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1、Copyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.Chapter 8An Economic Analysis of Financial StructureCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-2我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物Sources of External Finance in U.SCopyright 2010 Pearson Ad
2、dison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-3我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物FIGURE 1 Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A Comparison of the United States with Germany, Japan, and CanadaSource: Andreas Hackethal and Reinhard H. Schmidt, “Financing Patt
3、erns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results,” Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Working Paper No. 125, January 2004. The data are from 19702000 and are gross flows as percentage of the total, not including trade and other credit data, which are not available.Copyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesl
4、ey. All rights reserved.8-4我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物8.1 Eight Basic FactsStocks are not the most important sources of external financing for businessesIssuing marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary way in which businesses finance their ope
5、rationsIndirect finance is many times more important than direct financeFinancial intermediaries, particularly banks, are the most important source of external funds used to finance businesses. Copyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-5我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感
6、到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物Eight Basic Facts (contd)The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economyOnly large, well-established corporations have easy access to securities markets to finance their activitiesCollateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts for both hou
7、seholds and businesses. Debt contracts are extremely complicated legal documents that place substantial restrictive covenants on borrowersCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-6我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物8.2 Transaction Costs and Financ
8、ial StructureTransaction costs hinder flow of funds to people with productive investment opportunitiesFinancial intermediaries make profits by reducing transaction costs1. Take advantage of economies of scaleExample: Mutual Funds2. Develop expertise to lower transaction costsExplains Fact 3Copyright
9、 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-7我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物8.3 Asymmetric InformationAdverse Selection:1. Before transaction occurs2. Potential borrowers most likely to produce adverse outcomes are ones most likely to seek loans and be se
10、lectedMoral Hazard:1. After transaction occurs2. Hazard that borrower has incentives to engage in undesirable (immoral) activities making it more likely that wont pay loan backAgency theory analyses how asymmetric information problems affect economic behaviorCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. Al
11、l rights reserved.8-8我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物8.4 Adverse Selection and Financial Structure8.4.1 Lemons Problem in Securities Markets1.If cant distinguish between good and bad securities, willing to pay only average of good and bad securities values.2.Resul
12、t: Good securities undervalued and firms wont issue them; bad securities overvalued, so too many issued.3.Investors wont want to buy bad securities, so market wont function well.Explains Fact 2 and Fact 1.Also explains Fact 6: Less asymmetric information for well known firms, so smaller lemons probl
13、emCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-9我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物8.4.2 Tools to Help Solve Adverse Selection Problem1.Private Production and Sale of InformationFree-rider problem interferes with this solution2.Government Regulation t
14、o Increase InformationExplains Fact 53.Financial IntermediationA. Analogy to solution to lemons problem provided by used-car dealersB. Avoid free-rider problem by making private loansExplains Fact 3 and 4Copyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-10我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽
15、的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物4.Collateral and Net Worth- Collateral, property promised to the lender if the borrower defaults, reduces the consequences of adverse selection because it reduces the lenders losses in the event of a default. Explains Fact 7 -Net worth, the difference between a fir
16、ms assets and its liabilities, can perform a similar role to collateral. “Only the people who dont need money can borrow it!”Copyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-11我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物8.5 Moral Hazard in Equity Contracts Called
17、the Principal-Agent Problem Principal: less information (stockholder) Agent: more information (manager) Separation of ownership and control of the firm Managers pursue personal benefits and power rather than the profitability of the firmCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-12
18、我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物Principal-Agent Problem: Solutions Monitoring: production of information But the monitoring process can be expensive in terms of time and money.And the free-rider problem decreases the amount of information production.2. Government
19、regulation to increase informationExplains Fact 5Government have laws to force firms to adhere to standard accounting principles that make profit verification easier. They also pass laws to impose stiff criminal penalties on people who commit the fraud of hiding and stealing profits.Partly effective
20、.Copyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-13我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物Financial intermediationExplains Fact 3Venture capital firm can helps reduce the moral hazard.Debt contractsMoral hazard arises with an equity contract.For debt contrac
21、ts, only when the firm cannot meet its debt payments, is there a need for the lender to verify the state of the firms profits.Explains Fact 1: Why debt used more than equityCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-14我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个
22、活的生物8.6 Moral Hazard in Debt MarketsMoral hazard: borrower wants to take on too much riskTools to Help Solve Moral HazardNet worth and collateralMake the debt contract incentive-compatible.Monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenantsCovenants to discourage undesirable behavior. Covenants to e
23、ncourage desirable behavior. Covenants to keep collateral valuable Covenants to provide informationCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-15我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物Moral Hazard: Solutions3.Financial intermediationBanks and other inter
24、mediaries have special advantages in monitoringExplains Fact 3,4.Copyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-16我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物Summary Table 1 Asymmetric Information Problems and Tools to Solve ThemCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-We
25、sley. All rights reserved.8-17我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物8.7 Conflicts of Interest Type of moral hazard problem caused by economies of scope (applying one information resource to many different services). Arise when an institution has multiple objectives and,
26、 as a result, has conflicts between those objectives A reduction in the quality of information in financial markets increases asymmetric information problems Financial markets do not channel funds into productive investment opportunitiesCopyright 2010 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.8-18
27、我吓了一跳，蝎子是多么丑恶和恐怖的东西，为什么把它放在这样一个美丽的世界里呢？但是我也感到愉快，证实我的猜测没有错：表里边有一个活的生物Asymmetric Information in Transition and Developing Countries. “Financial repression” created by an institutional environment characterized by: Poor system of property rights (unable to use collateral efficiently) Poor legal system (difficult for lenders to enforce restrictive covenants) Weak accounting standards (less access to good information) Government intervention through directed credit programs and state owned banks (less incentive to proper channel funds to its most productive use).