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1、C O R P O R AT I O NResearch ReportHOWARD J. SHATZDisruption Without Change The Consequences of COVID-19 on the Global Economic BalanceFor more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA1464-1.About RANDThe RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public
2、policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. To learn more about RAND, visit www.rand.org.Research IntegrityOur mission to help improve policy and decisionma
3、king through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publicatio
4、ns to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the
5、 open publication of our research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. For more information, visit www.rand.org/about/principles.RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its res
6、earch clients and sponsors.Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 2022 RAND Corporation is a registered trademark.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN: 978-1-9774-0896-9Cover: Blue Planet Studio/Adobe Stock. Limited Print and Elec
7、tronic Distribution RightsThis publication and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to its webpage on rand.org is e
8、ncouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research products for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.iiiAbout This ReportThe coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has upended
9、 the global economy, resulting in large losses of gross domestic product worldwide. This report reviews the economic track record of the United States and its main com-petitors and allies to discern how the dramatic economic changes induced by the disease could affect geopolitical competition and th
10、e future security environment. The report uses data through August 31, 2021. This research was completed in September 2021, before the February 2022 Russian inva-sion of Ukraine. It has not been subsequently revised.The research reported here was conducted within the Strategy and Doc-trine Program o
11、f RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of fiscal year 2021 con-cept formulation.The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.RAND Project AIR FORCERAND Project
12、 AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the Department of the Air Forces (DAFs) federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses, supporting both the United States Air Force and the United States Space Force. PAF provides the DAF with independent analyses of
13、 policy alternatives affecting the develop-ment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Strat-egy and Doctrine; Force Modernization and Employment; Resource Man-agement; and Workforce, Development, and Hea
14、lth. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000.Additional information about PAF is available on our website: www.rand.org/paf/The draft report, issued on June 14, 2021, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and DAF subject-matter experts. Disruption Without Change: Cons
15、equences of COVID-19 on the Global Economic BalanceivFundingFunding for this research was made possible through the concept formu-lation provision of the Department of the Air ForceRAND Sponsoring Agreement. PAF uses concept formulation funding to support a variety of activities, including research
16、plan development; direct assistance on short-term, decision-focused Department of the Air Force requests; exploratory research; outreach and communications initiatives; and other efforts under-taken in support of the development, execution, management, and report-ing of PAFs approved research agenda
17、.AcknowledgmentsI thank Raphael Cohen of the RAND Corporation for conceiving of and supporting this report and James Dobbins and Krishna Kumar of RAND, as well as Thomas Wright of the Brookings Institution, for thoughtful reviews that greatly improved the reports quality. At RAND, Julienne Ackerman
18、managed the production of this report, Katie Hynes provided expert copy editing, and Sandy Petitjean prepared the figure art. All errors of fact and interpretation remain my responsibility.vSummaryThe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic caused the largest drop in global economic activity si
19、nce World War II and has the potential to disrupt international relations in ways that were still developing as of the conclusion of this research in late summer 2021. As of January 31, 2020, there were fewer than 10,000 confirmed cases worldwide. By August 31, 2021, there were more than 217.71 mill
20、ion confirmed cases and 4.52 million confirmed deaths, according to data tracked by Our World in Data. But by the time the pandemic was well into its second year, an unex-pected pattern had emerged. Although the worlds worst pandemic in a cen-tury might have accelerated previous trends, it had not c
21、hanged much about the international economic order. China was the only major economy to show positive economic growth in 2020 relative to 2019 but reversed neces-sary domestic reforms to do so. The United States was the best-performing advanced Western economy in 2020 but greatly increased its feder
22、al debt. Europe and U.S. treaty allies performed less well. Prepandemic trends per-sisted: Chinas share of the global economy was growing, that of the United States was holding steady, and that of U.S. allies was declining.Approach This report provides a review of economic developments in the United
23、 States; major U.S. competitors China and Russia; and U.S. allies and part-ners, including the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, Australia, and India. It focuses on the global economic balance, or geoeconomic balancethat is, the relative size and influence of national economies in
24、 the global economy. The report also discusses what has come to be known as vaccine diplomacy, or the effort to distribute vac-cines to developing countries, which is exemplary of how the pandemic has affected global competition. It draws on official data releases, reports by international organizat
25、ions, and media reports and uses data released through August 31, 2021. This research was completed in September 2021, Disruption Without Change: Consequences of COVID-19 on the Global Economic Balancevibefore the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has not been sub-sequently revised.Key F
26、indingsEconomic performance extended existing trends and exacerbated exist-ing problems such that the geoeconomic balance had not changed as of late summer 2021. The pandemic also opened up a new field of global competi-tion: vaccine diplomacy. The United States performed better than other major adv
27、anced econo-mies, helped by several major stimulus bills. Continued plans for addi-tional high spending levels have raised concerns about inflation and debt. In addition, the pandemic exacerbated inequality. China was the only major economy to experience positive economic growth in 2020. However, th
28、is came at the cost of a reversal of Chinas economic reform attempts, with debt relative to gross domestic prod-uct (GDP) rising. Russias economy declined less than expected, but the decline was still large. With oil prices rising in 2021, Russias recovery appears to be on track. Among U.S. allies a
29、nd partners, the EU performed poorly in 2020 and then had a further GDP decline in the first quarter of 2021. The UK was the worst-performing major advanced economy. As in most other countries, Japans GDP fell in 2020, and partly because of a COVID-19 resurgence, it fell in the first quarter of 2021
30、. Australia performed rela-tively better than most advanced economies. India had a steep decline in 2020, and although it was thought to have COVID-19 under control in late 2020, the disease surged in the spring of 2021. Leaving the populations of lower-income countries unvaccinated pres-ents a vari
31、ety of risks. Most prominently, new variants could develop, endangering the world. As well, these countries will continue to suffer economically, slowing the global recovery. COVID-19 opened a new field of global competition: distributing vac-cines to low- and middle-income countries to claim credit
32、 for being a responsible provider of global public goods. SummaryviiImplications for Policymakers and Defense PlannersFrom an economic and social standpoint, COVID-19 upended the world, but its effect on the global balance of power has so far proved modest. The success of Operation Warp Speed, the U
33、.S. effort that brought the vaccine to market, could make U.S. policymakers across the political spectrum more open to industrial policy and government intervention in the economy. Although the effort could be viewed as equivalent to a wartime measure in which results were more important than cost a
34、nd perhaps not applicable to normal times, the model could be adapted for the future. Likewise, new fiscal measures by the EU could stabilize growth on the continent and make the euro a larger factor among reserve currencies. The pandemic showed that global competition has wide bounds and now includ
35、es promises to safeguard the worlds health. Vaccine diplo-macy became an ongoing activity, but one for which it is too early yet to conclude which countries will benefit. China continued to grow economically and modernize its armed forces. Russias economy declined, but most of the countrys defense a
36、ctivi-ties have relatively modest cost. Accordingly, at least as of mid-2021, the pandemic did not call for major changes in the U.S. stance toward major competitors. However, the extent to which U.S. allies will increase their contribu-tions to collective defense efforts is a continuing issue heigh
37、tened by lower levels of growth in Europe. And ambitious plans for federal spending and investment in the United States for civilian purposes might mean additional pressure on the U.S. defense budget, although the fiscal year 2022 budget proposal still plans for a small defense spending increase. Th
38、e international response to this global pandemic exposed a gap in U.S. leadership, which is only beginning to be redressed.There are also a variety of risks and uncertainties that could affect the global geoeconomic balance. Among these are the evolution of globaliza-Disruption Without Change: Conse
39、quences of COVID-19 on the Global Economic Balanceviiition; damage to and resilience of international cooperation; and the con-sequences of the pandemic for national cohesion, support for government, and trust in expertise, which has been reduced.ixContentsAbout This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iiiSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vCHAPTER ONEThe COVID-19 Disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1A World Reordered? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41、 . . . . . . .2The Plan for This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3CHAPTER TWOThe Economic Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Annual Gross Domestic Product Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42、. . . . .7Quarterly Gross Domestic Product Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8Continued Uncertainty into 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9CHAPTER THREECOVID-19 and the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43、. . . . . . . . . . . .13The U.S. Economy in 2020 and 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Vaccination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23CHAPTER FOU
44、RCOVID-19 and U.S. Competitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Conclusion . . . . . .
45、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37CHAPTER FIVECOVID-19 and U.S. Allies and Partners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39The United Kingdom and Non-U.S. Members of
46、the Quad: Japan, Australia, and India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47Disruption Without Change: Consequences of COVID-19 on the Global Economic BalancexCHAPTER SIXThe Developing World
47、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49The Developing World in the Geoeconomic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50Consequences of COVID-19 in the Developing World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53CHAPTER SEVENVaccine Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49、 . . . .61Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63Europe, the United Kingdom, and the Quad Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67CHAPTER EIGHTCOVID-19, the
50、 Global Economy, and Global Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69Beyond Growth and the Geoeconomic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70Policy Implications for the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73Abbreviations .