论是否存在可能的原因,对被告的定罪过程始终不能受到那些认为其有罪的舆论的影响。同样也不应该让舆论的敌意来

12、影响被告的量刑。最近的一个案例正说明了这一点。1995年,纽约南区联邦地方法院法官贝尔 Judge Baer审理了一起有名的对毒品案件的起诉。在经过庭审听证之后,法官贝尔认为辩方的论证具有可信度而控方的指控没有可信度,他排除认定大量毒品存在和辩方的认罪,判决被告的第四、五项修正案权利被侵犯。针对这一判决,民间和官方的反应都非常迅速。纽约时代周刊的几篇评论都谴责这一判决。国会的议员公开表示要弹劾法官,甚至有些议员要求克林顿总统加入他们的声讨。当此之时,贝尔法官也批准了对该案的重审,克林顿总统则拒绝评论该案以待该案的重审。根据纽约时代,一群巡回法院的法官和若干评论家传递给贝尔法官的信息是很明确的:

13、保全你自己或者冒着丢掉工作的风险去坚持己见,尽管仅因为法官对某案件的判决就弹劾其的做法不符合惯例。在案件重审后,贝尔法官推翻了他原来的判决并附上证据,引用了最新产生的警方报告作为新证据,这份报告显示法官贝尔曾被威胁要求改变判决结果。但是评论家认为,这一新增的证据并不足以支持其推翻原判决,并且这样一来由于导致了官方证词的出尔反尔而可能损害该公诉案件判决的可信度。贝尔法官陷入两难境地。舆论中有反对贝尔法官排除该证据的声音,同样也有反对他改变态度去采纳该证据的声音,无论哪一种做法都会损害公众对司法公平的信任。已故首席大法官伦奎斯特 Chief Justice Rehnquist曾这样描写舆论对司法决

14、策过程的影响没有一个法官能自觉地在众多观点的包围中表达自己。“我给你提供最公正的判决并且我觉得宪法就是这样规定和表达的,但是由于压倒性的公众意见反对我对宪法的解读,于是我将改变我的观点。”从表面上看,这句话似乎在反对将社会舆论作为宪法裁决的考虑因素之一,而更多地与论奎斯特的判决保持一致。在这些情形下,屈服于社会舆论的反对声音将意味着司法独立的终结。但是在某些特殊情形下,对社会舆论的谨慎采纳将完全不必然意味着对司法独立的侵蚀。评论家和法学家早就认可了舆论的影响力而没有总结出这是由于司法机关自己放弃了独立审判的职责而引起的结果。(二)关于如何在司法过程中合理考虑民意的观点评论家和法学家很早就认识到

15、舆论对司法的影响也可以存在于其对司法独立不构成威胁的情况下。首席大法官伦奎斯特总结自己作法律秘书 Law clerk时的经验对杰克逊法官说:“在钢铁劫持案 Steel Seizure Case中,舆论对法庭的立场有着显著的影响力。”1952年,杜鲁门总统因担心钢产量的下降会影响到当时对朝鲜的战争,下令联邦机关在一场罢工中控制和经营一些钢铁生产机构。钢铁企业于是提起诉讼并从法院获得了禁令,责令总统不得夺取钢铁厂。联邦政府从法院收到了中止令并直接上诉至最高法院,最高法院同意复审并在九天后听取了他们的申辩。法院驳回了政府认为他们的扣押是基于宪法第二条赋予总统的一项权力这一说法。政府提出“固有权利”这

16、一论点的时机并不好,因为当时对朝鲜战争和杜鲁门总统的支持正处于其最低点。首席大法官伦奎斯特认为,舆论的浪潮会通过司法系统加速并加剧案件的快速变化,影响着法庭的决策。然而,承认舆论的影响力和把它融汇入判案原则是两回事。首席大法官伦奎斯特多次反对把舆论列入考虑的做法,认为舆论与宪法不具有相关性。斯卡利亚法官 Justice Scalia同意伦奎斯特的理论,如此评论道:“多令人苦恼啊,这么多我们的市民们都认为我们法官应该把他们的意见列入考虑,好像我们从事的不是确定某项客观的法律规则而是决定某项社会共识。”首席大法官伦奎斯特也从一种长期以来的理念中寻求到了对自己立场的支持,这种理念就是法官不会也不应该

17、在作出判决的考虑公众的意见。不仅如此,许多法学界也对司法工作和他们自己的工作抱有同样的看法。法官道格拉斯把法官描述成能在政治变革之风中挺立那般强大。首席大法官贝格 Chief Justice Burger如此写道:“应当是立法机关而不是法院有义务回应民意以及人民的道德价值观。”法官鲍威尔 Justice Powell也同意并表示:“对民意进行评估本质上是一项立法性质的只能而不是司法性质的。”法官法兰克福 Justice Frankfurter也曾写过法院与代表机构不同,因为他们“不是要被设计成一个对民主社会良好的反映系统”。支持将民意作为判决作出的考虑因素的意见在美国上诉法院法官中是混杂不清的

18、。在1981年对35名法官的调查中,只有1名法官认为民意是一项非常重要的考虑因素,而8名法官认为它比较重要,且有22名法官认为其不重要。第十巡回法院的法官塔克 Judge Tacha声称在立项的司法程序中舆论应当没有任何的影响力。法官司道丽 Justice Story写道:“听取民意不是法官的工作。”首席大法官泰尼 Chief Justice Taney在德莱德斯科特诉桑福德案 Dred Scot v. Sanford中总结舆论的作用说,当下流行的舆论与宪法解释毫无关系。但是,严格否定舆论的作用在某些情况下是有问题的。首先,这样做不符合实际。下文讨论的证据就表明舆论的确影响司法决策,虽然只是在

19、无意识的层面中。其次,在某些情况下,舆论可以作为政策制定法庭的一项合法的考量因素。在某些合乎宪法的情况下也存在着一种尊重民意的传统。在计划生育联盟宾夕法尼亚东南分部诉罗伯特凯西州长案 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey中,法官苏特 Justice Souter援引意见分歧的民意作为一个理由来支持罗伊诉韦德案 Roe v. Wade中的中央控股。根据大法官苏特的说法,法院应该尽量避免推翻它的那些具有分水岭意义的案件判决,直到大量有关于此的民意变得不利于此判决。外文文献原稿Crowd Control: The Major

20、itarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in DoctrineI. IntroductionThe judicial branch of the federal government has historically had an uneasy relationship with public opinion. Like the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary depends on public support for its legitimacy. But unl

21、ike the political branches, the judiciary is not electorally accountable to those whose support it requires. To the contrary, one of its defining attributes is the duty to thwart political expressions of popular will that run afoul of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the argume

22、nts of appellate judges in the Common Law world necessarily rest, according to some legal scholars, on community consensus about extralegal values. n1 In other words, the often counter-majoritarian judiciary must produce results acceptable to the general public over the long term in order to maintai

23、n its legitimacy. Professor Chemerinsky has posited that the judiciarys legitimacy actually hinges on both the general acceptability of the results it produces and the relative consistency of the methods by which those results are reached. Traditionally, scholarly and judicial commentary on the infl

24、uence of public opinion on the federal judiciary has followed two courses. Some commentators and jurists argue that judicial independence requires that public opinion have no influence on judicial decision-making. Another group of scholars advocates an indirectly influential role for public opinion

25、in limited contexts. These scholars believe judges should refer to objective measures of public opinion as guidelines when deciding questions of statutory interpretation and delineating the Eighth Amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.Recent developments in empirical research sugges

26、t that these positions take too limited a view of public opinion as an influence on judicial decision- making. The research suggests that the judicial isolation model conflicts with reality-the influence of public opinion may be inevitable. This Article will examine this evidence, which suggests tha

27、t many judges are influenced-at least marginally - by public opinion. Because the judiciary is the one branch of the federal government committed to a transparent decision-making process, this Article sets out to determine how public opinion affects the judicial decision-making process in various co

28、ntexts. The mechanics of this apparent influence have significant consequences for how we conceive of the relationship between public opinion and judicial outcome and whether this apparent influence is in fact a threat to judicial independence. One might expect public opinion to exert its influence

29、through the judiciarys interaction with the political branches into which democracy channels it, and it is to these interactions that this Article turns first in its inquiry into the mechanics of public opinions apparent influence on judicial outcomes. But political controls, such as Congressional c

30、ontrol over jurisdiction and budget, are blunt instruments. The political costs of threatening reprisal through these means for individual decisions make their use ineffective as a means to influence the judiciary on a case-by-case basis.Presidential refusal to execute the judiciarys rulings is a mo

31、re precise-but rarely invoked-constraint. Formal political constraints ultimately fail to explain public opinions influence on individual cases.The Article next turns to more informal influences on judicial decisions. These constraints include the role of stare decisis and the appellate process, as

32、well as concerns about the jurists individual reputation and that of the judiciary as a whole. Public opinion may reinforce several of these constraints, but seems to have most of its influence where these constraints leave jurists with discretion. Public opinion thus appears to operate in much the

33、same sphere as the judges own political ideology, which, according to the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, the judge may promote within the scope of the discretion afforded by precedent.Because consideration of both formal and informal constraints and attitudinal models of decision-mak

34、ing yields unsatisfying answers, the Article turns from influences external to the judicial decision-making framework and examines the framework itself. In an attempt to understand the apparent influence of public opinion, this Article imagines what a principled incorporation of public opinion into

35、the various analyses might look like. That is, the Article speculates what American jurisprudence would look like if public opinion were an explicit, rather than mysterious, influence on judicial outcomes, beginning with an examination of one case where the Court did consider public opinion polls as

36、 part of its legal analysis. This thought experiment ultimately suggests another explanation for the correlation of public opinion and judicial output.The Supreme Courts citation of opinion polls in Atkins v. Virginia n4 suggests that polls may be useful evidence of public opinion if public opinion

37、had a legitimate place in legal analysis. The use of opinion polls as evidence of public opinion would expand the universe of issues about which there may be judicially knowable public opinion, and represent a significant step towards the potential principled incorporation of public opinion into jud

38、icial decision-making. Although the courts use of opinion polls was unfortunate because the polls were not subject to examination and criticism by expert witnesses in the trial court, polls are potentially important and powerful evidence of public opinion. The criticisms leveled at the courts use of

39、 opinion polls in Atkins, moreover, suggests that public opinion can be measured accurately enough to be of use to judges. The traditional spectrum of deference n5 suggests it is possible to make a reasoned evaluation of the appropriateness of public opinion as an influence in various judicial conte

40、xts. The spectrum is based on a realistic evaluation of the relative institutional advantages of the judiciary and Congress, and affords Congress varying degrees of deference depending on the various functions implicated by the decision-making context. Although the considerations are not identical w

41、hen the question is the consideration of public opinion rather than deference to the will of a political branch, an examination of the values underlying our government and the judiciarys institutional abilities will illuminate when and how the judiciary may reflect public opinion. For example, Profe

42、ssor Eskridge has argued that public values ought to and do influence the process of statutory interpretation. n6 Atkins suggests that public opinion, which may amount to something less than Eskridges public values, might influence statutory interpretation depending on the strength of the preference

43、 and the strength of other traditional indicators of statutory meaning.Federal common law is another potential context for the consideration of public opinion. Although the common law does not always directly reflect public preferences, democratic principles suggest that public opinion could be rele

44、vant to determining common law rules. The common law context illuminates several instances where public opinion should not be considered-in most cases where the rule may affect the publics tax burden, or where public opinion is adverse to a minority or individual who does not enjoy constitutional pr

45、otection related to the rule of law to be decided.Public opinion could also theoretically play a role in constitutional adjudication. Perhaps ironically, determining whether legislation is within Congresss power under the Interstate Commerce Clause - in which the Court grants Congress substantial de

46、ference - proves to be an inappropriate doctrine for incorporating public opinion. The reason is twofold. First, there is no reason to believe that the public has any inherent advantage over the judiciary in determining whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, the Court

47、s Commerce Clause jurisprudence serves merely to channel public opinion to the constitutionally appropriate decision-maker-a determination for which the popularity of the legislation in question seems irrelevant. Nevertheless, public opinion fits surprisingly well into other constitutional doctrines

48、.The vindication of national opinion over a majority in a smaller constituency may justify consideration of public opinion in the Courts Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Doctrinal developments in Lawrence v. Texas suggest that public opinion could become a legitimate and explicit consideration in

49、 the substantive due process arena. In the course of striking down Texass law against homosexual sodomy only seventeen years after upholding the states ability to prohibit such conduct in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Lawrence Court engaged in analysis that bore striking similarities to its Eighth Amendment analysis in Atkins. The Lawrence Court thus pointed to a doctrinal place for public opinion

展开阅读全文
相关资源
相关搜索

当前位置:首页 > 教育专区 > 小学资料

本站为文档C TO C交易模式,本站只提供存储空间、用户上传的文档直接被用户下载,本站只是中间服务平台,本站所有文档下载所得的收益归上传人(含作者)所有。本站仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对上载内容本身不做任何修改或编辑。若文档所含内容侵犯了您的版权或隐私,请立即通知淘文阁网,我们立即给予删除!客服QQ:136780468 微信:18945177775 电话:18904686070

工信部备案号:黑ICP备15003705号© 2020-2023 www.taowenge.com 淘文阁